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ABSTRACT
Stochastic Radon Transform Inversion Models for Estimation
by
Neveen Shlayan
Dr. Pushkin Kachroo, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This research scrutinize various attributes of complex networks; mainly, modeling,
sensing, estimation, safety analysis, and control. In this study, formal languages and
finite automata are used for modeling incident management processes. Safety prop-
erties are checked in order to verify the system. This method introduces a systematic
approach to incident management protocols that are governed by mostly unsystem-
atic algorithms. A portion of the used data in this study is collected by means of
radar and loop detectors. A weighted t-statistics methodology is developed in order
to validate these detectors. The detector data is then used to extract travel time in-
formation where travel time reliability is investigated. Classical reliability measures
are examined and compared with the new entropy based reliability measure proposed
in this study. The novel entropy based reliability measure introduces a more consis-
tent measure with the classical definition of travel time reliability than traditional
measures. Furthermore, it measures uncertainty directly using the full distribution of
the examined random variable where previously developed reliability measures only
use first and second moments. Various approaches of measuring network reliability
are also investigated in this study. Finally, feedback linearization control scheme
iii
is developed for a ramp meter that is modeled using Godunov’s conditions at the
boundaries representing a switched system. This study demonstrates the advantages
of implementing a feedback liberalized control scheme with recursive real time pa-
rameter estimation over the commonly practiced velocity based thresholds.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Goal
Most modern systems are becoming increasingly networked such as transportation,
communication, sensor, and power networks. These systems can be described as cyber
physical complex networks since they feature a tight combination and coordination
among physical elements, such as, human factors as well as computational science.
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Figure 1.1: Overall research work
Traditionally, modeling of complex systems has been based either on continuous dy-
namics or on discrete modeling paradigms. However, most real systems have a com-
bination of continuous and discrete dynamics, i.e. they can be viewed as hybrid dy-
namical systems. Hybrid dynamics provide us with solutions to extremely challenging
control problems such as systems with major uncertainty. Therefore, a rigorous study
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of deterministic and stochastic hybrid dynamical systems and networks is necessary
for understanding the dynamics of such systems as well as for proper analysis and
design in order to generate appropriate optimal solutions. Hybrid control provides us
with solutions to extremely challenging control problems such as systems with major
uncertainty, or nonlinear systems where continuous control laws are not applicable.
This research will make original contributions to the very important emerging area
of developing mathematical tools for complex systems and networks. The specific
technique studied will be in the area of deterministic and stochastic dynamic systems
that provides a powerful framework for studying such systems. Applications will
be in sustainable transportation networks. However, many of the developed models
can also be used in other cyber physical systems such as in communication networks
where packet delivery is parallel to traffic in transportation systems as well as power
systems where demand and service must be addressed. It is evident that concepts
such as reliability, controls, safety, as well as data analysis compose a common ground
to such cyber complex highly networked systems.
Interstate 15 (I-15) is one of the most important commute system in the Las Vegas
valley. This cyber physical system is composed of networked physical as well as cyber
elements. The physical elements are composed of traffic flow, human response, and
roadway network; whereas the cyber element is composed of sensor networks, compu-
tational engines, data bases, and actuation. It is highly desired, by various agencies
such as Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) as well as the commuter,
to enhance the performance of this freeway stretch. Performance evaluation can be
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embodied by different notions. One may consider safety as an indication of perfor-
mance, other might consider travel time reliability as a good measure performance,
and similarly, reduced congestion. These are all valid measures of performance, and
there is no one measure that is the correct one. However, one can have a favorite
measure based on the functionality of interest. For instance, travel time reliability is
usually desired in manufacturing. In order to properly evaluate performance, the sys-
tem must be “observable” or at least “detectable” in some sense. The I-15 is featured
with detectors, radars as well as loop detectors, which collect traffic counts as well
as speeds. Additional data is obtained from agencies that collect it such as incident
data. In this research all possible data is obtained in order to have the best evaluation
possible of the transportation system at stake. Hybrid modeling is recognized to be a
suitable modeling strategy of the transportation system, as depicted in Figure 1.1. In
this research, the hybrid dynamics modeling of traffic involves four discrete states cor-
responding to normal operations, an occurrence of an incident, incident management
stage, and incident clearance stage. Formal modeling is used for implementation and
verification of the discrete modeling. In each state the continuous dynamics of traf-
fic flow is running. The continuous traffic flow is modeled macroscopically based on
partial differential equations that normally are used to describe compressible fluids.
The continuous models in each state are very similar in their construction; however,
the parameters used are different in each model and highly depend on the physical
change that is taking place due to nonrecurring events such as incidents. In addi-
tion to addressing certain performance measures, sensing, and modeling, this research
also provides control schemes for the system based on the estimated data from mea-
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surements. Ramp metering is a common actuation methodology that is used in the
I-15. Therefore, this research develops hybrid control strategy for ramp metering and
compares it to currently implemented ramp metering algorithms.
1.2 Contributions
This research scrutinize various attributes of complex networks; mainly, modeling,
sensing, estimation, safety analysis, and control. In this study, formal languages and
finite automata are used for modeling incident management processes. Safety prop-
erties are checked in order to verify the system. This method introduces a systematic
approach to incident management protocols that are governed by mostly unsystem-
atic algorithms. A portion of the used data in this study is collected by means of
radar and loop detectors. A weighted t-statistics methodology is developed in order
to validate these detectors. The detector data is then used to extract travel time in-
formation where travel time reliability is investigated. Classical reliability measures
are examined and compared with the new entropy based reliability measure proposed
in this study. The novel entropy based reliability measure introduces a more consis-
tent measure with the classical definition of travel time reliability than traditional
measures. Furthermore, it measures uncertainty directly using the full distribution of
the examined random variable where previously developed reliability measures only
use first and second moments. Various approaches of measuring network reliability
are also investigated in this study. Finally, feedback linearization control scheme
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is developed for a ramp meter that is modeled using Godunov’s conditions at the
boundaries representing a switched system. This study demonstrates the advantages
of implementing a feedback liberalized control scheme with recursive real time param-
eter estimation over the commonly practiced velocity based thresholds. The specific
contributions of this dissertation work are listed below.
1.2.1 Modeling
• Formal Language Modeling of Incident Management: Formal language
and automata theory is used for modeling, analyzing, and implementing traffic
incident management process.
• Hybrid Modeling of a freeway on-ramp: Godunov based conditions are
used in determining boundary conditions of the hyperbolic PDE used in mod-
eling traffic flow on a freeway section.
1.2.2 Sensing
• Detector Validation: A weighted t- statistics developed in order to compare
a set of uncertain data with another set of uncertain data with various levels of
uncertainty.
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1.2.3 State Estimation
• Hybrid Estimation: Estimation techniques are developed in order to estimate
from the data the time of occurrence of various events such as the time of
incident and the time of incident clearance.
1.2.4 Performance Analysis
• Reliability Theory: Average travel time is a good indicator of the perfor-
mance of a highway segment or a transportation network in general. However,
by itself, it lacks information about the overall performance of the transporta-
tion system. Hence, for proper assessment of the transportation system’s per-
formance, this research develops and uses five different reliability measures for
freeway and arterials in Las Vegas: variability based on normalized standard
deviation, analysis of variance (ANOVA), average time mean estimation, relia-
bility as a measure of non-failures, and information theory.
• Entropy Based Reliability: A novel travel time reliability is developed that
is based on measuring the uncertainty of travel time from data.
• Network Reliability: Max-plus algebra is proposed in order to extend the
reliability measure of a component to network reliability.
• Bayesian Networks: A Bayesian network is a probabilistic model which repre-
sents relationships between uncertain variables and can be used as a framework
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for various applications. This research develops a Bayesian traffic safety an-
alyzer using crash data and other surrogate information to estimate risks at
various locations.
1.2.5 Control
• Hybrid Ramp Control:A hybrid control scheme is developed in order to
maintain a given freeway segment at certain desired conditions.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into the following chapters.
Formal Language Modeling of Incident Management is presented in Chapter 2. Flow
Detectors Validation is in Chapter 3. Classical Reliability is in Chapter4, then
Entropy-based Reliability is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the Min-
Plus Semi-ring Algebraic Structure of Network Reliability. Bayesian Safety Analyzer
is demonstrated in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 presents Hybrid Modeling and Control of
Ramps. Finally the Conclusions are in Chapter 9.
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Part I
Modeling
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CHAPTER 2
Formal Language Modeling of Incident Management
2.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the modeling aspect of nonrecurring events as shown in Figure
2.1. Understanding nonrecurring events is crucial when investigating characteristics of
complex networked systems. The reliability of network is a particular trait of interest
that is directly influenced by such events which will be studied in later chapters.
Furthermore, proper modeling of nonrecurring events is necessary for the system’s
state estimation which leads to implementing the appropriate control methodology.
Figure 2.1: Overall research work
Traffic Incident Management is a multi-jurisdictional process. Complications with
communications, compatibility, coordination, institutional responsibilities, and legal
issues are inherent in the traffic incident management system. Increased delay in in-
cident clearance due to various conflicts has vital economical, safety, environmental,
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and social impacts. Therefore, a thorough and rigorous modeling of the system is nec-
essary to better understand its properties and systematically discern issues that might
arise. This study proposes the use of formal language and automata theory for mod-
eling and analyzing the traffic incident management process. Incident management
is a very practical discipline; however, theoretical modeling and analysis can help in
finding inefficiencies in the system and improving it. Formal language and automata
theory provides the foundation that has been used successfully in numerous hardware
and software developments with applications in digital design, compilers, program-
ming languages, etc. Every agency involved in the incident management process can
be modeled as an individual processing unit that interacts with other units. Formal
language and automata theory provide us with powerful tools for developing, ana-
lyzing, and debugging such models. Creating an incident management model with a
systematic structure permits a methodical identification of the system’s “bugs”. This
study demonstrates the development of models of some first response incident man-
agement agencies through a case study in the Las Vegas area using formal languages
and automata theory. Sequence properties are checked for the developed models.
Glossary for Actions Used in Finite State Process (FSP) Models is presented in Table
2.1.
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Table 2.1: Glossary
Action Translation
alt route Alternative route
anthrtow Another tow
arriveloc Arrive to location
call rc call received
callf Call fire department
congt clrd Congestion cleared (Program 2)
congtn clrd Congestion cleared (Figure 2.3)
congtnotclr Congestion not cleared
driveloc Drive to location
ernotarrv Emergency responders have not arrived
ernotreq Emergency responders are not required
ertaskincmplt Emergency responders task is not complete
eqptavl Equipment available
fbusy Fire department is busy
fmbusy Fire and Medical are busy
freq Fire department is required
mbusy Medical department is busy
mreq Medical required
noeqpt No equipment
rdnt call Redundant call
tow nformed Towing company is informed
townotavl Towing truck not available
trfcjam Traffic jam (Figure 2.7(b))
trfjam Traffic jam (Program 2)
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2.2 Introduction
In traffic flow operations, traffic incidents are non-recurring events that often cause
delay due to congestion and safety hazards. These incidents account for approxi-
mately one third of all delays caused by traffic congestion on U.S. highways and are
responsible for nearly 60% of delays triggered by weather, construction, and special
events [2]. The operating capacity of a typical three-lane freeway segment is reduced
by 63% during a one-lane obstruction and by 77% during a two-lane obstruction [3].
Incidents, such as a disabled passenger car parked on the shoulder of the roadway, re-
duce the available capacity by up to 17% [3]. The impact of traffic incidents stretches
beyond safety degradation and traffic congestion. In addition, Human productivity
loss and fuel waste are definite economical outcomes [4] [5]. In 2005, congestion costs
were estimated to be $78.2 billion in 437 U.S. urban areas where 52 to 58% of the
total motorist delay was due to traffic incidents [3]. The benefits of crash reduction
or crash avoidance can be significant, as illustrated by an evaluation conducted by
the Minnesota Department of Transportation in 2004. This evaluation reported that
68% of the monetary benefits of a traffic incident management program were due to
the reduction in crashes.
When an incident occurs, medical, law enforcement, fire, and other public emergency
agencies are usually among the first to respond. In addition, private agencies, such as
towing companies and hazardous materials contractors, are most likely to be involved
[2]. On one hand, the existence of specialized entities delivers high quality work in
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handling tasks at the incident scene. On the other hand, this also raises challenges
since each of these agencies has different priorities and views [2].
Moreover, every agency has a separate communication system through which dis-
patchers communicate information about the incident to their agents. The indepen-
dence in communication leads to additional delays in the incident clearance process.
Carson, et. al. [6] conducted a comprehensive evaluation of an incident response team
program for the Washington State Department of Transportation, designed to deter-
mine its effectiveness. The study claims a 20.6 minute reduction in average duration
of incidents from 1994 to 1995 resulting in $20,600 to $61,800 savings per incident [6].
This study concluded that an organized traffic incident management process is nec-
essary that promotes integration and bonding of multi agency operations as well as
communications at the incident scene. A well planned incident management system,
using both formal and informal processes, improves efficiency and communications
between the multi-jurisdictional responses, thus reducing incident clearance times
and vehicle delays [4] [5]. However, an attempt to create such coordination faces with
many obstacles that are inherent in the system, such as uncertainty, sudden events,
resource shortage, faulty information, and disruption of infrastructure support [7]. In
addition to support systems, incident management is currently formulated and imple-
mented conventionally, based on manual methods that rely on personal experiences
of the personnel from within the incident management field; which has its shortcom-
ings [8]. The current conventional approach does not allow for conflict detection or
for alternative incident management scenario evaluation due to time constraints [8].
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Furthermore, personal experiences are likely limited or else widely varied, they also
vary among people’s different experiences which may lead to clashes at the incident
scene. This often results in further conflicts and difficulties, thus adversely impacting
the traffic operations.
This study proposes the use of formal languages and automata theory for model-
ing and analyzing the traffic incident management process. Formal languages and
automata theory modeling allows us to perform rigorous debugging on existing and
future incident management systems, covering wide range of possibilities for inefficien-
cies and problems for which we can find solutions. The modeling approach introduced
herein provides the flexibility to evaluate any Incident Management process, depend-
ing on the various variables involved for a certain urban region. Through formal
methods modeling, customized software tools can be developed for a specific region,
significantly enhancing the Incident Management process. In Section 2.3, a litera-
ture review on previous work for Incident Management modeling will be discussed.
Section 2.4, describes the IM process in the Las Vegas area as well as the Incident
Command System (ICS). An overview of the modeling method and approach used
are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents a demonstration on how formal
methods are used to model the IM process by means of a case study. Conclusions are
provided in Section 2.7.
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2.3 Literature Review
Effective traffic incident management systems consist of three main aspects: multia-
gency communications and control, decision making, and sharing of limited resources.
In order for a model to be successful, these three aspects have to be addressed; oth-
erwise, complications in the incident management system may be overlooked. In this
section, some proposed approaches to improve Incident Management processes are
discussed.
Sullivan [9] argues key issues in the document, “Assessing the National Incident Man-
agement System;” in specific communications. In his study, Sullivan evaluates private
and public stakeholders that have key roles in the incident management system on a
national level and also discusses the administrative or technological challenges. How-
ever, Fries [10], examines the effectiveness of specific Incident Management strategies,
such as quick clearance laws. He argues that investing in advertisements regarding
quick clearance laws are beneficial to the Incident Management process [10]. Skabar-
donis [11] also examines the effectiveness of specific Incident Management programs.
Skabardonis compiled before and after data relating to the implementation of Freeway
Service Patrol (FSP) programs. It was found that FSP contributed to the reduction
of the number of accidents; however, no significant effect was found on the incidents
duration [11]. Karlaftis [12] uses regression models and a five- year incident database
in order to identify primary incidents’ characteristics that increase the likelihood of
secondary incidents. Pal [13] analyzes Incident Management data in order to make
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recommendations to improve the Incident Management.
Konduri, et. al. [14] proposes incident prediction models based on analysis of incident
patterns, frequency, and duration and uses them for improving the freeway manage-
ment system by assessing various IM strategies. Scherer [15] proposes a statistical
approach in order to model congestion caused by freeway incidents. Linear regression
has shown evident relationships between incident severity and congestion levels that
can be used in congestion level prediction [15]. Such models would be very useful in
incident management systems; however, methods based on static data are not suffi-
cient to comply with the required short term actions necessary in the most effective
incident management systems [16]. An agent-based approach for monitoring, analyz-
ing, and supporting Incident Management processes by error detection and providing
support for such errors is proposed in [17]. Temporal Trace Language (TTL) was used
as a tool for formal representations of system’s properties. The author’s approach is
adequate; however, the scope of this modeling involves error detection for improving
techniques in current incident management support systems that detect contradic-
tory and unreliable information. This approach does not address broader issues in
incident management, such as the overall interaction and harmony between the in-
volved agencies, limited and shared resources, or liveness properties of the incident
management system as a whole.
Ozbay [18] introduces Rutgers Incident Management System (RIMS) software. RIMS
is an evaluation software that is able to compare different incident management tech-
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nologies and programs as well as strategies [18]. Moreover, RIMS introduces a mod-
eling method that can be used to build software for incident management. Mingwei
in [8] proposes a real-time Evaluation and Decision Support System (REDSS) for
IM that detects traffic incidents, estimates impacts of incidents, formulates guidance
scenarios, and monitors and evaluates scenario implementations. REDSS integrates
a series of information analysis and processing technologies such as data fusion, ex-
pert systems, data warehousing and, data mining [8]. However, REDSS has not yet
been validated. Chen, in [7], recognizes the constraints on responder’s capabilities to
analyze coordination problems due to the requirement of rapidness in decision mak-
ing. Therefore, a life cycle approach is introduced providing a broad and systematic
view of activities relating to emergency response management. Roccetti introduces
an inter-vehicular communication system design is proposed in [19]. This system
provides the ability to quickly discover and transmit real time multimedia informa-
tion from an incident location to the approaching first responders [19]. Kim in [20]
introduces a conceptual model that explains the efficiency of decision-making of the
Critical Incident Management Systems (CIMS) [21].
Researchers have demonstrated numerous attempts in improving the incident man-
agement process [8]; however, in the history of IM, such attempts have been focused
mainly on supporting systems. Such systems are used, in large part, to assist partic-
ipating agency in assigning tasks and making decisions. These systems may or may
not integrate all aspects necessary for a successful incident management modeling
as well as implementation of strategies. A successful IM necessitates a broad and
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integrated response to incidents [22]. The formal languages modeling proposed in
this study forms a suitable environment for validation and debugging of supporting
expert systems, thus increasing efficiency and accuracy of such systems.
After a great deal of calibration, simulation and modeling based tools are very suit-
able for evaluation and comparison purposes. For instance, a paper by Sinha develops
methodology to predict incidents using such models as Poisson and Negative Bino-
mial.etc. Methodology based on the formal language theory does not compete with
these excellent methods. Instead, it provides additional tools to improve the overall
system by concentrating on finding “process bugs”. A regular, discrete, simulation-
based modeling approach serves a different purpose in Incident Management Modeling
than the proposed methods. Hence, since these methods work on different aspects of
the incident management process, their results do not address comparable methodolo-
gies. In this study, an incident management representation is proposed that provides
the ability to account for any desired aspect of the IM process and to integrate the as-
pects into one systematic model. Moreover, this proposed representation can specify
as well as verify properties for the system before implementation. The proposed model
provides the ability to validate and verify existing incident management processes,
including supporting systems. Most importantly, it provides a method to verify the
interaction between such systems as well as between multi-agency processes.
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2.4 The Incident Command System (ICS) and Incident Management in the Las
Vegas Area
According to the Federal Highway Administration’s Simplified Guide to the Incident
Command System for Transportation Professionals (FHW-HOP-06-004, 2006), “The
ICS is a systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordination of an emer-
gency response [23]”. The purpose of the ICS is to improve interagency communi-
cations through common terminology and operating procedures. However, according
to this simplified guide the incident command system (ICS) by the FHWA [23], only
64% of surveyed agencies indicate that an ICS is used on-scene to manage traffic
incidents in their jurisdiction. Until recently, Las Vegas has been one of the fastest
growing cities in the United States. Consequently, highway capacity investment has
not been able to keep pace with the growth in traffic; therefore, major roadways have
experienced substantial congestion during off-peak periods as well as peak periods.
Users cost per hour for a closure on Highway I-15 was recently estimated at $240,000
and can go up to $750,000 during the afternoon peak period. Report produced by
Iteris [24] identified the existing institutional relationships, which include operational
agreements between various agencies for the Las Vegas area. Furthermore, this report
showed the responsibilities of various organizations during an incident management
process. Emergency responders in Las Vegas include, but are not limited to, the fol-
lowing agencies: Department of Safety - Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP), Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), Regional Transportation Commission of
Southern Nevada (RTC), Freeway Arterial Transportation System (FAST), Clark
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County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Clark County Fire
Department (CCFD), and Coroner’s Office.
In the hopes of resolving any conflicts resulting in an improved communications,
enhanced coordination, and an efficient incident management process in the Las Vegas
area, a local traffic incident management (TIM) Coalition has been formed where
various emergency responder agencies meet and discuss regional issues involving traffic
incidents. The Freeway and Arterial System of Transportation, or FAST, operates the
freeway and arterial traffic signal systems. FAST also supports incident management
through traffic control [24]. According to the Incident Management Strategies Draft
Report, incident management is the key motivation for the existence of FAST in Las
Vegas. Specifically, FAST provides data and tools to identify incidents and also assists
with remote monitoring of the incidents.
Las Vegas has witnessed drastic improvements in the incident management process
as a result of FAST efforts in detecting and monitoring incident occurrences and
also a result of TIM’s efforts to resolve any miscommunication issues among local
agencies. However, from analyzing crashes obtained from LVMPD (arterial) and NHP
(freeway), it was found that the average management and clearance times of incidents
need improvement, as presented in Tables 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) and as depicted in Figures
2.2(a) and 2.2(b). Thus, a systematic approach through quantitative modeling is
necessary for revealing inefficiencies of the system and understanding its nature.
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Table 2.2: Average Arrival, Management, and Clearance times for incidents that
occurred on the I15 and arterials in the Las Vegas area
(a) LVMPD data
Year AVG Arrival Time AVG Management AVG Clearance Time
2003 0:18:04 1:05:16 1:23:29
2004 0:22:37 1:11:20 1:33:39
2005 0:25:08 1:10:29 1:35:37
2006 0:25:09 1:13:12 1:38:21
2007 0:21:51 1:13:28 1:34:38
2008 0:19:47 1:43:21 1:46:00
(b) NHP data
Month AVG Arrival Time AVG Management AVG Clearance Time
Jul-08 0:11:30 1:12:04 1:30:01
Aug-08 0:11:10 1:13:22 1:30:27
Sep-08 0:11:06 1:13:18 1:31:35
Oct-08 0:10:53 1:16:39 1:33:47
Nov-08 0:10:43 1:08:20 1:25:59
Dec-08 0:13:21 1:10:58 1:31:33
Jan-09 0:11:22 1:13:12 1:28:49
Feb-09 0:12:12 1:08:40 1:27:29
Mar-09 0:11:42 1:07:50 1:24:54
Apr-09 0:12:38 1:08:42 1:27:07
May-09 0:11:22 1:07:06 1:23:33
Jun-09 0:11:52 1:07:18 1:26:40
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(a) LVMPD data, incidents occurred on arterials
(b) NHP data, Incidents occurred on the I15
Figure 2.2: Average arrival, management, and clearance times for incidents that
occurred in the Las Vegas area
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2.5 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL APPROACH
2.5.1 Basic Definitions
Alphabet,
∑
is a finite nonempty set of symbols.
Letter is an element of the alphabet. Letters are not restricted to single characters.
Word a sequence of symbols a1a2a3 . . . an of length n where ai ∈
∑ ∀ ∈ N .
Empty Word, λ is the word consisting of zero letters or it is the empty string.
Deterministic Finite Automaton is a mathematical model of a machine that
accepts a specific set of words generated using a certain given alphabet
∑
. It can be
considered as finite state control.
Formally, a deterministic finite automaton is defined as follows:
{∑, S, s0, δ, F}
1.
∑
: the input alphabet
2. S : a finite nonempty set of states
3. s0 : the initial state
4. δ : the state transition function, δ : S ×∑→ S
5. F : the set of finite or accepting states.
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2.5.2 Formal Languages and Automata Theory Overview
The purpose of formal languages theory is to bring order to complex system anarchy
[25]. Formal languages are characterized by predefined rules, such as formal notations
in mathematics, logic, and computer science [26, 25]. A finite automaton is a string
processor that assists in defining certain formal languages by accepting or rejecting
a sequence of symbols [25]. Applications that require pattern recognition techniques
have fundamental interest in finite automata [26]. A deterministic finite automaton
consists of a finite number of states or conditions in which a system can exist. Only one
of these states can be an “initial” state. Additionally, such an automaton must contain
at least one or more “terminal” or “accepting” states. Transitioning may be performed
through two different actions, either switching to another state or remaining in the
current state [26]. Execution of state transition depends on the current state and the
action identified by the symbol.
S1S0 S2callfailed
accident call 911
stillcongested
congtn clrd
Figure 2.3: A simple state diagram based model for an incident occurrence
Using finite automata, a simple example of an incident may be modeled in a pictorial
form called a state diagram, as depicted in 2.3. A glossary for Finite State Process
(FSP) actions is introduced before the “Introduction” section in this study. State
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“S0” represents a pre-accident situation which might imply traffic is in a free-flow
state. The symbol “accident” represents an occurrence of an incident that causes
the system to switch to state “S1” implying an incident scene. Once the system is
in state “S1” only two transitions are possible represented by the symbols “call 911”
and “callfailed”; the first symbol which causes the system to switch to state “S2”
implying that the incident is in the management process. The second symbol causes
the system to remain in the same state, implying that no advancements can be made
unless an emergency responder is informed. Once the system reaches the management
state, it can switch states when congestion is cleared (“congtn clrd”) and go back to
free traffic flow in pre accident conditions (state “S0”). Otherwise, it remains in the
management state “S2” ” if congestion is not cleared (“stillcongested”).
The following is the deterministic finite automaton of an incident model:
{∑, S, s0, δ, F}
1.
∑
: accident, call 911, callfailed, stillcongested, congtn clrd.
2. S : S0, S1, S2.
3. s0 : S0.
4. δ :
(a) (S0, accident)→ S1
(b) (S1, callfailed)→ S1
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(c) (S1, call 911)→ S2
(d) (S2, stillcongested)→ S2
(e) (S2, congtn clrd)→ S0
5. F : S0.
2.5.3 Modeling and Simulation Software
Labeled Transition System Analyzer (LTSA) v3.0 and Modeling Software is used to
construct Finite State Processes (FSP) and to perform property checking on devel-
oped models. This is a Java-based open source software. The exact algorithms as
well as executions are given in this study under Programs.
Modeling the evolution of an incident scene by using finite automata is methodically
appropriate in terms of a sequence of events. Furthermore, many transitioning pos-
sibilities can be considered, depending on various conditions, which add flexibility
in modeling any Incident Management system. Every Incident Management process,
however, is an interaction between multiple processes occurring concurrently. Thus,
concurrency is an aspect that must be addressed in the Incident Management model.
Shared actions in Labeled Transition Systems (LTS) Analyzer provide the ability to
model concurrent finite state machine processes. They are described textually as finite
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state processes, and are displayed and analyzed by the LTS analysis tool [27]. The
LTS analysis tool provides the ability to structure complex systems as sets of simple
activities represented as sequential processes using Finite State Processes (FSP) [27].
Processes can overlap or run concurrently, reflecting real-world situations as in the
Incident Management process.
Program 1 An FSP model for an incident occurrence process
PRE_ACCIDENT = (accident->ACCIDENT),
ACCIDENT = (call_911->CLRNSinPROCESS|callfailed->ACCIDENT),
CLRNSinPROCESS = (congtn clrd->PRE ACCIDENT|stillcongested->CLRNSinPROCESS).
Finite state processes (FSP) have a predefined language for their description. Actions
can be de- scribed using the action operator “→ ”. For instance, (x→ P ) describes
a process that initially engages in the action “x” and then behaves as described by
process P [27]. In order to model choice, the choice operator “|” is used, for instance
(x→ P |y → Q) describes a process that may engage in either action “x”, which leads
the system to behave as described by process P, or action “y” leading the system to
behave as described by process Q [27]. Program 1 demonstrates an FSP process
illustrating the incident model described in Figure 2.3.
Concurrency can be modeled by using the parallel operator “||”. For example, (P ||Q)
represents the concurrent execution of the processes P and Q [27]. Parallel processes
have the capability to interact via shared actions which are executed at the same time
by all participant processes [27].
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Program 2 LVMPD model integrating three conccurent processes, Calltaker, Dis-
patch, and Officer
//CALL TAKER PROCESS
CALLTAKER LVMPD = (call 911->MFP QUESTION|nocall 911->CALLTAKER LVMPD),
MFP QUESTION = (medical->MED TRNSFR|fire->FIRE TRNSFR|police->POLICE TRNSFR),
MED TRNSFR = (med busy->MED TRNSFR|trnsfr med->CALLTAKER LVMPD),
FIRE TRNSFR = (fire busy->FIRE TRNSFR|trnsfr fire->CALLTAKER LVMPD),
POLICE TRNSFR = (police busy->POLICE TRNSFR|trnsfr police->CALLTAKER LVMPD).
//DISPATCH PROCESS
DISPATCH LVMPD = (trnsfr police->INFO LVMPD|nocall lvmpd->DISPATCH LVMPD),
INFO LVMPD = (getinfo lvmpd->RDNCHECK LVMPD),
RDNCHECK LVMPD = (rdnlvmpd call->DISPATCH LVMPD|newlvmpd call->ASSN OFFICER),
ASSN OFFICER = (officer order->OTHER ER|officer unavl->ASSN OFFICER),
OTHER ER = (nother er->DISPATCH LVMPD|fm req->CALL FM|m req->CALL M|f req->CALL F),
CALL FM = (fm busy->CALL FM|called fm->DISPATCH LVMPD),
CALL M = (m busy->CALL M|called m->DISPATCH LVMPD),
CALL F = (f busy->CALL F|called f->DISPATCH LVMPD).
POLICE BLOCKEDOPT = (another route->GOtoSCENE|no other route->STUCK LVMPD),
//LVMPD OFFICER MISSION PROCESS
OFFICER LVMPD = (nofficer order->OFFICER LVMPD|officer order->GOtoSCENE),
GOtoSCENE = (officer drive->STREET CON),
STREET CON = (trfjam lvmpd->STREET CON|blocked police->POLICE BLOCKEDOPT|arrive police->
SCENE LVMPD),
SCENE LVMPD = (notneeded er->TOWorNOT|fm needed->GET FM|m needed->GET M|f needed->GET F),
GET FM = (fm busy->GET FM|called fm->TOWorNOT),
GET M = (m busy->GET M|called m->TOWorNOT),
GET F = (f busy->GET F|called f->TOWorNOT),
TOWorNOT = (tow needed->CONTACT TOW|tow notneeded->ER ARRIVAL),
CONTACT TOW = (tow notavl->CONTACT TOW|tow informed->ER ARRIVAL),
ER ARRIVAL = (notaller arrived->ER ARRIVAL|towarrive loc->ERTASK COMPLETION),
//aller arrived=towarrive loc
ERTASK COMPLETION = (towdone goback->TRAFFIC MGT|ertasks notcmplt->ERTASK COMPLETION),
//ertasks cmplt=towdone goback
TRAFFIC MGT = (congtn notclrd->TRAFFIC MGT|congtn clrd->OFFICER LVMPD).
//CONCURRENT PROCESS
||LVMPD = (CALLTAKER LVMPD || DISPATCH LVMPD || OFFICER LVMPD).
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Since FSP provides the ability to model parallel processes as well as their interactions,
the incident model can be expanded to include an emergency response agency where
the occurrence of an incident and the agency’s operation are running in parallel and
have a shared action “call 911”. Program 2 illustrates the model of LVMPD based
on the corresponding agency in Las Vegas.
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S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
call 911 police
fire
medical
nocall 911 police busy fire busy med busy
trnsfr police
trnsfr fire
trnsfr med
Figure 2.4: A state diagram for the call taker process in the LVMPD model
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
S5
S6
S7
trnsfr p getinfo new call offcr order
f req
m req
fm req
nocall p busy
f busy
m busy
fm busy
rdnt call
nother er
called f
called m
called fm
Figure 2.5: A state diagram for the dispatch process in the LVMPD model
30
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12S−1
order drive arrive
freq callf
townotreq
towarrv
towdone
ernotreq
blckd
mreq
fmreq
towreq
noorder trfjam fbusy
ernotarrv
ertaskincmplt
congtnotclr
townotavl
mbusy
fmbusy
congtn clrd
tow nfrmd
called m
called fm
another route
no other route
Figure 2.6: A state diagram for the officer process in the LVMPD model
As demonstrated in Program 2, there exist within LVMPD several processes that are
executed in parallel and interact through shared actions. LVMPD has three main sep-
arate entities that function concurrently: call takers, dispatchers, and officers. When
an accident occurs and 911 is dialed (“call911”), a 911-operator (CALLTAKER) from
LVMPD will answer the call. The operator has three options for transferring the call:
Police, Fire, or Medical. The call will be transferred to the requested agency. Free-
way incidents are under NHP’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the call will be transferred
to NHP if incident location is freeway. If police is requested, LVMPD dispatch will
receive the call, accomplished by the shared action “trnsfr police”, then, LVMPD will
acquire information about the incident; verify redundancy of the call; send an officer
to the scene (which immediately starts the process of the officer through the shared
action “officer order”); contact fire, medical, or both depending on the severity of the
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incident; and then go back to the initial state, indicating that dispatch is available to
accept new calls. As 911-operators and dispatchers are available to receive new calls,
an officer is driving to the incident scene and could be faced with various conditions,
such as traffic congestion, blocked streets, and faulty information about the actual in-
cident severity. These are all examples of possible scenarios that can be considered in
the model. The officer’s task is not accomplished until the system returns to normal
conditions. This acknowledgment is achieved by means of the shared action “congt-
nclrd” between the LVMPD model and the incident model, as described in Figure
2.3. Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 demonstrate the state diagram for the LVMPD model
in Program 2.
Executing the three processes concurrently produces 520 different states, and the il-
lustration of that becomes challenging to express pictorially. Using FSP and LTSA,
properties of states and transitions for the system can be specified and then analyzed.
If a system satisfies a given property, then that property is true for every possible
execution [27].
There are mainly two types of properties that are of fundamental interest: safety
and liveness. Informally, a safety property guarantees that “nothing bad happens”,
whereas a liveness property guarantees that “something good eventually happens”.
Using temporal logic, a canonical safety property can be expressed as 2p, whereas a
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liveness property is of the form 3p [28]. Formally, p is a safety formula if and only if
(iff) any sequence p′ violating p, contains a prefix p′[0..k] all of whose infinite exten-
sions violate p [28]. p is a liveness formula iff any arbitrary finite sequence s0,. . . ,sk
can be extended to an infinite sequence satisfying p [28].
In the LTS analyzer software, liveness property is checked by using the progress prop-
erty, of which liveness is a subclass. A progress property is violated if a terminal set
of states are found that do not contain any of the progress set actions. In other
words, if the officer depicted in Figure 2.6 reaches a state that does not provide
a transition back to the desired state for instance, the action “no other route” is
chosen - then the system is in state “ - 1,” which does not provide an action for
recovery or for reaching “cngstn clrd” action; at that point, the system is not alive
or progress property is not satisfied for “cngstn clrd”. The safety property is verified
by specifying a set of actions that the system must satisfy at all times. This speci-
fication is executed concurrently with the system’s model for analysis. A case study
is presented in Section 2.6, using an existing IM model and analyzed using LTS tools.
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2.6 Case Study
In a meeting held by the local traffic incident management (TIM) team, where rep-
resentatives from various emergency responder agencies had gathered in order to
discuss regional issues involving traffic incidents, a certain incident (a rollover) that
occurred in Las Vegas was the center of discussion. In the rollover, towing services
were needed. Therefore, a private towing company was contacted with some infor-
mation about what kind of equipment was needed and the location of the rollover.
However, the tow truck arrived 30 minutes late. Upon arriving, the wrong vehicle was
towed. At that point, it was discovered that different equipment was required to tow
the vehicle of interest. After that, the officer and the tow company discussed whose
responsibility it was to clean-up the scene. This process delayed the scene clearance
by two hours. Clearly, such complications are a result of decisions that are made in
real time. A systematic way to discover and solve possible disruptions does not exist,
leading to inefficiencies inherent in the present system.
In order to model the Incident Management process in the rollover case, the incident
and LVMPD models presented in Programs 1 and 2 are used. A model describing
the tow company operation is presented in Program 3 takes into consideration the
issues discussed relevant to this specific case.
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Program 3 Tow company model integrating two concurrent processes Dispatch and
Driver
//DISPATCH PROCESS
DISPATCH TOW = (tow informed->INFO|nocall->DISPATCH TOW),
INFO = (get info->RDN CHECK),
RDN CHECK = (rdn call->DISPATCH TOW|new call->GIVE ORDER),
GIVE ORDER = (driver order->DISPATCH TOW|driver unavl->GIVE ORDER).
//TOW MISSION PROCESS
DRIVER TOW = (no order->DRIVER TOW|driver order->GET EQPT),
GET EQPT = (eqpt unavl->GET EQPT|eqpt avl->READYtoDRIVE),
READYtoDRIVE = (drive loc->TRAFFIC SITUATION),
TRAFFIC SITUATION = (traffic jam->TRAFFIC SITUATION|blocked->BLOCKED OPT|towarrive loc->EVAL LOC),
BLOCKED OPT = (alt route-> READYtoDRIVE|no alt route->STUCK),
EVAL LOC = (wrong eqpt->GET EQPT|truck notneeded->RESOURCE WASTE|right eqpt->WAITtoTOW),
RESOURCE WASTE = (drive back->DRIVER TOW),
WAITtoTOW = (waittotow->WAITtoTOW|cantow->CANTOW),
CANTOW = (another tow->CANTOW|towdone goback->DRIVER TOW).
//CONCURRENT PROCESS
||TOW COMPANY = (DISPATCH TOW || DRIVER TOW).
The towing company has two concurrent processes: 1) dispatching which receives calls
and information from customers; and 2) delivering (’driver’) the proper equipment
to the scene. State diagrams for the towing company model are depicted in Figures
2.7(a) and 2.7(b).
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S0 S1 S2 S3
call rc get info new call
nocall driver unavl
rdnt call
driver order
(a) Dispatch process
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
S5
S6
S7
S8S−1
order eqptavl driveloc arriveloc
righteqpt
cantowblocked
trucknotneeded
noorder noeqpt trfcjam
anthrtow
waittotow
alt route
drive back
done goback
wrong eqpt
no alt route
(b) Driver process
Figure 2.7: State diagrams for the tow company model
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The state diagram representation of the towing company, which includes the two
processes “Dispatching” and “Delivering,” becomes too complicated to represent pic-
torially. After the models of the incident scene, LVMPD, and Towing Company are
obtained, they are executed in parallel by the process described by the FSP in Pro-
gram 4.
Program 4 IM process as a concurent execution of three processes tow company,
LVMPD, and Incident scene
||ER MNGMNT = (TOW COMPANY || LVMPD ||PRE ACCIDENT)
Safety and liveness properties for the system are verified. Safety property is verified
by the process illustrated in Program 5, which indicates that at every state, the
system is not going into a situation where the process is blocked. The results of
the safety analysis execution for the complete Incident Management model and the
towing company model are depicted in the simulation results in Program 6.
Program 5 Safety property specification
property ACCIDENT_RESOLVED =(accident->call 911->congtn clrd->ACCIDENT RESOLVED).
||ER MNGMNT = (TOW COMPANY || LVMPD ||PRE ACCIDENT|| ACCIDENT RESOLVED).
Program 6 implies that there exists a trace where the system does not comply with
the safety requirement. Thus, the system is not safe and requires improvement in the
specified trace. In this case study, the system is not safe since the officer can reach
a blocked state that prevents the arrival to the incident scene. Other safety checks
may be specified for the Incident Management system or the individual agencies.
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Program 6 System verification for safety property
Trace to property violation in LVMPD.OFFICER LVMPD:
accident
call 911
police
trnsfr police
getinfo lvmpd
newlvmpd call
officer order
officer drive
blocked police
no other route
Trace to property violation in DRIVER_TOW:
call rc
get info
new call
driver order
eqpt avl
drive loc
blocked
no alt route
Liveness property is specified by the process illustrated in Program 7 which provides
that the system will eventually reach a certain “acceptable” state; the desired action
in this case would be congestion clearance “cngstn clrd.” The analysis results of the
liveness check program execution is demonstrated in Program 8.
Program 7 Liveness property specification
progress LVMPD MISSION ACCOMPLISHED = congtn clrd
Formal Methods modeling allows for two types of property checking safety and live-
ness. After the models were created, the LTSA software was used in order to perform
properties checking. Programs 5 and 7 show the exact command lines for checking
safety and liveness, respectively. Program 6 and 8 show the results after the execu-
tion of the safety and liveness commands. The execution of the safety checking is
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Program 8 System verification for liveness property
Progress Check...
-- States: 14 Transitions: 107 Memory used: 4022K
Finding trace to cycle...
Finding trace in cycle...
Progress violation: LVMPD MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
TOW MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
Trace to terminal set of states:
accident
call 911
police
trnsfr police
getinfo lvmpd
newlvmpd call
officer order
officer drive
blocked police
no other route
Cycle in terminal set:
nocall
Actions in terminal set:
no order, nocall, nocall 911, nocall lvmpd,
notaller arrived, stillcongested
Progress Check in: 62ms
demonstrated in Program 6, where it lists the accepted strings by the given automata
model. However, it reaches the state “no alt route.”This clearly indicates that, at
some point in time, the process could enter an undesired state. Similarly, when live-
ness checking was executed, the software entered the “stillcongested” state, indicating
that complete clearance is not accomplished. Obtaining these results depends greatly
on the user-defined model.
The liveness check indicates that the system will not reach the desired state if it
reaches one of the listed terminal states. The analysis in Program 8 recognizes the
set of terminal states where progress property is violated. It also provides the trace
to terminal states. Therefore, the system is not “alive” and requires improvement
in the indicated actions. Even though the issues in the rollover incident were taken
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into consideration in modeling the IM system, analysis of the model has identified a
trace that leads to the action “no other route.” This action is also recognized to be a
member of the terminal set whose members avert the system’s progression.
Ultimately, every Incident Management process should be live, implying it will always
eventually reach a desired terminal state where the incident is cleared. Ideally, every
Incident Management process should be perfectly safe, signifying that the system is
always safe. Safety can take various forms, according to which specifications are ex-
ecuted. For instance, a certain Incident Management system may be considered safe
if delay does not exceed a certain amount or if only certain routes are allowed.
2.7 Conclusions
This study demonstrated incident management modeling using formal languages and
automata theory. Formal languages methodology provides the ability to perform rig-
orous debugging and analysis through which robustness of the Incident Management
system can be achieved upon implementation. This approach allows analysis to be
conducted of processes concurrently executed processes that have specifications for
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liveness and safety properties specifications. The purpose of this approach is to model
the traffic management processes in various coordinating agencies and then to find
out if undesirable situations, such as “semaphores locking” exist. This method offers
flexibility in modeling various Incident Management systems that account for many
possible existing scenarios. Formal modeling can lead to the development of cus-
tomized systems resulting in a more successful Incident Management process. The
approach studied in this study can be expanded to include a wider range of resources
for every process within the agencies as well as to model additional agencies that
might be involved in the Incident Management process. In addition, this model can
be enhanced to include real-time information within the states representing traffic
conditions or other continuous, random activities. Finally, real-time data and statis-
tics can be incorporated to support predictions and estimations.
Using formal methods, modeling provides practical and accessible techniques that
aid evaluating designs for concurrent software. The incident management process is
composed of a combination of sequential and concurrent events that are performed
by multiple agencies. Therefore, it is inevitable that incident management software
must feature high level of concurrency in its design. Formal methods are found to
be very suitable and natural for incident management modeling, from which incident
management software can be developed. Using formal methods modeling and its
associated features, such as concurrency and property checking, can provide flexible
and appropriate tools for software design, leading to enhancement in communica-
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tions, response, and management. From a practical point of view, formal methods
modeling as well as associated software are used in order to ensure that the incident
management process is well defined. The user - and in this case, the user can be
any of the responder agencies, the Department of Transportation, or any party that
has an active role in managing incidents - takes an active role in determining the
structure of the model and defining the desired safety and liveness properties.
Formal methods based approach is particularly useful for complex systems where
high levels of hierarchy and concurrency are required. Complex models can be built
based on modular structure. The software allows modular interaction through event
sharing. This method is also useful when quantification of qualitative procedures is
needed. For instance, the various Incident Management systems across the nation are
evaluated based on the Incident Command. However, the Incident Command system
stands as a document that is described qualitatively. This introduces challenges in
achieving a common means of evaluation as well as a common structure among the
different IM systems.
This modeling scheme will help us understanding nonrecurring events for investigating
characteristics of complex networked systems. The reliability of network is a partic-
ular trait of interest that is directly influenced by such events which will be studied
in later chapters. Furthermore, proper modeling of nonrecurring events is necessary
for the system’s state estimation which leads to implementing the appropriate control
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methodology.
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Part II
Validation and Estimation
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CHAPTER 3
Flow Detectors Validation
3.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the detector validation aspect of complex networks as shown
in Figure 3.1. In this chapter, we examine the detectors that were used in order
to collect most of the data on the roadway network treated in this research. The
detectors’ counts are compared with manual video counts. T-statistics was used since
both sets of data are experimental and the actual mean is not available. A weighted
statistical approach is developed in order to give more weight to data obtained from
clear videos. Additional statistical processing is performed in order to remove the
bias of the video ratings since they are assigned by different people.
Figure 3.1: Overall research work
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3.2 Introduction
According to the FAST/NDOT inter-local agreement for the freeway management
system (FMS) scope of service, traffic volumes from Freeway Flow Detectors (FDD)
need to be compared and verified. The total lane-by-lane traffic counts need to be
verified to assure that the FDD is properly aligned and calibrated. This Scope of work
outlines tasks for the implementation of traffic count verification for the freeway flow
detectors on segments of I-15, US-95 and CC 215. FAST provided traffic counts and
corresponding videos of traffic flow extracted from the FMS database and freeway
surveillance videos of the same time periods and locations to be verified. UNLV TRC
verified the traffic counts (lane-by-lane) from the videos. Data analysis was applied
to the traffic counts and verification, and this study was generated to document the
verification results.
This study provides methods for analysis and hypothesis testing for paired data where
one source of data has to be tested against another source for validation, which has
varied levels of reliability. In this work, traffic counts for some highway locations
obtained from flow detectors had to be validated against the data obtained by manual
counting of video data obtained from those sites. However, the video data had various
levels of clarity that was recorded by the human observers, and hence a technique
that performed validation with such recorded data with variable accuracy was needed.
This method was developed in the project.
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3.2.1 Tasks Performed
1. Data acquisition:
(a) Data from 146 detectors was provided.
(b) Videos that correspond to the same time frame of the given detector data
were provided
(c) The GIS information on FAST detectors was provided in a kml file in the
Google earth format.
2. Manual video counting for the validation process:
(a) Adobe Premier Pro was used to edit the videos to fifteen minute time
frames that correspond to the provided data.
(b) Adobe Photoshop was used to draw a line on a still frame from the video
which was used as a reference point for counting each lane.
(c) Multiple lane data were extracted simultaneously by assigning one student
to each.
(d) A difficulty rating for each lane with 0 being the easiest and 10 being the
hardest was recorded.
(e) One highly rated video was chosen and recounted by students multiple
times in order to determine the accuracy of the manual counting method
used.
3. Data Analysis:
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(a) Analysis was performed on the percent differences between the detector
and manually counted video data.
(b) A method for identifying possibly faulty detectors was developed and ex-
ecuted.
(c) A method for using video quality ratings was developed for analysis.
(d) This new method was used to perform data analysis.
4. Recommendations based on the work performed were developed
3.2.2 Software Tools
• Adobe Premier Pro
• Adobe Photoshop
• Microsoft Excel
• R - statistical software
3.3 Background
According to the FAST/NDOT inter-local agreement for the freeway management
system (FMS) Scope of Service, traffic volumes from freeway flow detectors (FDD)
need to be compared and verified. The total lane-by-lane traffic counts need to be
verified to assure that the FFD is properly aligned and calibrated.
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3.3.1 Project Description
The scope of work performed at the Transportation Research Center (TRC) at UNLV
for the implementation of traffic count verification for the freeway flow detectors on
segments of I-15, US-95 and CC 215 involved the following main steps:
1. Obtaining the list of detectors and their location
2. Obtaining the data from the detectors and the corresponding video data for
comparison of volume data obtained at 15 minutes interval for the various lanes
3. Performing manual count of volume data
4. Performing statistical analysis of the flow detector data and the manual counts
3.3.2 Methodology
FAST/NDOT provided videos of traffic flow recorded at the sensors verified. Adobe
Premier Pro was used to edit the videos to fifteen minute time frames that correspond
to the provided data. Adobe Photoshop was used to draw a line on a still frame from
the video. The line would depict the cross section of the freeway where the sensor
would be counting cars. During the manual counts, one student was assigned to one
lane, so that multiple lane data could be extracted simultaneously. Due to vehicles
switching lanes and other factors that made counting difficult, the overlayed line was
used as a reference point for counting each lane.
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After each viewing, the counts were recorded in a table next to the sensor counts. A
difficulty rating for each lane with 0 being the easiest and 10 being the hardest, was
also recorded. Factors including but not limited to large numbers of vehicles changing
lanes, camera angles that were difficult to view, and clarity of picture in the video
were the basis for the difficulty ratings. If there were any particular problems with a
certain video, a note of it was included with the data.
Moreover, in order to determine the level of accuracy of student counts, a video with
a high rating indicating that it was hard to view for counting was chosen. Students
were asked to count the same video multiple times so that different students would
take turns counting the data on different lanes. The data was recorded in an Excel
spreadsheet, and then compiled in another spreadsheet for further analysis.
3.3.3 Description of the Data
The GIS information on FAST detectors was provided in a kml file in the google earth
format. The graphical display of the detectors on google earth is shown in Figure 3.2.
3.3.3.1 Freeway Flow Detector (FFD) Raw Data
The data values that we used for analysis are defined as follows:
• DateTimeStamp - This is the date and time when each new segment of data
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Figure 3.2: Detector Locations in KML
was recorded. Detectors record their data at 15 minute intervals, and this value
specifies the interval in question.
• RoadwayID, SegmentID, and DeviceID - These are all specifications indicating
which detector was used.
• Lane - This indicates which lane is counted by the detector. Lane 1 is farthest
from the detector, and higher number lanes are closer.
• Volume - This is the total number of vehicles that the detector counted during
the time interval.
• Volume1, Volume2, Volume3, Volume4, Volume5, and Volume6 are vehicle
counts based on different lengths of vehicles and all add up to the total number
51
of vehicles shown in the Volume field.
• Occupancy, Speed, Poll Count, Failure, RoadType, Location, and
Polling Period were not used for analysis and can be disregarded for this study.
NOTE: Because they are not necessary for the analysis and to save space, the Vol-
ume1, Volume2, Volume3, Volume4, Volume5, Volume6, Occupancy, Speed, Poll Count,
Failure, RoadType, Location, and Polling Period values are not included in this study.
3.3.3.2 Verification Data
The following values were used in verification:
• DateTimeStamp - This is the same as the DateTimeStamp above and specifies
the interval in question.
• RoadwayID, SegmentID, and DeviceID - These are the same as above and
specify which detector was used.
• Lane - This is the same as above and indicates which lane the data corresponds
to.
• Detector Volume - This is the same value as the Volume value above and rep-
resents the total number of vehicles counted by the detector.
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• Counted Volume - This is the total number of vehicles counted in the manual
count for the specified lane.
• Lane Rating - This is a difficulty rating recorded for statistical purposes. It
indicates how hard it was to do a manual count of the specified lane. The
rating is from 0 to 10 with 0 being the easiest and 10 being the most difficult.
Factors that affect the rating include camera angle, distance of the camera to
the detector, vehicles changing lanes, shaky cameras, unclear images, etc.
3.4 Problem Statement for Data Analysis
Data from 146 detectors was provided. Each device detects a range of 1 to 5 lanes.
Videos that correspond to the same time frame of the given detector data were also
provided. The time interval was 15 minutes for every detector. Manual counting was
performed for every lane where results were compared to given detector counts. It
was noted that video quality was not consistent for each detector or even for every
lane; therefore, the level of difficulty ranging from 0 to 10 was given to every lane.
An screenshot of a video from which the vehicle count was manually obtained is shown
in Figure 3.3(a). The location of the corresponding flow detector on Google Map is
shown in Figure 3.3(b).
We use the variable diji as the detector counts for the detector Di. Here, we have
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(a) Video for Traffic (b) Location of the Flow Detector
Figure 3.3: Traffic Video and Flow Detector Location
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nd}, where Nd = 146 which is the total number of detectors; ji ∈
{1, 2, · · · , Ni}, where Ni is the number of lanes for detector Di. For our data, we
have, Ni ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}. Corresponding to each diji , we have viji , which is the
manual vehicle counts from the video camera Ci corresponding to the detector Di
for lane Lji . We, similarly also have scores wiji given by the human observer for the
difficulty level associated with obtaining the vehicle counts viji .
Now, let us denote the total number of comparisons by N . We have for the N the
formula given by Equation 3.1.
N =
Nd∑
i=1
Ni (3.1)
We list each detector data in a single vector whose elements are given by xi, i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}; similarly the manual video data is given by yi, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, and
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the corresponding rating of difficulty of video measurements by ri, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
3.5 Literature Review
In this work, traffic volume readings were manually verified from videos where a rating
is associated with each video based on difficulty in viewing and human errors. Since
the problem statement in this study is very specific to validation with data that has
varying reliability, relevant literature that was found was very limited and did not
directly target the specific methods used in this research. However, various papers on
general detector verification projects were studied. In general, when two sets of data
are compared where the population’s standard deviation is unknown, paired student
t-test is used. However, in this work every data point has a unique distribution
that is different than the other data points due to the variable error involved in
each. Previous studies have not typically targeted the described statistical problem.
However, a number of papers were collected in order to assist in developing the theory
for the specific goal of this project.
In Kang’s paper [29] an anisotropic magneto-resistive (AMR) sensor was tested by
measuring traffic volumes on the highway with the detector and comparing with the
exact traffic volumes in a highly congested traffic. It was found that performance of
this sensor highly depends on the rate at which vehicles are flowing. Verification done
in this study did not well define “exact traffic volumes”. Even though defining it is
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not the main scope of Kang’s paper, statistical analysis must take error possibilities
under consideration for accuracy and reliability of results.
Interestingly, Chen’s paper [30] presented an L∞ norm Path flow estimator (PFE)
model in order to handle inconsistencies of traffic counts and the systematic bias
of the total demand estimate encountered in the PFE model. This technique was
shown to be capable of determining the maximal absolute error needed to define the
set of inequality constraints, traffic counts and capacities, while estimating the path
flows. This research work even though not directly related to the scope of this paper,
however it provides a very interesting approach for handling errors in counts.
In Fathy’s research work [31], traffic movements at junctions were measures using
image processing techniques. The results of the operations of the proposed algorithms
show an error rate of 9.5%. For the purpose of this study, 9.5% error rate is not
acceptable. Error rates in that same range are always associated with any available
commercial or open source software specially that quality of video differs based on
view angle and position of the camera in relation with the detector. Therefore, manual
vehicle counts had to be done for this research project.
In Zhuang’s work on statistical methods to estimate vehicle count using traffic cameras
[32], two methods were developed for constructing traffic models, one using statistical
machine learning based on Gaussian models and the other using analytical derivation
from the origin-destination (OD) matrix. It was found that Gaussian-based statis-
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tical learning method outperforms correlation coefficient based method. Simulations
showed that it reduces the average estimation error by up to 72%. Variance estima-
tion can also be provided. This method is particularly useful for roads with more
dynamic and uncertain traffic. When training data is missing, Given that traffic is
somewhat stable, then the developed OD matrix based method is superior to the
statistical learning methods.
Zimmerman [33] has focused in his study on type 1 error probability of the Student
t test which arises by unequal variances combined with unequal sample sizes. The
Welch student t test is known to eliminate these effects. Zimmerman found condi-
tional probabilities of rejecting the null hypothesis, for both significance tests, given
various conditions on the sample variances implying that inspection of sample data
alone cannot protect the significance level and power of the t test.
3.6 Data Analysis
In this section, we present the descriptive and inferential statistics based on the
detector data, the manual video data, and the corresponding ratings. We also analyze
the data obtained from the repeated manual video counting of a single site, to extract
a model for the relationship between the ratings and the distribution of the errors.
We use the open-source statistical package R for the descriptive and inferential data
analysis.
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3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
First the data was put in a table, a sample of which is shown in Figure 3.4. The three
variables, x, y, and r, in this table in Figure 3.4 are given below. Additionally, three
more derived variables, PDx, PDy, and PD, are also presented, that created in the
subsequent R-code.
x y r PDx PDy PD
122 144 3
116 118 2
71 81 2
277 179 7
Figure 3.4: Basic Data for Analysis
x: Detector data
y: Counted data
r: Rating of the video quality
PDx: 100(x− y)/x
PDy: 100(x− y)/y
PD: if r ≥ 5 then PDx else PDy
Listing 1 shows the code that allows to transfer data to the R software and presents the
basic summary.
This listing indicates that the summary statistics for X and Y are close to each other. This
is indicated by the fact, e.g. that the mean for X is 275 and for Y is 270.7. Similarly,
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Listing 1 Summary Statistics
> inputdata<-read.table(file = "clipboard")
> x <- inputdata$V1
> y <- inputdata$V2
> r <- inputdata$V3
> PDx <- 100*(x-y)/x
> PDy <- 100*(x-y)/y
> for (i in 1:length(r))
+ if (r[i] < 5) PD[i] <= PDy[i] else PD[i] <= PDx[i]
> summary(inputdata)
V1 V2 V3
Min. : 22.0 Min. : 21.0 Min. : 0.000
1st Qu.:196.0 1st Qu.:200.0 1st Qu.: 1.000
Median :286.0 Median :280.0 Median : 2.000
Mean :277.6 Mean :274.0 Mean : 2.411
3rd Qu.:355.0 3rd Qu.:345.0 3rd Qu.: 3.000
Max. :946.0 Max. :973.0 Max. :10.000
the values of the order statistics are close, such as for the first, second(median), and third
quartiles. However, as the summary of the statistics for the difference of x and y indicates
that although their distributions have similar statistics, the percent difference shows more
variation. We define the percent difference to be PDx = 100(x − y)/x. The statistics for
the percent difference are shown in Listing 2
Listing 2 Summary Statistics for the Difference
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-1067.000 -4.822 0.495 -3.187 6.351 82.070
This analysis shows us clearly that there are some outliers in the data based on the extreme
values of the minimum and the maximum. To identify these outliers, we present some more
plots. First, we present the boxplots and violin plots for the raw x and y data. These are
shown in Figure 3.5.
The box plots show many outliers for x and y data. The violin plots show the order
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Figure 3.5: Box and Violin Plots for X and Y
statistical information and dispersion of these variables on the same plot. The same plots
for the percent difference is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Box and Violin Plots for Percent Difference
Figure 3.6 shows that there are some outliers in the data. The analysis of the outliers can
help in identifying faulty flow detectors.
Figure 3.7 shows the histogram plot for the percentage difference, PDx = 100(x − y)/x
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between the volume data and the manual video count values, and its density plot.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram and Density Plots for Percent Difference
3.6.2 Analysis of the Conditionally Normalized Percent Difference Data
The code for plotting PD data is shown in Listing 3. The plot itself of the PD data is
shown in Figure 3.8.
Listing 3 R-code for PD Plotting
hist(PD, freq = FALSE, ylim = c(0, 0.06))
lines(density(PD))
rug(PD, side=1)
The reason for the formula for the PD variables is as follows. We need to find the percent
difference between the two data, where the percentage is taken over the better estimate
out of the two counts (one from the video and one from the detector). Hence we choose to
normalize PD with respect to x if the video is not clear, i.e. r ≥ 5, and with respect to y
if the video is clear, i.e. r < 5. The summary of the PD data is shown in Listing 4.
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Figure 3.8: Basic Data for Analysis
Listing 4 Summary of PD Data
summary(PD)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-250.0000 -4.4150 0.4717 -0.3376 5.5650 39.2400
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Now, 95% of the sample data is between −23.11984% and 20.64176%. This is obtained
using the R-code shown in Listing 5.
Listing 5 Summary of PD Data
> quantile(PD, probs=.025)
2.5%
-23.11984
> quantile(PD, probs=.975)
97.5%
20.64176
3.6.2.1 Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals for the Mean
We hypothesize that the PD data is coming from a population of zero mean. This is our
null hypothesis. This indicates that the percentage error in the detectors is unbiased, and
that essentially the detectors and the video data are compatible.
Null Hypothesis:
Mean value of the percent difference between the FAST detector flow rates and the video
counted rates is zero.
To perform the hypothesis testing, we will use the t-test. The assumptions and the basic
implementation of paired t-test are available from any textbook on statistics, such as [34].
We present the very basics here.
Given two independent random variables X and Y , where X has a normal distribution with
0 mean 1 variance, and Y has a chi-square distribution with n degrees of freedom, then the
random variable T given by 3.2 has a t-distribution.
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T =
X
Y/
√
n
(3.2)
For the data that we have, we use PD for the X variable here, and σ for the Y variable,
and we get the t-statistic as given by
t =
PD
σ/
√
N
(3.3)
Here, we have for sample mean
PD =
∑N
i=1 PDi
N
(3.4)
and for sample variance
σ =
∑N
i=1(PDi − PD)2
N − 1 (3.5)
The application of the t-test to the PD data gives the result shown in Listing 6. The result
shows a p-value of 0.6595 which clearly shows that the null hypothesis can not be rejected.
Hence, we accept the null hypothesis, which means that we claim that the flow detector
data has been validated by the video counted data.
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Listing 6 T-test of PD Data
> t.test(PD)
One Sample t-test
data: PD
t = -0.4408, df = 486, p-value = 0.6595
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-1.842502 1.167272
sample estimates:
mean of x
-0.3376151
The confidence interval, at the confidence level, γ for the population mean, µ is given by
Equation 3.6.
PD − cσ√
n
≤ µ ≤ PD + cσ√
n
(3.6)
The value of c is obtained based on the level of confidence γ. For instance, for 95% confidence
level, the value for c is 1.96. Listing 6 gives the 95% confidence interval for the population
mean as (−1.842502, 1.167272).
3.6.2.2 Confidence Interval for the Variance
In this subsection, we will estimate the confidence interval for the variance of the percent
error that we expect from the population. This will indicate to us what performance can
be expected from flow detectors of the type that were tested.
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The steps to determine the confidence interval for the variance of the population are as
follows (see [34], page 185 for details).
First Step
Choose a confidence level γ.
Second Step
Using the chi-squared distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom, solve for c1 and c2
from F (c1) = (1− γ)/2, F (c2) = (1 + γ)/2.
Third Step
Compute (n− 1)s2 where s2 is the sample variance.
Fourth Step
Compute k1 = (n− 1)s2/c1 and k2 = (n− 1)s2/c2.
Fifth Step
Compute confidence interval for the variance as k2 ≤ σ2 ≤ k2.
These steps applied to the analysis of the PD data produce the following.
First Step
γ = 0.95.
Second Step
We get F (c1) = (1− 0.95)/2 = 0.025, and F (c2) = (1 + 0.95)/2 = 0.975
For F (c1) = 0.025, c1 = (h − 1.96)2/2, where h =
√
2m− 1, m being the number of
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degrees of freedom, i.e. m = n−1. For our data, n = 487, which gives c1 = 426.3455.
Similarly, for F (c2) = 0.975, c2 = (h+ 1.96)
2/2, which gives c2 = 548.4961.
Third Step
Variance of the PD data is 285.6768. Hence, (n− 1)s2 = 138838.9.
Fourth Step
Now, k1 = (n− 1)s2/c1 = 325.6488 and k2 = (n− 1)s2/c2 = 253.1265.
Fifth Step
Hence, the confidence interval for the variance is 253.1265 ≤ σ2 ≤ 325.6488. This
implies that the confidence interval for the standard deviation is (15.90995, 18.04574).
3.6.2.3 Normalized Plot of Percent Errors and Analysis
Based on the sample mean and the sample variance, we can create a normal curve to show
the approximate performance in terms of the percent difference for the flow detectors. The
code for this plot is shown in Listing 7, and the corresponding plot is shown in Figure 3.9.
Listing 7 Code for Normal Curve for PD Data
> mean <- mean(PD)
> sd <- sd(PD)
> x <- seq(-4,4,length=100)*sd + mean
> hx <- dnorm(x,mean,sd)
> plot(x, hx, type="l", xlab="PD", ylab="Density",main="Percent Error Plot")
We can use this plot for some basic approximate analysis. For instance, if we want to find
out what percentage we get errors between the values of (−5%,+5%), we use the pnorm
function in R, and obtain the answer of 21.73%. Similarly, for errors between the values of
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Figure 3.9: Normal Plot for Percent Errors
(−10%,+10%), we get 43.25%, and for errors between the values of (−15%,+15%), we get
61.43%. The R-code for this analysis and the corresponding results are shown in Listing 8.
Listing 8 Code for Analysis of PD Data
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-5,mean,sd))
[1] 0.2173356
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-10,mean,sd))
[1] 0.4324558
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-15,mean,sd))
[1] 0.6143293
3.6.3 Methodology for using Ratings for Statistical Analysis
In order to develop the methodology for using the ratings data for statistical analysis, we
use the ratings given by people who were performing the manual counts to a fixed video,
when the counting was performed multiple times on the same video. The ratings for the
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five lanes of the video given by multiple raters is presented in Table 3.1.
Lane1 r Lane2 r Lane3 r Lane4 r Lane5 r
15.33 7 27.02 6 -4.57 3 -8.65 3 7.53 1
16.02 6 8.78 7 1.02 2 -5.48 3 2.08 4
12.36 7 9.70 4 7.61 6 -7.78 3 8.05 4
15.56 4 13.86 8 -1.52 6 -3.75 3 7.79 5
27.46 7 10.16 7 -1.52 2 -2.59 3 11.69 5
10.30 6 5.54 6 5.08 4 -7.78 4 6.75 4
15.10 6 10.16 7 -1.52 0 -0.58 1 4.42 1
Table 3.1: Ratings of the Video
The columns of the Table 3.1 show the percentage difference with respect to X compared
with the ratings for each lane of the video. For each lane, we obtain the mean rating as well
as the variance of the percentages for that lane. These values are presented in Table 3.2.
Mean Rating 6.14 6.42 3.29 2.86 3.43
Variance Percent Diffference 29.75 48.83 18.20 9.25 9.14
Table 3.2: Variance of the Percentage Difference in Counts vs Average Rating
The data in Table 3.2 is curve fitted using three curves, linear, power curve, and a log-linear
curve. The plot of the data and the three curves is shown in Figure 3.10.
The analysis of this data for curve fitting is presented in the following code. The data for
the mean ratings is stored in variable rm, and the variance of the percent differences in
rxv, as seen in Listing 9.
Listing 9 Variables for Mean rating and Variance
> rm
[1] 6.14 6.42 3.29 2.86 3.43
> rxv
[1] 29.75 48.83 18.20 9.25 9.14
The data is stored in a data frame as shown in Listing 10.
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Figure 3.10: Plot of Variance in Percent Difference to Mean Rating
Listing 10 Data frame for the Variables
> ds <- data.frame(x = rm, y = rxv)
> str(ds)
’data.frame’: 5 obs. of 2 variables:
$ x: num 6.14 6.42 3.29 2.86 3.43
$ y: num 29.75 48.83 18.2 9.25 9.14
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The code and interaction for linear regression model with zero intercept (so as not to have
non-positive variance) is given in Listing 11.
Listing 11 Linear Regression
> rfit <- lm(rxv ~ rm + 0)
> abline(rfit)
> summary(rfit)
Call:
lm(formula = rxv ~ rm + 0)
Residuals:
1 2 3 4 5
-4.6118 12.9012 -0.2121 -6.7556 -10.0556
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
rm 5.5964 0.8732 6.409 0.00304 **
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.145 on 4 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.9113, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8891
F-statistic: 41.08 on 1 and 4 DF, p-value: 0.003045
The code and interaction for the power regression model is given in Listing 12. The code
and interaction for the log-linear regression model is given in Listing 13.
The log-linear fit gives the best performance. Hence, we will use it for statistical inference.
The formula for variance in terms of the rating score therefore, is given by Equation 3.7.
s(r) = e1.13+0.41r (3.7)
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Listing 12 Power Regression
> m.2 <- nls(y ~ rhs(x,intercept, power), data = ds, start = list(intercept = 1,
+ power = 2),trace = T)
183.6028 : 1 2
180.8829 : 1.159547 1.916102
178.7074 : 1.355049 1.833367
178.1608 : 1.376444 1.831493
178.1608 : 1.376735 1.831399
> summary(m.2)
Formula: y ~ rhs(x, intercept, power)
Parameters:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
intercept 1.3767 1.4787 0.931 0.4205
power 1.8314 0.6047 3.029 0.0564 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 7.706 on 3 degrees of freedom
Number of iterations to convergence: 4
Achieved convergence tolerance: 5.62e-06
> plot(rm,rxv)
> lines(s, predict(m.2, list(x = s)), lty = 1, col = "blue")
Listing 13 Loglinear Regression
> m.e <- nls(y ~ I(exp(1)^(a + b * x)), data = ds, start = list(a = 0,
+ b = 1), trace = T)
508654.9 : 0 1
61724.38 : -0.5294191 0.9373290
6359.583 : -0.4243993 0.7921467
542.5241 : 0.4408596 0.5634763
165.3981 : 1.0201739 0.4315203
159.0372 : 1.1207667 0.4090216
159.0220 : 1.1312375 0.4071317
159.0220 : 1.1320508 0.4069949
159.0220 : 1.1321105 0.4069849
> summary(m.e)
Formula: y ~ I(exp(1)^(a + b * x))
Parameters:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
a 1.1321 0.7566 1.496 0.2315
b 0.4070 0.1253 3.248 0.0475 *
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 7.281 on 3 degrees of freedom
Number of iterations to convergence: 8
Achieved convergence tolerance: 3.461e-06
> lines(s, predict(m.e, list(x = s)), lty = 1, col = "red")
> title(xlab="mean rating")
> plot(rm,rxv, xlab="Mean Rating",ylab="Variance of Percentage Difference")
> lines(s, predict(m.e, list(x = s)), lty = 1, col = "red")
> lines(s, predict(m.2, list(x = s)), lty = 1, col = "blue")
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3.7 Identification of Potentially Faulty Detectors
The correlation between the flow detector values and the manually counted values is very
high. The plot shown in Figure 3.11 shows the linear relationship between the data and
also the regression line obtained from the data.
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Figure 3.11: Plot showing Linear Relationship
A call to the linear regression function in R produces the result shown in Listing 14.
The regression result shows strong linear relationship with the intercept 0.90974. The values
of Pearson, Spearman, and Kendall rank coefficients are given in Table 3.3.
Using the ecdf()() function in R on the percent difference data, we find that 90% of the values
are within ±21% difference. We use this percentage as the threshold for designing a decision
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Listing 14 Regression Analysis Result
> fit <- lm(Y ~ X)
> summary(fit)
Call:
lm(formula = Y ~ X)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-232.4050 -15.5883 -0.8347 17.0857 160.7384
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 20.57962 3.92018 5.25 2.2e-07 ***
X 0.90974 0.01302 69.87 < 2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 37.07 on 537 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.9009, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9007
F-statistic: 4882 on 1 and 537 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Coefficient Name value
Pearson Coefficient 0.95
Spearman Coefficient 0.94
Kendall Coefficient 0.81
Table 3.3: Correlation Coefficients
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system to identify faulty detectors. We use percentage of X and also of Y and identify all
the detectors whose errors from either percentage is greater than 21%. Table shown in
Figure 3.12 shows some data that is analyzed to identify potentially faulty detectors.
x y r PDx RoadID SegID Lane DevID Sign Diff Pdy
122 144 3 !18.03 23 1 1 8 !1 !15.28
116 118 2 !1.72 23 2 1 8 !1 !1.69
71 81 2 !14.08 39 2 1 8 !1 !12.35
277 179 7 35.38 39 2 2 8 1 54.75
132 258 8 !95.45 39 2 3 8 !1 !48.84
43 147 9 !241.86 56 2 1 13 !1 !70.75
146 215 9 !47.26 56 2 2 13 !1 !32.09
230 300 9 !30.43 56 2 3 13 !1 !23.33
319 328 9 !2.82 56 2 4 13 !1 !2.74
439 366 9 16.63 49 2 1 12 1 19.95
340 378 9 !11.18 49 2 2 12 !1 !10.05
340 303 9 10.88 49 2 3 12 1 12.21
286 135 9 52.80 49 2 1E 12 1 111.85
372 270 9 27.42 49 2 2E 12 1 37.78
328 343 3 !4.57 49 3 1 15 !1 !4.37
400 368 3 8.00 49 3 2 15 1 8.70
367 353 3 3.81 49 3 3 15 1 3.97
Figure 3.12: Sample Data Table
The columns of the data in Figure 3.12 are given in Table 3.4.
x Flow detector data
y Manually Counted Video data
r Rating
PDx Percent Difference 100(X − Y )/X
RoadID Road identification number
SegID Road segment identification number
Lane Lane number
DevID Flow detector identification number
SignDiff (X − Y )/|X − Y |
PDy Percent Difference 100(X − Y )/Y
Table 3.4: Variables in the Data
The algorithm to find out if a given detector is possibly faulty is as follows. For any detector
which has any instance where condition 3.8 is true, we apply the the test given in Equation
3.10. We take the percentage threshold to be denoted by pTh and we take it equal to 21%.
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This threshold is the 90th percentile value for the absolute value of the function h applied
to every data entry.
diji − viji
h(riji , viji , diji )
≥ pTh (3.8)
The formula for the function h is given in Equation 3.9.
if riji ≥ 5 then h(riji , viji , diji ) = diji
otherwise h(riji , viji , diji ) = viji
(3.9)
Given detector Di,
if
∑Ni
ji=1
diji − viji
s(riji )h(riji , viji , diji )∑Ni
ji=1
(1/s(riji ))
> pTh then Di is defective
otherwise Di is not defective
(3.10)
The formula for s(riji ) is given in Equation 3.7. This algorithm was applied on an excel
sheet to identify detectors that should be tested to see if they are faulty. Figure 3.13 shows a
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snapshot of the excel sheet analysis where the possible faulty detectors are identified by red
cells. Unique detectors are identified by unique combinations of RoadID and SegID fields.
The pink colored cells show the detectors that satisfy the condition given by Equation 3.8.
The red colored cells show the detectors that satisfy the condition given by Equation 3.10.
x y r PDx RoadID SegID Pdy 1/s( r ) pd apd v_pd sumK sumN Def
122 144 3 !18.03 23 1 !15.28 0.09 !15.28 15.28 1.44
116 118 2 !1.72 23 2 !1.69 0.14 !1.69 1.69 0.24
71 81 2 !14.08 39 2 !12.35 0.14 !12.35 12.35 1.76
277 179 7 35.38 39 2 54.75 0.02 35.38 35.38 0.65
132 258 8 !95.45 39 2 !48.84 0.01 !95.45 95.45 1.16 0.17 3.56 20.64
43 147 9 !241.86 56 2 !70.75 0.01 !241.86 241.86 1.95
146 215 9 !47.26 56 2 !32.09 0.01 !47.26 47.26 0.38
230 300 9 !30.43 56 2 !23.33 0.01 !30.43 30.43 0.25
319 328 9 !2.82 56 2 !2.74 0.01 !2.82 2.82 0.02 0.03 2.60 80.59
439 366 9 16.63 49 2 19.95 0.01 16.63 16.63 0.13
340 378 9 !11.18 49 2 !10.05 0.01 !11.18 11.18 0.09
340 303 9 10.88 49 2 12.21 0.01 10.88 10.88 0.09
Figure 3.13: faulty Detector Identification Worksheet Sample
3.8 Analysis using Ratings
We can use the ratings of the videos to design an algorithm that takes the accuracy of
videos into account for analysis. The method uses the formula for variance in terms of the
rating score from Equation 3.7.
3.8.1 Weighted Mean Method
In the weighted-mean method, we choose the weighted estimator for the mean as shown in
Equation 3.11.
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PD
∗
=
∑
wiPDi∑
wi
(3.11)
The weights in this equation will be taken as wi = 1/s(ri). This equation can be equivalently
be written as
PD
∗
=
∑
giPDi (3.12)
where
gi =
wi∑
wi
(3.13)
To make coding easier, we can replace each PDi by a weighted PDi value as shown in
Equation 3.14. Then, we can perform the standard analysis, such as a t-test using these
values. The statistics for the weighted percent difference are shown in Listing 15.
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wPDi =
wi∑
wi
N
PDi (3.14)
Listing 15 Summary Statistics for the Weighted Difference
> inputdata<-read.table(file = "clipboard")
> wPD <- inputdata$V1
> summary(wPD)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-99.4400 -2.6450 0.2636 0.1922 3.7390 45.7000
The code for plotting wPD data is shown in Listing 16. The plot itself of the wPD data is
shown in Figure 3.14.
Listing 16 R-code for wPD Plotting
hist(wPD, freq = FALSE, ylim = c(0, 0.1))
lines(density(wPD))
rug(wPD, side=1)
Now, 95% of the sample data is between −18.33740% and 22.49848%. This is obtained
using the R-code shown in Listing 17.
Listing 17 Summary of wPD Data
> quantile(wPD, probs=.025)
2.5%
-18.33740
> quantile(wPD, probs=.975)
97.5%
22.49848
3.8.1.1 Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals for the Weighted Mean
We hypothesize that the wPD data is coming from a population of zero mean. This is our
null hypothesis. This indicates that the percentage error in the detectors is unbiased, and
that essentially the detectors and the video data are compatible.
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Figure 3.14: Basic Weighted Data for Analysis
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Null Hypothesis:
Mean value of the weighted percent difference between the FAST detector flow rates and the
video counted rates is zero.
To perform the hypothesis testing, we will use the t-test. For the data that we have, we get
the t-statistic as given by
t =
wPD
σ/
√
N
(3.15)
Here, we have for sample mean
wPD =
∑N
i=1wPDi
N
(3.16)
and for sample variance
σ =
∑N
i=1(wPDi − wPD)2
N − 1 (3.17)
The application of the t-test to the wPD data gives the result shown in Listing 18. The
result shows a p-value of 0.7084 which clearly shows that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis, which means that we claim that the flow
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detector data has been validated by the video counted data.
Listing 18 T-test of wPD Data
> t.test(wPD)
One Sample t-test
data: wPD
t = 0.3742, df = 486, p-value = 0.7084
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.8172784 1.2017711
sample estimates:
mean of x
0.1922463
The confidence interval, at the confidence level, γ for the population mean, µ is given by
Equation 3.18.
wPD − cσ√
n
≤ µ ≤ wPD + cσ√
n
(3.18)
Listing 18 gives the 95% confidence interval for the population mean as (−0.8172784, 1.2017711).
3.8.1.2 Confidence Interval for the Variance for the Weighted Data
In this subsection, we will estimate the confidence interval for the variance of the percent
error for the weighted data that we expect from the population. This will indicate to us
what performance can be expected from flow detectors of the type that were tested using
the enhanced method.
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The steps applied to the analysis of the wPD data produce the following.
First Step
γ = 0.95.
Second Step
We get F (c1) = (1− 0.95)/2 = 0.025, and F (c2) = (1 + 0.95)/2 = 0.975
For F (c1) = 0.025, c1 = (h − 1.96)2/2, where h =
√
2m− 1, m being the number of
degrees of freedom, i.e. m = n−1. For our data, n = 487, which gives c1 = 426.3455.
Similarly, for F (c2) = 0.975, c2 = (h+ 1.96)
2/2, which gives c2 = 548.4961.
Third Step
Variance of the wPD data is 128.5585. Hence, (n− 1)s2 = 62479.45.
Fourth Step
Now, k1 = (n− 1)s2/c1 = 146.5465 and k2 = (n− 1)s2/c2 = 113.9105.
Fifth Step
Hence, the confidence interval for the variance is 113.9105 ≤ σ2 ≤ 146.5465. This
implies that the confidence interval for the standard deviation is (10.67289, 12.10564).
3.8.1.3 Normalized Plot of Percent Errors and Analysis
Based on the sample mean and the sample variance, we can create a normal curve to
show the approximate performance in terms of the weighted percent difference for the flow
detectors. The code for this plot is shown in Listing 19, and the corresponding plot is shown
in Figure 3.15.
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Listing 19 Code for Normal Curve for wPD Data
> mean <- mean(wPD)
> sd <- sd(wPD)
> x <- seq(-4,4,length=100)*sd + mean
> hx <- dnorm(x,mean,sd)
> plot(x, hx, type="l", xlab="wPD", ylab="Density",main="Percent Error Plot")
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Figure 3.15: Normal Plot for Weighted Percent Errors
We can use this plot for some basic approximate analysis. For instance, if we want to find
out what percentage we get errors between the values of (−5%,+5%), we use the p norm
function in R, and obtain the answer of 35.3%. Similarly, for errors between the values of
(−10%,+10%), we get 63.13%, and for errors between the values of (−15%,+15%), we get
81.97%. The R-code for this analysis and the corresponding results are shown in Listing
20.
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Listing 20 Code for Analysis of wPD Data
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-5,mean,sd))
[1] 0.3530016
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-10,mean,sd))
[1] 0.631303
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-15,mean,sd))
[1] 0.8197213
3.9 Analysis of the Data with the Best Rating
In this section we present analysis of the data that has 0 rating, which means it is the data
where the video quality was the best. We use the variable PD0 for the percent difference
for this data. The statistics for the percent difference are shown in Listing 21.
Listing 21 Summary Statistics for the Weighted Difference
> inputdata<-read.table(file = "clipboard")
> PD0 <- inputdata$V1
> summary(PD0)
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-51.5400 -3.7560 0.2212 -0.3035 4.3060 21.4300
The code for plotting PD0 data is shown in Listing 22. The plot itself of the PD0 data is
shown in Figure 3.16.
Listing 22 R-code for PD0 Plotting
hist(PD0, freq = FALSE, ylim = c(0, 0.08))
lines(density(PD0))
rug(PD0, side=1)
Now, 95% of the sample data is between −19.06819% and 14.53804%. This is obtained
using the R-code shown in Listing 23.
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Figure 3.16: Basic Best Rated Data for Analysis
Listing 23 Summary of PD0 Data
> quantile(PD0, probs=.025)
2.5%
-19.06819
> quantile(PD0, probs=.975)
97.5%
14.53804
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3.9.0.4 Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals for the Mean for the Best
Rated Data
We hypothesize that the PD0 data is coming from a population of zero mean. This is our
null hypothesis. This indicates that the percentage error in the detectors is unbiased, and
that essentially the detectors and the video data are compatible.
Null Hypothesis:
Mean value of the percent difference between the FAST detector flow rates and the video
counted rates is zero for the Best Rated Data.
To perform the hypothesis testing, we will use the t-test. For the data that we have, we get
the t-statistic as given by
t =
PD0
σ/
√
N
(3.19)
Here, we have for sample mean
PD0 =
∑N
i=1 PD0i
N
(3.20)
and for sample variance
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σ =
∑N
i=1(PD0i − PD0)2
N − 1 (3.21)
The application of the t-test to the PD0 data gives the result shown in Listing 24. The
result shows a p-value of 0.749 which clearly shows that the null hypothesis can not be
rejected. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis, which means that we claim that the flow
detector data has been validated by the video counted data.
Listing 24 T-test of PD0 Data
> t.test(PD0)
One Sample t-test
data: PD0
t = -0.3208, df = 106, p-value = 0.749
alternative hypothesis: true mean is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
-2.179141 1.572207
sample estimates:
mean of x
-0.3034671
The confidence interval, at the confidence level, γ for the population mean, µ is given by
Equation 3.22.
PD0− cσ√
n
≤ µ ≤ PD0 + cσ√
n
(3.22)
Listing 24 gives the 95% confidence interval for the population mean as (−2.179141, 1.572207).
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3.9.0.5 Confidence Interval for the Variance for the Weighted Data for the Best
Rated Data
In this subsection, we will estimate the confidence interval for the variance of the percent
error for the data that we expect from the population using the Best Rated Data. This will
indicate to us what performance can be expected from flow detectors of the type that were
tested using the enhanced method.
The steps applied to the analysis of the PD0 data produce the following.
First Step
γ = 0.95.
Second Step
We get F (c1) = (1− 0.95)/2 = 0.025, and F (c2) = (1 + 0.95)/2 = 0.975
For F (c1) = 0.025, c1 = (h − 1.96)2/2, where h =
√
2m− 1, m being the number of
degrees of freedom, i.e. m = n−1. For our data, n = 107, which gives c1 = 426.3455.
Similarly, for F (c2) = 0.975, c2 = (h+ 1.96)
2/2, which gives c2 = 548.4961.
Third Step
Variance of the PD0 data is 95.77. Hence, (n− 1)s2 = 10151.62.
Fourth Step
Now, k1 = (n− 1)s2/c1 = 23.81078 and k2 = (n− 1)s2/c2 = 18.5081.
Fifth Step
Hence, the confidence interval for the variance is 18.5081 ≤ σ2 ≤ 23.81078. This
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implies that the confidence interval for the standard deviation is (4.302104, 4.879629).
3.9.0.6 Normalized Plot of Percent Errors and Analysis for the Best Rated Data
Based on the sample mean and the sample variance, we can create a normal curve to show
the approximate performance in terms of the percent difference for the flow detectors using
the Best Rated Data. The code for this plot is shown in Listing 25, and the corresponding
plot is shown in Figure 3.17.
Listing 25 Code for Normal Curve for PD0 Data
> mean <- mean(PD0)
> sd <- sd(PD0)
> x <- seq(-4,4,length=100)*sd + mean
> hx <- dnorm(x,mean,sd)
> plot(x, hx, type="l", xlab="PD0", ylab="Density",main="Percent Error Plot")
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Figure 3.17: Normal Plot for Weighted Percent Errors
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We can use this plot for some basic approximate analysis. For instance, if we want to find
out what percentage we get errors between the values of (−5%,+5%), we use the norm
function in R, and obtain the answer of 36.87%. Similarly, for errors between the values of
(−10%,+10%), we get 67.82%, and for errors between the values of (−15%,+15%), we get
86.68%. The R-code for this analysis and the corresponding results are shown in Listing
26.
Listing 26 Code for Analysis of PD0 Data
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-5,mean,sd))
[1] 0.3687108
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-10,mean,sd))
[1] 0.6782343
> 2*(0.5 - pnorm(-15,mean,sd))
[1] 0.8668406
3.10 Summary of the Results
The following are the main results for the data analysis performed that consisted of the
following:
• Data analysis without considering video ratings
• Potentially Faulty detectors:
• Data analysis considering video ratings
3.10.1 Percent Errors Without Using Video Ratings
Listing 27 demonstrates the statistics for the percent difference obtained.
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Listing 27 Summary Statistics for the Difference
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-1067.000 -4.822 0.495 -3.187 6.351 82.070
The performance of the errors are depicted in the Figure 3.18.
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Figure 3.18: Normal Plot for Percent Errors
3.10.2 Potentially Faulty Detectors
The detectors listed in Table 3.5 are the potential faulty detectors identified by the algorithm
developed in section 3.7.
3.10.3 Percent Errors Using Video Ratings
Listing 28 demonstrates the statistics for the percent weighted difference obtained.
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Table 3.5: Potential faulty detectors identified using developed algorithm
RoadID SegID
56 2
49 2
102 1
103 1
103 1
41 1
57 1
61 1
65 1
190 1
125 2
126 1
8 2
29 2
405 1
327 1
329 2
129 2
Listing 28 Summary Statistics for the Weighted Difference
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
-99.4400 -2.6450 0.2636 0.1922 3.7390 45.7000
1. 95% of the sample data errors are between −18.33740% and 22.49848%.
2. 95% confidence interval for the population mean is (−0.8172784%, 1.2017711%).
3. 95% confidence interval for the population standard deviation is (10.67289%, 12.10564%).
4. 35.3% of the data is in between (−5%,+5%), 63.13% between (−10%,+10%), and
81.97% between (−15%,+15%).
The performance of the errors can be seen in the Figure 3.19.
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Figure 3.19: Normal Plot for Weighted Percent Errors
3.10.4 Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the analysis performed:
1. The analysis presented in this study identified some detectors that could be potentially
faulty, and those must be tested further.
2. An automated method of data verification should be developed so that on a regular
basis faulty detectors can be identified.
3. The method for the verification should be further developed. If video will be used
for verification, then the requirements for the video quality that includes its location,
angle, zoom etc. will have to be specified.
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4. Some detectors should be tested thoroughly in a highly controlled environment to
see what the accuracy is when the actual counts can be compared with the detector
counts. The controlled environment can be a location where the researchers can drive
vehicles to see how the detectors are responding.
3.11 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examine the detectors that were used in order to collect most of the
data on the roadway network treated in this research. The detectors’ counts are compared
with manual video counts. T-statistics was used since both sets of data are experimental
and the actual mean is not available. A weighted statistical approach is developed in order
to give more weight to data obtained from clear videos. Additional statistical processing
is performed in order to remove the bias of the video ratings since they are assigned by
different people. This study compares the flow detector volume data to manual counted
traffic video volume data. Since, traffic videos can have varying levels of clarity depending
on different factors such as the angle, distance, occlusion, and clarity due to environment,
a new technique for statistical analysis for comparison was developed. This technique used
clarity ratings of the manual counters. Analysis was performed to obtain a model relating
the rating numbers to consistency variation, which was then used for paired t-test for final
comparison. This technique was used on data collected and the results were presented.
Finally, specific recommendations were made based on the results obtained in this project.
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Part III
Reliability
96
CHAPTER 4
Classical Reliability
4.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the classical reliability which treats the performance measures aspect
of networks as shown in Figure 4.1. In this chapter, some classical reliability measures are
introduced and investigated. Travel time data is used along Interstate 15 along the South
as well as the North bounds. Mainly, normalized standard deviation analysis, the 95th
percentile, and reliability as non-failure analysis are used in conducting the reliability day-
to-day and within the day analysis.
Figure 4.1: Overall research work
4.2 Introduction
In this chapter, the classical methods of measuring travel time reliability are presented.
Traffic conditions caused by non-recurring events are highly unpredictable, causing unex-
pected delays that directly affect travel times. This uncertainty results in variable traffic
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conditions, and is measured by “travel time reliability.” The uncertainty associated with
travel times is of major importance to drivers: in fact, it is highly ranked among all influen-
tial factors that affect the choice of departure time choice of travelers [35]. The inconsistency
of travel times inflict a scheduling cost, where commuters have to budget extra time when
traveling a certain route [36]. Also, manufacturing operations give travel time reliability
more importance than delayed trips [37]. Therefore, travel time reliability is an crucial
measure in transportation system management [38]. Lomax [37] recognizes some of the
possible sources for inconsistency, such as incidents, work zones, weather, fluctuations in
demand, special events, traffic control, and inadequate capacity. He also argues that reli-
ability measures should indicate how much each source contributes to the inconsistencies,
when possible; this is highly dependent on the measure used as well as on the available
data.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Reliability in the Transportation Sense
The reliability of transportation systems mainly quantifies the consistency of travel times
of a certain trip or route. “Travel time” is the time that takes users of the road system to
commute from an origin to a certain destination. Considering a fixed length of a highway
section, travel times directly reflect traffic conditions, such as congestion due to recurring
or nonrecurring events. Overall transportation reliability research has come to agree on the
importance of measuring inconsistency of travel times for certain trips as well as inconsis-
98
tency of performance. Many reliability measures were developed and shown to be “good
measures.” However, as stated in Lint’s work [39], all these measures have been proven to
be inconsistent with each other: they do not accurately measure inconsistency and, as a
whole, are inadequate measures for the performance of the transportation network.
4.3.2 Classical Reliability Measures
Traditionally, travel time reliability can be evaluated using various quantitative measures, all
of which differ to a certain degree in the information they contain. The appropriate measure
to be chosen depends on the evaluation criteria. Most researchers as well as transportation
entities use standard statistical methods when defining reliability.
Lomax [37] recognizes that the common definition for reliability used in transportation is
the level of consistency in travel times. In this context, reliability allows assessment of the
performance of certain elements of transportation systems, such as a mode, trip, route, or
a corridor.
Bogers [35] recognizes the various reliability measures that have been used, and stresses
that the reliability analysis method depends on the application. Nie and Fan [40] developed
an adaptive routing strategy, named the stochastic on-time arrival (SOTA) algorithm, to
target least-expected travel time as a mechanism to address the performance measure of
reliability. Oh and Chung [38] studied travel time variability by using data from Orange
County, California. They studied travel time variability that was computed in terms of
day-to-day variability, within-day variability, and spatial variability. They concluded that
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travel time is correlated with standard deviation. Chen et. al. [36] demonstrated the
relationship between travel time and level of service. They show how the 90th percentile
travel incorporates the mean and variability into a single measure; they also studied how
travel time information using ITS can reduce travel uncertainty.
The median of travel times as a measure of reliability was used in Lam’s study [41] [35].
Black [42] defines a travel time reliability ratio that gives an assessment of the extra time
that commuters must account for, based on variance [35]. Van Lint [43] defined “skew”
as a measure of the asymmetry of the travel time distribution, and claimed that skew
was important in travel time reliability. Cambridge Systematic [44] used planning time,
planning time index, and buffer index to measure reliability; they found that buffer and
planning time indices are very useful statistical measures. The buffer index is defined as
the extra time needed to accomplish a certain trip with respect to the mean travel time,
where planning time index is an indication of the deviation of the buffer size from the ideal
travel time [44].
Classical reliability measure can be categorized into four classes, as depicted in Figure 4.2:
statistical range, buffer time, tardy trip, and probabilistic. Clearly, the main focus of these
measures are travel time reliability.
4.3.2.1 Statistical Range
Statistical range relies on expected value (average travel time) as well as standard deviation
calculations upon which the following measures are based: travel time window, percent
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Figure 4.2: Classical reliability measures summary
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variation, and variability index. The travel time window indicated the expected travel time
range that is experienced by travelers. Percent variation is the percentage of variation in
travel time with respect to average travel time. The variability index is the percentage
of the range of travel time, and indicates the inconsistency level during peak hours with
respect to off-peak hours.
4.3.2.2 Buffer Time Measures
Buffer time measures are also based on average travel time. In their calculations, this class
of measures uses percentiles, defined as planning time, and ideal travel times. They indicate
the extra amount of time that the traveler must allow to reach the desired destination at
the desired time. The most common set of measures that are based in buffer time are buffer
time, buffer time index, and planning time. Basically, buffer time is the difference between
the expected travel time and the 95th percentile travel time. In other words, it is the extra
travel time caused by variability. The buffer time index is the percentage of buffer time
with respect to the expected travel time. The planning time index is the percentage of the
planning time with respect to the ideal travel time.
4.3.2.3 Tardy Trips
Tardy trips is a class of measures that indicate how often travelers are late. This measure
is based on thresholds that are preset in order to define what is considered to be late; in
the previous measure, buffer time, calculations are mostly based on averages. Tardy trip
measures are also based on the extra delay incurred during the worst trips [39]. Florida
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reliability, on time arrival, and misery index are examples of reliability measures of this
class. The Florida reliability method gives the percentage of trips where the travel times
are less than or equal to the expected travel time. “On time arrival” indicates the percentage
of time where travel times are less than or equal to the expected travel time. The ratio of
the difference between the average travel time rate for the longest 20% of total trips and
average travel rate of total trips is given by the misery index.
4.3.2.4 Probabilistic Measures
Probabilistic measures are based on the distribution fitting of the random variable. The
transportation component’s reliability to be measured becomes the random variable for
which the appropriate distribution is determined, based on the nature of the component.
This measure indicates the probability of success based on a threshold set by the evaluator,
for instance, the probability that the travel time is greater than a certain threshold. The
distribution that is used can vary based on what is being measured. The following are
common distributions used for extreme event failure, such as incidents and failure of traffic
control devices: gamma, Weibull, normal, exponential, log normal, Poisson process, and
truncated normal.
4.4 Reliability Measures and Technical Methods
The term “reliability” suggests repeatability or dependability. For a random experiment
this would mean that the results of an experiment are repeatable. In terms of travel-time,
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this would mean that if travel time is measured repeatedly on a section, we obtain compara-
ble values. In general, repeatability of travel time could be framed in terms of time-of-day,
day of the week, etc. Thus, travel time reliability is determined by conducting analysis on
data measured for a certain roadway segment.
In this chapter, the following approaches are used in obtaining various reliability measures:
• Classical Method: Planning Time, Planning Time Index, Buffer Index
• Variability, Based on Normalized Standard Deviation,
• Analysis of Variance ANOVA
• Travel Time Mean Estimation using t Statistics,
• Reliability as a Measure of Non-failures, and
4.4.1 Classical Method: Planning Time, Planning Time Index, Buffer Index
Traditionally, reliability is measured through calculating planning time (the buffer) and two
indices: planning time index and buffer index through analyzing the travel time frequency
distribution. Planning time or the buffer is calculated as the 95th percentile of travel time as
demonstrated in Equation 4.1. The planning time buffer indicates the extra time travelers
should account for in order to guarantee on time arrival. Planning time index is the ratio
of the planning time to the ideal travel time (free flow) which indicates how planning time
compares to ideal travel. Planning time provides more information about the severity of
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the conditions. The cheer buffer size (planning time) indicates consistency of travel times.
Buffer index is the ratio of the difference between planning time and average travel time to
the average travel time as demonstrated in Equation 4.2.
τpi = τp/τf (4.1)
Bi =
τp − τA
τA
(4.2)
where
τp : planning time (the 95
th percentile)
τpi : planning time index
τf : free flow travel time
τA : average travel time
Bi : buffer index
4.4.2 Variability, Based on Normalized Standard Deviation
For a given set of travel time data on a freeway section, statistical mean can be calculated
by Equation 4.3; however, travel time mean is not sufficient since it does not convey any
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information about how volatile the travel times are on the studied highway segment. There-
fore, calculations of the standard deviation given in Equation 4.5 are necessary in order to
understand the distributive nature of travel times [45]. Clearly, a lower standard deviation
indicates a higher concentration of data about the mean illustrating closer values to the
mean; thus a more reliable highway segment.
τ¯ =
∑n
i=0τi
N
(4.3)
σ =
√∑n
i=0(τi − τ¯)2
N − 1 (4.4)
σn = σ/τ¯ (4.5)
where
τn : travel time on a certain highway segment
τ¯ : Average travel time for the given data set
σ : Standard deviation of travel times for the given data set
N : Total number of data points in the data set
σn :Normalized standard deviation
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4.4.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Using ANOVA, the means of various data sets were compared for hypothesis testing. A null
hypothesis is defined by determining a desired α value representing the variation between
the groups tested. If the ratio of the variance among the samples means to the variance
within the samples, F , is less than critical value (Fα), then the null hypothesis (H0) is ac-
cepted indicating that the variation in mean falls within the desired regions. Otherwise, the
alternate hypothesis (H1)is accepted indicating higher variability thereof lower reliability.
H0 : F ≤ Fα
H1 : F > Fα
(4.6)
where:
H0 : Null hypothesis
H1 : Alternative hypothesis
4.4.4 Travel Time Mean Estimation Using t-Statistics
Average of measured travel times of the sample data τ¯ may or may not reflect an accurate
measure of the actual population mean µ. The actual travel time mean can be estimated
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using T distribution, since actual population variance is unknown, with a certain confidence
interval 4.7. Travel time mean estimation with the specified confidence intervals delivers a
practical measure that could be easily understood by the general public. Furthermore, this
measure can be used for the day to day operations of emergency responders in the private
and public sectors as well as general drivers. An automated statistical technique can be
developed to reflect travel times given certain settings such as day, time, and location based
on real time data.
1− α = 90%
t =
τ¯ − µ
σ/
√
n
The 90th percentile:
Pr(τ¯ − tα/2
σ√
n
< µ < τ¯ + tα/2
σ√
n
) = 0.9
(4.7)
where
τ¯ : Average travel time for the given data set
σ : Standard deviation of travel times for the given data set
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4.4.5 Reliability as a Measure of Non-Failures
One can perceive travel time reliability, R, as the probability of success of a certain route.
This method provides probability of the extremes, pass or fail, defined in Equation 4.9.
Success can take various meanings; in terms of travel time. Success of a highway segment
can be defined as whether the actual travel time is below or above a desired travel time τd
as defined in Equation 4.8. This measure is a representation of the percentage of time a
certain link is at a desired condition, for instance free flow. It is easily understood by the
general public and could be expanded further to measure reliability of complex networks.
This measure is different from the meaning of traditional reliability since it indicates the
success of the transportation system of maintaining travel times at free flow. This measure
is more useful for transportation engineers, and policy makers.
τd = τff + τth (4.8)
Ri =
ST
N
(4.9)
where
τd : Desired Travel Time
τff : Free Flow Travel Time
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τth : Travel Time Threshold, ex: 5 min
N : Sample size
ST : Total number of successes, where τ < τd
Using this method, reliability of a highway segment Rs that consists of multiple contagious
segments R1, R2 . . .Rn is determined as implied by Equation 4.10 [46]
Rs =
n∏
i=1
Ri (4.10)
4.4.6 Issues with Classical Reliability Measures
By carefully examining the classical reliability measures, one can obtain far more informa-
tion from the values other than pure inconsistency. For instance, the tardy trip and the
probabilistic class of measures deliver reliability with respect to a certain threshold that
determines the success rate and/or the failure rate. Even though this meaning of “reliabil-
ity” is not touched upon by the classical definition, it is of major interest to researchers as
well as to transportation systems evaluators because it is a vital indicator of the system’s
performance.
Inadequacy is another issue with the classical reliability measures. Lint [39] highlighted that
classical measures are highly inconsistent in providing conclusions regarding the reliability
of a certain trip or roadway segment. This is a predictable result since all of these measures
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use various thresholds. Another flaw in using these measures is that most of them assume a
symmetrical distribution in calculating the variability ranges; this is inaccurate, particularly
because symmetrical distributions are not the most appropriate for extreme event analysis.
Therefore, a measure of inconsistency needs to be developed irrespective of any threshold
or distribution.
The lack of equipment in order to measure network reliability is another issue. Lint argues
that these measures are inadequate in terms of cost for evaluating the performance of the
system. Such evaluation is crucial for policy makers and for the optimization of budget
allocation in transportation projects. In order for a certain value to serve as a good perfor-
mance measure, it must capture such information as the safety of the link, emissions, and
incident rates. Thus, the development of network reliability measures is highly necessary.
Issues with the classical reliability measures can be summarized as follows:
1. Inadequacy
2. Inconsistency
3. Inability of expansion to Network Reliability
4.5 Results and Discussion
Two types of analysis were conducted, day-to-day and within the day reliability, on the
DMS data obtained from FAST using the six proposed methods.
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4.5.1 Variability, Based on Normalized Standard Deviation (NSTD)
Tables 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) list the obtained NSTD for both signs.
Table 4.1: Normalized Standard Deviation
(a) Day to day
Std. Statistics Sign 13 Sign 17
Average Variance Std N-Std Average Variance Std N-Std
Monday 13.37 3.12 1.77 0.13 13.86 0.62 0.79 0.06
Tuesday 14.43 3.48 1.87 0.13 13.10 0.42 0.65 0.05
Wednesday 14.97 3.17 1.78 0.12 13.57 0.52 0.72 0.05
Thursday 14.44 4.09 2.02 0.14 12.52 0.69 0.83 0.07
Friday 14.88 6.30 2.51 0.17 14.14 1.32 1.15 0.08
Saturday 11.32 0.92 0.96 0.08 9.67 1.16 1.08 0.11
Sunday 10.30 0.03 0.17 0.02 9.25 1.11 1.05 0.11
(b) Within the day
Std. Statistics Sign 13 Sign 17
Average Variance Std N-Std Average Variance Std N-Std
6am-8am 12.84 5.78 2.40 0.19 12.36 14.81 3.85 0.31
8am-10am 13.69 8.51 2.92 0.21 12.29 12.62 3.55 0.29
10am-12am 12.97 5.45 2.33 0.18 12.26 13.15 3.63 0.30
12am-2pm 15.02 10.99 3.31 0.22 14.54 26.69 5.17 0.36
2pm-4pm 22.97 56.59 7.52 0.33 17.00 28.71 5.36 0.32
4pm-5pm 22.07 49.84 7.06 0.32 17.82 40.12 6.33 0.36
Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) show the normalized standard deviation trends for signs 13 and 17.
The data was processed in two different ways day to day and within the day. Day to
day processing aggregates travel times for a one day at a time which allows comparison of
aggregated travel times between different days of the week as well as weekends.
Examining the obtained results for day to day analysis for sign 13 (north bound direction of
the I15), higher variability is noted during week days. Yet, lower overall NTSD was obtained
for sign 17 (I-15 south bound) compared to sign 13. However, results of the processed data
during weekends show a higher variability for I-15 south bound (sign 17) than I-15 North
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Figure 4.3: Normalized Standard Deviation Analysis
bound (sign 13). This phenomenon may be caused by the fact that drivers’ destination for
that section of the freeway is most likely to be in the south direction during weekends since
it leads to the center of the town. Overall reliability is not very high which means that
traffic conditions on that segment are somewhat inconsistent.
From analyzing the obtained values of the normalized standard deviation for within the day
processing, it is noted that the values are higher than the values obtained for day to day
analysis. This was expected since traffic conditions vary tremendously from throughout the
day taking into consideration traffic demand during peak hours as well as off peak hours;
however, aggregating the values to represent a day as whole will result in a more consistent
travel times. Less consistency is noted when travel times are compared for all days vs. when
only alike days are compared. This emphasizes the importance of data processing methods
and how different processing can give different meanings. Overall, higher reliability is noted
on I-15 North which is inconsistent with day to day analysis.
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The same data will be analyzed in the subsections to follow using the various proposed
methods in order to extract the information that each one provides.
4.5.2 Analysis of Variance ANOVA
Tables 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) show the F value obtained from the ANOVA hypothesis test with
α = 0.05. The F values obtained from ANOVA analysis for both signs and the two types
of analysis (day to day and within the day) are greater than the critical value Fα which
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis. These results show low consistency in travel times
for the studied freeway section; thus, low reliability.
Table 4.2: Normalized Standard Deviation
(a) Day to day
F P-Value Fα
Sign13 59.56 6.95E-51 2.12
Sign17 253.12 2.6E-125 2.12
(b) Within the Day
F P-Value Fα
Sign13 193.2 1.8E-151 2.22
Sign17 56.45 7.88E-53 2.12
4.5.3 Travel Time Mean Estimation
Tables 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) illustrate the average travel time with 95 percent confidence. De-
picted in Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b)the 95th percentile for both signs.
As expected, the 95 th percentile averages approximately 18 and 14 minutes for sign 13
and 17, respectively during week days; however, it is much lower on weekends. Analyzing
within the day values, it is noticeable that travel times are much higher in the afternoon
than it is in the mornings as shown in Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b).
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Table 4.3: Anaysis of Variance (ANOVA)
(a) Day to day
Confidence Intervals Sign13 Sign 17
Time Percentile Time Percentile
Monday 12.96 < t < 13.78 16.44 13.68 < t < 14.04 15.06
Tuesday 13.99 < t < 14.86 17.92 13.41 < t < 13.74 14.98
Wednesday 14.29 < t < 15.46 17.92 13.41 < t < 13.74 14.98
Thursday 13.97 < t < 14.91 17.87 12.32 < t < 12.71 14.06
Friday 14.29 < t < 15.46 18.81 13.87 < t < 14.41 16.16
Saturday 11.09 < t < 11.54 12.91 9.42 < t < 9.92 11.48
Sunday 10.26 < t < 10.34 10.62 9.00 < t < 9.49 10.76
(b) Within the day
Confidence Intervals Sign13 Sign 17
6am-8am 12.56 < t < 13, 12 16.35 11.92 < t < 12.81 18.75
8am-10am 13.35 < t < 14.02 18.82 11.87 < t < 12.70 19.59
10am-12am 12.70 < t < 13.24 17.93 11.84 < t < 12.68 18.68
12am-2pm 14.64 < t < 15.41 20.57 13.94 < t < 15.14 25.37
2pm-4pm 22.10 < t < 23.84 32.84 16.38 < t < 17.62 26.92
4pm-5pm 21.25 < t < 22.89 32.71 17.09 < t < 18.56 30.32
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Figure 4.4: The 95th percentile
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4.5.4 Reliability as a Measure of Non-failures
Tables 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) show the results obtained when non-failure analysis is used in
determining reliability. Figures 4.5(b) and 4.5(a) illustrate the trend for both day to day
and within the day.
Table 4.4: Reliability as a measure of non-failure analysis
(a) Day to day
Failure Anlys Min Max Range Threshold Success Failure R
Sign(S) S13 S17 S13 S17 S13 S17 S13/17 S13 S17 S13 S17 S13 S17
Monday 10.58 11.83 16.51 15.10 5.94 3.27 11 3 0 49 52 0.06 0
Tuesday 10.94 11.59 17.68 14.31 6.74 2.72 1 0 51 52 0.02 0
Wednesday 11.72 12.34 17.99 15.02 6.27 2.67 0 0 52 52 0 0
Thursday 10.71 10.73 17.93 14.09 7.22 3.36 3 2 49 50 0.06 0.04
Friday 10.67 12.48 18.85 16.18 8.18 3.71 3 0 49 52 0.06 0
Saturday 10.33 8.26 12.94 11.59 2.61 3.33 25 43 27 9 0.49 0.83
Sunday 10.07 8.19 10.62 10.77 0.55 2.57 52 52 0 0 1 1
(b) Within the day
Failure Anlys Min Max Range Threshold Success Failure R
Sign(S) S13 S17 S13 S17 S13 S17 S13/17 S13 S17 S13 S17 S13 S17
6am-8am 9 7.63 31.1 30.98 22.10 23.35 11 52 97 151 105 0.26 0.48
8am-10am 9.63 7.63 22.94 24.73 13.31 17.1 48 94 155 108 0.24 0.47
10am-12am 9.63 7.63 24.29 25.71 14.67 18.08 32 94 171 108 0.16 0.47
12am-2pm 9.83 8.6 30.67 33.42 20.83 24.81 20 65 183 137 0.1 0.32
2pm-4pm 9.63 8.63 38.85 37.23 29.23 28.6 14 21 189 181 0.07 0.10
4pm-5pm 10.17 8.08 42.40 32.81 32.23 24.73 3 27 200 175 0.02 0.13
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Figure 4.5: Reliability as non-failure Analysis
Data was compared to an eleven minute threshold based on a free flow speed of 65 mph
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as well as segment length which is approximately 10.5 and 7.7 miles for signs 13 and 14,
respectively. The results show a higher overall reliability for sign 17 (south bound) than it
is for sign 13 (north bound). The studied freeway section is unreliable in the afternoon as
well as weekends for both directions. In this case reliability indicates whether travel times
are above or below the desired travel time.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, some classical reliability measures are introduced and investigated. Travel
time data is used along Interstate 15 along the South as well as the North bounds. Mainly,
normalized standard deviation analysis, the 95th percentile, and reliability as non-failure
analysis are used in conducting the reliability day-to-day and within the day analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
Entropy-based Reliability
5.1 Overview
Figure 5.1: Overall research work
This chapter discusses a novel reliability measure which treats the performance measures
aspect of networks as shown in Figure 5.1. In this chapter, a novel travel time reliability
measure is proposed. The developed measure is based on entropy from information theory.
In this chapter, some classical reliability measures are introduced and investigated. Travel
time data is used along Interstate 15 along the South as well as the North bounds in order
to conduct within the day analysis.
5.2 Introduction
Classical reliability measures rely fundamentally on the statistical standard deviation quan-
tity. However, entropy is a direct tool to measure the uncertainty present in any random
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variable. The quantity of entropy not only contains the standard deviation but also all
other moments. Based on this, a novel travel time reliability measure is constructed that
can be applied to any random variable regardless of its distributional characteristics. Then
the use of the proposed novel travel time reliability measure is demonstrated by applying
it to travel time data obtained from stationary detectors. The developed measure herein
can be also used in various cyber complex networks such as manufacturing, power, and
communication system specifically when the goal is to assess uncertainty.
Information theory has successfully demonstrated tools and formulations that are used in
many disciplines such as data compression and coding in communications. Information the-
ory introduced a number of equations that quantify information. One of the most important
quantity in information theory is entropy. Entropy is the measure of uncertainty present
in a random variable. Since travel time can be considered as a random variable, this study
proposes developing a travel time reliability measure based on entropy.
5.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
5.3.1 Information Theory
Information theory quantifies information based on probability theory and statistics. Much
of the mathematics behind it was developed in order to quantify entropy in thermodynam-
ics. Nyquist has developed a similar relation in order to quantify telegraph speed. The
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information theory field was established later on by Claude E. Shannon. He introduced
qualitative and quantitative models for communications based on information theory. This
was considered revolutionary in the field of communications. Information theory had many
applications, such as data compression. In order to understand better how information
theory can be used to measure reliability, one must understand the various concepts as well
as the various properties that this theory provides. Various quantities of information can be
measured, most importantly, entropy and mutual information. In this study, the entropy
measure will be considered since it is the most relevant measure to reliability.
5.3.1.1 The Concept of Entropy
Entropy is the measure of uncertainty that is embedded in a random variable. A high level
of uncertainty in a random variable indicates high information content since it cannot be
easily predicted, and vise versa. Low level of uncertainty indicates low information content.
The ability to measure information content in this manner provides a powerful tool in
many applications, such as message compression. Likewise, one can quantify the level of
information in any set of data and, more generally, in any random variable.
Generally speaking, random variables can be discrete or continuous. The entropy mea-
sure formulation is developed for both cases. Even though they might seem similar, some
properties may hold in one case but not the other.
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5.3.1.2 Discrete Entropy
Equation (5.1) presents the discrete formulation of entropy [47][48][49].
Definition: Let X be a discrete random variable where {x1, x2, · · · , xn} is the set of all
possible events, and let P (x) be the probability of x ∀x ∈ X. Then, the entropy of X is
defined as the expected value Ex of the self information I(x):
H(x) = Ex[I(x)] = −
∑
x∈X
P (x)logP (x) (5.1)
where I(x) is the entropy contribution of a single member of X.
Note that entropy is maximized when P (x) = 1n∀x ∈ X. In other words, uncertainty is at
its highest when the random variable has uniformly distributed probability mass function
(PMS) since equiprobable events have high unpredictability. This gives the following
result [47][48][49]:
H(x) = Ex[I(x)] = −
∑
x∈X
1
n
log
1
n
= n(− 1
n
log
1
n
) = log(n)
(5.2)
This result will be used in normalizing the formulation of the reliability measure.
5.3.1.3 Differential Entropy
Differential entropy is the quantity obtained when measuring the uncertainty of a continuous
random variable. This is defined by (5.3). Definition: Let X be a continuous random
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variable, and let f(x) be the probability density function (pdf) of x such that the support
of f lies in X. Then, the differential entropy of X is defined as [47][48][49]:
h(x) = −
∫
X
P (x)logP (x) (5.3)
It is important to note that there are fundamental differences in the properties between
entropy and differential entropy. Some of these differences are as follows:
• Normal distribution is maximized in differential entropy, whereas uniform distribution
is maximized in discrete entropy.
• Differential entropy can take negative values.
• Differential entropy is not invariant under change of variables.
The last two properties mentioned in the list are undesired properties. This is resolved
by introducing the relative entropy or the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which includes the
invariant measure factor and is based on the limiting density of discrete points. In this
chapter, the main focus will be on the discrete formulation of reliability based on information
theory.
5.3.2 Entropy as a “Measure”
One can consider entropy to be a signed measure. The results in (5.2) and (5.3) can be
expressed in one generalized form using relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence. It
is clear that the integration in the differential entropy is taken with respect to the Lebesgue
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measure µ(x). Therefore, differential entropy in (5.3) can be expressed as (5.4) [47][48][49]:
h(x) = −
∫
X
f(x)logf(x)dµ(x) (5.4)
where f(x) is the probability density function.
Likewise, the entropy measure for a discrete random variable can also be expressed as
integration instead of summation; however, the integration, in this case, is with respect to
the counting measure v(x). In this case, (5.2) can be expressed as in (5.5) [47][48][49]:
h(x) = −
∫
X
f(x)logf(x)dv(x) (5.5)
Note that in both (5.4) and (5.5), the probability density function f is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the probability measure with respect to their associated measures. For exam-
ple, f = dPdµ in (5.4) where f =
dP
dv in (5.5). This realization leads to generalizations of the
entropy concept, regardless of the nature of the space of random variables. Generalization
is accomplished by introducing the following proposition:
Proposition: Let P and Q be probability measures defined on the same space. Assume
that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, that is P << Q. Then , by the Radon-
Nikodym theorem, the Radon-Nikodym derivative dPdQ exists.
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This allows us to extract the relative entropy or the Kullback-Leibler divergence as it is
expressed in its most general form as follows [47][48][49]:
DKL(P ||Q) =
∫
supp(P )
dP
dQ
log
dP
dQ
dQ
=
∫
supp(P )
log
dP
dQ
dP
(5.6)
Practically, this quantity represents the additional uncertainty involved when using one
probability measure versus another probability measure.
In some cases, the quantity in (5.6), or the relative entropy, can be more fundamental to
use than entropy, particularly, in the continuous case, for the same reasons mentioned the
Differential Entropy Section. This is induced from the “nice” properties of (5.6) such as:
• Non-negative, also called Gibb’s inequality
• Invariant under parameter transformation
• Additive for independent distributions
5.4 ENTROPY AS A MEASURE OF RELIABILITY
The purpose of the transportation systems reliability is to quantify the consistency of travel
times of a certain trip or route. Consistency can also be thought of as redundancy or cer-
tainty. As mentioned previously, entropy is a measure of uncertainty in a random variable,
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where high entropy in a random variable indicates a high level of uncertainty and low en-
tropy indicates a low level of uncertainty. In order to relate the both concepts, a number
of issues must be discussed, such as:
• What are the desired properties in a reliability measure?
• How can one use entropy to measure reliability?
• What is the reasoning behind using information theory versus using any other classical
reliability measure?
• How can the new measure be applied to data?
5.4.1 Desired Properties of the Reliability Measure
Properly defining the properties of interest, is the key to developing the appropriate mea-
sure. Properties of the desired travel time reliability measure can be categorized into two
categories qualitative and quantitative. Let R(x) be the reliability measure and X be the
random variable.
5.4.1.1 Qualitative Properties:
• R(x) has to effectively quantify certainty of travel times.
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5.4.1.2 Quantitative Properties:
• R(x) : X → [0, 1]
5.4.2 Entropy based Reliability Construction
One can view the reliability of a certain segment of freeway as a random variable since it
has uncertainty associated with it. Entropy is a well established measure of uncertainty for
messages, data, and random variables in general. This information theory quantity pro-
vides a fundamental tool in quantifying uncertainty in travel time as a random variable.
Definition:Let TT be the probability mass function of a discrete random variable, repre-
senting travel time on a given roadway segment. Then, from (5.2) the entropy TTe or the
uncertainty of the travel time on a given segment is given by (5.7):
TTe(x) = −
∑
x∈X
TT (x)log(TT (x)) (5.7)
As mentioned in the properties, it is desired that the reliability value is less than 1 and larger
than 0. Even though in its raw form TTe is not the reliability measure, normalizing it can
simplify later derivation. In order to normalize the quantity TTe, the fact that entropy is
maximized under uniform distribution (5.2) is used as shown in (5.8).
Proposition: Let TTne be the normalized travel time entropy, and let n be the total
number of allowable discrete travel time values. Then,
126
TTne(x) =
−∑x∈X TT (x)log(TT (x))
log(n)
(5.8)
Equation (5.8) provides us with a normalized value of the uncertainty present in a unit
travel time. However, as stated in the qualitative properties, the reliability measure has
to quantify predictability or in other words certainty. Therefore, it is proposed that this
quantity is obtain by (5.9).
Proposition: Let RTT be the travel time reliability for a given roadway segment. Then,
RTT (x) = 1− TTne(x) (5.9)
Note that the reliability measure satisfies the qualitative as well as the quantitative measure
properties that are desired.
5.4.3 Why Information Theory?
Information theory provides a direct measure of uncertainty from which the reliability mea-
sure can be easily derived. To indicate variability, classical reliability measures mainly use
statistical variance as well as its different forms. There is no doubt that these measures
somewhat represent certainty; however, the proposed entropy based reliability considers not
only variance but also all statistical moments of a probability density function. This follows
from the fact that the entropy formulation uses the probability density function as a whole
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in order to extract the certainty associated with the travel time.
5.4.4 Travel Time Reliability Analysis Using Entropy
In order to demonstrate the proposed reliability measure, travel time data was obtained
from The Freeway Arterial System of Transportation (FAST), an integrated Intelligent
Transportation System organization in the Las Vegas area. FAST has approximately 21
Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) mostly distributed along the I-15, as depicted in Figure
5.2. Travel times are computed by means of the Incident Processing Module (IPM) in the
Freeway Management System (FMS). The detector data from traffic detector stations on
the freeways is processed and then displayed on the DMS [50] [51].
Figure 5.2: DMS on the I-15 corridor in Las Vegas from FAST
The travel time data that was obtained spanned a period of eight months, from October
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Table 5.1: Sample Data Analysis using Information Theory
Time of Day RSign13 RSign17
6am-8am 0.75 0.45
8am-10am 0.63 0.48
10am-12pm 0.75 0.47
12pm-2pm 0.56 0.37
2pm-4pm 0.27 0.33
4pm-5pm 0.26 0.26
2008 through May 2009. Sign identifiers 13 and 17 were selected for analysis since they are
located on main thorofares that are frequently traversed. Sign identifier 17, located on the
southbound I-15 freeway, records the travel time from US-95 to the I-215. Sign identifier 13,
located on the northbound I-15, records the travel time from I-215 to US-95. The stretch of
freeway covered by the chosen signs witnesses a high percentage of commuters daily, which
emphasizes the importance of studying it.
Reliability calculations for the obtained data were performed using the new proposed in-
formation theory based reliability measures presented in (5.9). After further discretization
of the data, the frequency distribution was obtained from which the probability density
function was attained.
Analysis results are presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3. Both sets of data from Sign 13
and Sign 17 show higher reliability during morning hours and much lower reliability during
afternoon peak hours. This is consistent with what is expected.
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Figure 5.3: Sample Data Analysis using Information Theory
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel travel time reliability measure is proposed. The developed measure
is based on entropy from information theory. In this chapter, some classical reliability
measures are introduced and investigated. Travel time data is used along Interstate 15
along the South as well as the North bounds in order to conduct within the day analysis.
The reliability measure proposed in this study measures pure consistency of travel time data,
which is exactly what is needed. This measure can also be used in other cyber complex
system such as communication, power, and manufacturing systems.
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CHAPTER 6
Min-Plus Semi-ring Algebraic Structure of Network Reliability
6.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the expansion of link reliability to complex networks which treats
the performance measures aspect of networks as shown in Figure 6.1.
In this chapter, we investigate the measure of network reliability when link reliability is
provided. Various approaches are introduced using the max-plus algebraic structure using
reliability, unreliability, and Bellman’s principle of optimality.
Figure 6.1: Overall research work
6.2 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates measuring the reliability of networked roadway segments or any
networked system such as communications, sensor, and power networks. In this study, it
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is found that the algebraic structure of the reliability of a network is consistent with the
semi-ring min-plus algebraic structure. This provides us with well established properties
that can simplify the algebra over networks’ reliability. This study discovers the structure
of the algebraic space when reliability is measured for a network.
Generally speaking, the reliability of a complex network is multilayered. As in the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model described in Figure 6.2, this study develops a similar
model for the transportation system. Each layer of the OSI network model is responsible for
a specific functionality of the networked system where information is passed to subsequent
layers once data is processed [52][53].
Physical
Data Link
Network
Transport
Session
Presentation
Application Services Supporting Applications
Data Services and Security
Dialog Control and Session Connection
Error Recognition and Recovery
Translation of Logical Addresses to Physical Addresses
Raw data Packaging into Frames
Data Transmition from one System to another
Figure 6.2: Open System Interconnection (ISO/OSI) model
Figure 6.3 describes the proposed Transportation Network Hierarchical Layer Model. Each
layer is composed of elements and components residing in a layer at a lower level.
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Figure 6.3: Transportation Network Hierarchical Layer Model
The Physical Layer is the most basic component of the network which consists of the
connections between nodes such as roadways, highways, and freeways.
The Processing Layer is responsible for the traffic operations including traffic manage-
ment strategies such as traffic management centers and intelligent transportation systems.
The Elemental Layer is responsible for the operations, safety, and reliability of the various
physical components of the network such as traffic lights, ramp meters, intersections, and
crosswalks.
The Elemental Layer is responsible for the operations, safety, and reliability of the various
physical components of the network such as traffic lights, ramp meters, intersections, and
crosswalks.
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The Link Layer is responsible for the operations, safety, and reliability of a link which is
composed of various physical components of the network such as traffic lights, ramp meters,
intersections, crosswalks, and roadways.
The Topological Layer is the reliability of a certain topological structure composed of a
number of links in the network.
The Route Layer is the reliability of a trip specified by an origin and destination. A route
is composed of various lower level components.
The Network Layer is the highest level in the hierarchy. The network reliability must
be composed of a quantitative integration or mapping of all reliabilities that compose the
overall system.
6.3 Network Reliability
Transportation systems are composed of many components that are highly networked. Com-
ponents of the transportation system can be chosen based on the criteria of the system’s
performance evaluation. For instance, a transportation system can be viewed as a network
of the most common trip routes. A Network Structure Map (NSM) can be developed based
on the network’s actual topology, based on which the overall reliability of the transportation
system can be measured. It is evident that the operation of some components is essential
for the operation of other components. Therefore, components of the transportation net-
work may have two possible connections: a series connection or a parallel connection. Two
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components are connected in series if the operation of one depends on the operation of the
other; parallel connections take place when the operation of one component is independent
of the operation of the other [54].
6.3.1 Discovering the Space
An NSM can represent all the physical relations present in a transportation system. Road-
way segments are mainly connected either in parallel or in series. A Network Structure
Function (NSF) must be developed that allows the aggregation of the reliability measures
of individual components in order to be able to quantify the reliability of the network as a
whole.
6.3.1.1 Parallel Components
Given a transportation network with n components connected in parallel, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.4, let R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn} be the set of reliability values of the segments. Since
the segments are connected in parallel, there is a possibility that the driver takes any of
the available components or roadway segments. Therefore, in order to obtain the total
reliability of the network, more information is needed, such as the probability of taking a
certain route. This leads to introducing a new set of values W = {w1, w2, · · · , wn} or the
probability mass function of the parallel segments, where wi is the probability of taking
route or segment i. Note that
∑n
i=1wi = 1.
Proposition 6.3.1. The total parallel reliability network value RP is given by the expected
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W1 R1
W2 R2
W3 R3
Wn Rn
Figure 6.4: Reliability of the parallel network
value of the segmental reliability set R with respect to their probability mass function, as
given in Equation 6.1.
RP =
n∑
i=1
wiRi (6.1)
Definition 6.3.1. Define R
′
i ≡ wiRi. In which case (6.2) becomes:
RP =
n∑
i=1
R
′
i (6.2)
This quantity will be used later to establish the algebra of reliability measure on networks.
Rewriting (6.1) in a matrix form, we obtain the following:
RP = W`R (6.3)
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6.3.1.2 Series Components
Given a transportation network with n components connected in series, as shown in Figure
6.5, let R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rn} be the set of reliability values of the segments. Since the
segments are connected in series, the driver must go through all the available components
or roadway segments. Therefore, the total reliability of a series network is given by the
minimum reliability out of all segments, as presented in Equation 6.4.
R1 R2 R3 Rn
Figure 6.5: Reliability of the series network
Proposition 6.3.2. The total series network reliability value Rs is given by the minimum
of {R1, R2, · · · , Rn} as presented in Equation 6.4.
Rs = min{R1, R2, · · · , Rn} (6.4)
6.3.1.3 Desired Properties
Based on (6.2) and (6.4), we are mainly interested in performing two operations on the real
numbers: the minimum and the addition operations. This constructs a semi-ring algebraic
structure that is consistent with the min-plus algebra [55].
6.3.2 Min-Plus Algebra
Definition 6.3.2. Min-plus algebra is a semi-ring algebraic structure defined on the set
Rmin = {∞} ∪ ℜ together with two operations [56]:
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1. a⊕ b = min(a, b)
2. a⊗ b = a+ b
6.3.3 Reliability of a Network
Now, we are ready to redefine the algebraic structure of the reliability of a network for
parallel and series connections based on min-plus algebra.
Proposition 6.3.3. Let R
′
i ≡ wiRi. Then, the total parallel reliability network value RP
is given by (6.5).
RP = ⊗ni=1R
′
i
(6.5)
Proposition 6.3.4. The total series network reliability value Rs is given by (6.6).
Rs = ⊕ni=1Ri (6.6)
6.3.4 Reliability of General Networks
Given a general network, as in Figure 6.6, that has a mixed parallel and series connections.
In order to analyze the reliability of the network, one must parse the overall system in
terms of Origin-Destination (OD) routes. Then one must recognize all possible OD routes
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as demonstrated in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. If more than one route can be assigned for the
same OD pair then the routes are considered to have parallel connection.
O1
O2
D1
D2
D3
R1 R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
 R12
Figure 6.6: Transportation network
The next step in determining the reliability of the network is to determine the reliability of
each route. By parsing the network into OD routes, each route simply becomes composed
of links that are connected in series. In each case, the reliability of the route is determined
by the minimum reliability among all links. Table 6.1 states the reliability for all possible
OD pairs shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
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Figure 6.7: Possible routes for O1
In order to determine the reliability associated with a certain OD pair, additional infor-
mation is needed on the network that indicates the possibility of taking a certain route as
indicated in Equation 6.1. However, from this point forward, it will be assumed that the
routes are equi-probable. This results in the following:
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Figure 6.8: Possible routes for O2
Table 6.1: Reliability of all possible routes
OD Pair Route Reliability
O1 to D1
R11a = R1 ⊕R2 ⊕R3 = min{R1, R2, R3}
R11b = R1 ⊕R2 ⊕R4 ⊕R5 = min{R1, R2, R4, R5}
O1 to D2 R12 = R1 ⊕R2 ⊕R4 ⊕R8 =min{R1, R2, R4, R8}
O2 to D1
R21a = R6 ⊕R2 ⊕R7 ⊕R4 ⊕R3 =min{R6, R7, R4, R3}
R21b = R6 ⊕R7 ⊕R5 =min{R6, R7, R5}
O2 to D2
R22a = R6 ⊕R7 ⊕R8 =min{R6, R7, R5}
R22b = R9 ⊕R12 = min{R9, R12}
O2 to D3
R23a = R6 ⊕R10 =min{R6, R10}
R23b = R9 ⊕R12 =min{R9, R11}
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RP =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ri (6.7)
where n is the number of routes connected in parallel.
Based on this assumption, the reliability of the ODs in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 is presented in
Table 6.2
Table 6.2: Reliability of all OD pairs
OD Pair OD Reliability
O1 to D1 R11 =
1
2
(R11a ⊗R11b)
O1 to D2 R12
O2 to D1 R21 =
1
2
(R21a ⊗R21b)
O2 to D2 R22 =
1
2
(R22a ⊗R22b)
O2 to D3 R23 =
1
2
(R23a ⊗R23b)
Generalizing these results, when computing the reliability of a given network, OD pairs are
first recognized, then the reliability of all routes that connect a certain OD are computed
Each route is composed of roadway segments that are connected in series. In general, the
reliability associated with a certain route Rr is given as the minimum of the reliability of
all segments Rs composing it as in the following equation:
Rr = min{Rs} (6.8)
where s = 1 · · ·n and
n = number of segments connected in series that compose the route.
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When the reliability of each possible route of an OD is determined and assuming that
the probability of taking each route is equal, then the total reliability of an OD Rod is
determined as indicated in Equation 6.7.
Rod = ⊗n1 (⊕i,j,..l1 Rrs) =
1
n
(min{R11, R12, · · ·R1i}+min{R21, R22, · · ·R2j}+ · · ·+min{Rn1, Rn2, · · ·Rnl})
(6.9)
The network reliablity can then be repsented as a system of equations as follows:
Rod1 =
1
a
⊗ar=1 (⊕is=1Rrs)
Rod2 =
1
b
⊗br=1 (⊕js=1Rrs)
Rod3 =
1
c
⊗cr=1 (⊕ks=1Rrs)
Rod4 =
1
d
⊗dr=1 (⊕ls=1Rrs)
...
(6.10)
The system of equations in 6.10 describes the proposed network reliability. However, the
algebra over the min-plus algebraic structure is developed for problems that are of the form:
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y1 = ⊕ar=1(⊗is=1xrs)
y2 = ⊕br=1(⊗js=1xrs)
y3 = ⊕cr=1(⊗ls=1xrs)
y4 = ⊕dr=1(⊗ks=1xrs)
...
(6.11)
Therefore, in order to solve the system in 6.10, a new algebra must be developed. Alter-
natively, one can consider the dual problem for network reliability using unreliability as
presented in the next section.
6.4 Alternative View of Network Reliability using Unreliability
In order to be able to take advantage of the algebra developed for min-plus problems,
network reliability is defined slightly different than it is in the last section.
Definition 6.4.1. Let R be the reliability of a roadway segment where 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, then the
unreliability U ≡ 1−R.
6.4.1 Min-Plus Algebra
As it is for network reliability, network unreliability has the min-plus algebraic as well.
Definition 6.4.2. Min-plus algebra is a semi-ring algebraic structure defined on the set
Umin = {∞} ∪ ℜ together with two operations [56]:
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1. a⊕ b = min(a, b)
2. a⊗ b = a+ b
6.4.2 Series Components
Given a transportation network with n components connected in series, as shown in Figure
6.5, let U = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} be the set of unreliability values of the segments. Since the
segments are connected in series, the driver must go through all the available components
or roadway segments. Therefore, the normalized total reliability of a series network is given
by the addition of unreliability of all segments, as presented in (6.12)
.
Proposition 6.4.1. The total series network unreliability value Us is given by the addition
of {U1, U2, · · · , Un} as presented in Equation 6.12.
Us = ⊗ni=1Ui =
1
n
(U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Un) (6.12)
6.4.3 Parallel Components
Given a transportation network with n components connected in parallel, as shown in Figure
6.4, let U = {U1, U2, · · · , Un} be the set of unreliability values of the segments. Since the
segments are connected in parallel, the driver can chose to go through any roadway segments.
Therefore, the total unreliability of a parallel network is given by the minimum unreliability
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out of all segments, as presented in Equation 6.13.
Proposition 6.4.2. The total parallel network unreliability value Up is given by the mini-
mum of {U1, U2, · · · , Un} as presented in Equation 6.13.
Up = ⊕ni=1Ui = min{U1, U2, · · · , Un} (6.13)
6.4.4 Network Unreliability
using the unreliability concept, the network unreliability can then be represented as a system
of equations as follows:
Uod1 =
1
i
⊕ar=1 (⊗is=1Urs)
Uod2 =
1
j
⊕br=1 (⊗js=1Urs)
Uod3 =
1
k
⊕cr=1 (⊗ks=1Urs)
Uod4 =
1
l
⊕dr=1 (⊗ls=1Urs)
...
(6.14)
6.5 Network Reliability as the Optimal Path Problem
Optimal path problems are special discrete, deterministic, Optimal Control problems [57].
One can consider network reliability to be the “most” reliable path connecting an origin
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and a destination. In which case, the network reliability becomes an optimization problem.
6.5.1 Bellman’s Principle of Optimality
“An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are,
the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting
from the first decision.” [58]
6.5.2 Application of the Bellman’s Principle
Consider the network in Figure 6.9. The performance function in the considered case is
given to be reliability.
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Figure 6.9: A given network to be used in the optimal path problem
Assuming one has the reliability values of all links or link value. Then, the shortest path
will be the path with the maximum reliability. In this optimization problem it is desired
to maximize the performance function which in this case it is reliability. Therefore, solving
the deterministic maximum reliability problem is equivalent to solving the maximal weight
paths tree problem [57]. It is convenient to introduce the completed max-plus semi-ring, as
defined earlier, in order to characterize the optimal path problem.
According to the principle of optimality, the optimal path in the given network for a certain
147
set of OD is provided by:
R∗ = max{P1, P2, P3} =
3⊕
k=1
P
′
k ⊗ Ck
where:
P1 = R1 ⊗ {P11 ⊕ P12}
P2 = R4 ⊗ {P21 ⊕ P22 ⊕ P23}
P3 = R7 ⊗ {P31 ⊕ P32 ⊕ P33}
P11 = R2 ⊗R3, P12 = R12
P21 = R5 ⊗R3, P22 = R6, P23 = R10 ⊗R11
P31 = R8 ⊗R6, P32 = R8 ⊗R10 ⊗R11, P33 = R9 ⊗R11
This formulation of the network reliability problem clearly transforms it into a discrete,
linear optimal path problem which we know how to solve using dynamic programming
methods.
6.5.3 Link Reliability Dependency
The network reliability formulation developed earlier in this chapter assumes independency
between all the links in the network. However, this might not always be the case. It highly
depends on the type of reliability considered. For instance, if the reliability is measured
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by considering the number of incident on each link, then one can assume the links are
independent. Note that this is an approximation since an incident on one link can play
a role in causing incidents in subsequent links causing secondary incidents. However, in
the case were dependency cannot be ignored, such as travel time reliability, it is vital to
extract the independent reliability of each link before proceeding with the network reliability
calculations demonstrated above.
6.6 Introduction
This chapter demonstrated measuring the reliability of networked roadway segments. In
this study it is found that the algebraic structure of the reliability of a network is consistent
with the semi-ring min-plus algebraic structure. This provides us with well established
properties that can simplify the algebra over networks’ reliability. This study discovers the
structure of the algebraic space when reliability is measured for a network.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the measure of network reliability when link reliability is
provided. Various approaches are introduced using the max-plus algebraic structure using
reliability, unreliability, and Bellman’s principle of optimality.
In the future, the minimal path problem using a probabilistic approach based on failure
analysis will be considered. Dependency of roadway links is a major issue that will also be
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considered in future studies.
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Part IV
Safety
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CHAPTER 7
Bayesian Safety Analyzer
7.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the safety aspect of complex networks as shown in Figure 7.1. In the
future, the minimal path problem using a probabilistic approach based on failure analysis
will be considered. Dependency of roadway links is a major issue that will also be considered
in future studies.
Figure 7.1: Overall research work
7.2 Introduction
In this study, the development of a Bayesian Safety Analyzer (BSA) using multiple accident
data sources as well as traffic flow data is demonstrated. Simulations of the developed model
are conducted using MATLAB FullBNT toolbox where different parameter estimations are
used. This study demonstrates the efficiency as well as flexibility of using Bayesian analysis
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on large data sets containing a large number of attributes. The developed BSA can be used
in the incident management process. It can assist decision makers in estimating the severity
of a certain incident based on given attributes for better preparedness. BSA can also be
used in order to assess the safety transportation system.
This study presents a very important tool in data integration, analysis, and probability
theory [59] [60]. Bayesian theory is used in order to build a probabilistic data structure
that can be used to extract likelihood information about various pieces of parameters that
are updated through the enormous amount of data [61] [62]. A given data set usually has
a number of attributes where the relationship between them is not well defined. When
constructing a Bayesian structure over the available data set, each attribute becomes a
node. The links between the nodes can be determined by the nature of the problem,
for instance bad weather conditions can impact the probability of incidents hence causing
congestion. This leads to a nodal structure that has a topological order where ancestor
nodes must precede descendant nodes [59]. The Bayesian Safety Analyzer (BSA) is designed
based on an integration of multiple traffic and crash data sources. The BSA tool allows
structuring the available data into a Bayesian Network. Based on the content of the data,
the occurrence likelihood of different components in the system can be extracted. Data
for the BSA networks developed herein is obtained from Freeway and Arterial System
of Transportation (FAST), Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP), and Nevada Department of
Transportation (NDOT).
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7.3 Literature Review
7.3.1 Bayesian in Action
Bayesian analysis methods are used in many areas in transportation. Ozbay et. al. in [63]
uses Bayesian networks to analyze incidents in order to improve decision making during
the incident management process. In another work of his, Ozbay uses Bayesian networks
in order to estimate incident duration [64]. Lee in his dissertation work used Bayesian
sampling methodology in order to extend Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approxi-
mation for calibration of traffic simulation models [65]. Tuze et. al. [66] uses hierarchical
Bayesian mixed logit approach in order to estimate the value of travel time. Rongmei [67]
introduces an intelligent transportation system for traffic accident processing where key
influence factors are analyzed using case base Bayesian networks and provides conclusions
using Bayesian network Reasoning. Traffic flow forecasting based on Bayesian networks is
developed by Sun et. al. [68].
7.3.2 Accidents Analysis
When it comes to accidents analysis, researchers have used various analysis methodologies.
Tian in [69], employed data mining theories in order to analyze causes of accidents. Ma
in [70], uses Gray relations in order to identify the nature of traffic accidents and their
relation to pre-defined factors. SongBai et. al. [71] built a multidimensional association
rule model of traffic accidents, a data mining methodology, in order to develop the analysis
system of association factors in traffic accidents. Hwang et. al. uses a system that is
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based on hierarchical probabilistic network for detection of traffic accidents on intersections
[72]. Fuzzy distribution fitting is employed by Lurong in order to study the rules of traffic
accidents and hazards [73].
7.3.3 Why Bayesian?
Bayesian methods have proven to be very effective when large amount of data attributes
are involved in analysis. In this research, a Bayesian Safety Analyzer (BSA) is developed.
The BSA allows isolation and identification of likelihood of occurrence of the various data
attributes.
7.4 Theoretical Background
7.4.1 Bayes’ Theorem
In probability theory, Bays theorem is used to calculate the inverse conditional probability
or the posterior probability of a certain event A given another event B [74] [75]. Bay’s
theorem requires the knowledge of the prior probabilities of A and B (also called marginal
probability) and the likelihood of A given B which is obtained by calculating the conditional
probability of B given A.
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
In order to calculate the conditional probabilities, the following equation is used:
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P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
Where:
P (A): is the prior probability of A.
P (B): is the prior or the marginal probability of B.
P (A|B): is the posterior probability of A given B.
P (B|A): is the likelihood of A given B.
7.4.2 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference is a method of statistical inference. Data is used to calculate the proba-
bility that a hypothesis may be true, or it could be used to update its previously calculated
probability [76]. Bayesian inference uses the prior probability over a certain hypotheses to
determine the likelihood of a particular hypothesis given some observed data.
Definition:
Let S be a finite parents space containing n members given by s1, s2, . . . , sn. ∀si ∈
S,m(si) ≡ the number of states each parent si can take.
Proposition:
The number of all possible combinations of states for which the children’s probability dis-
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tribution must be defined is given by:
m (S) =
n∏
i=1
m(si)
This clearly indicates that the distribution tables’ size increase tremendously for each node
based on the number of parents nodes and the number of their states.
7.5 Available Data
The BSA structure presented in this study is based on traffic data as well as crash data
from multiple sources. The data is collected from multiple agencies Freeway and Arterial
System of Transportation (FAST), Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP), and Nevada Depart-
ment of Transportation (NDOT). FAST collects traffic data on the freeways, mainly the
I-15. In addition, FAST collects accident data observed through their video cameras. Addi-
tional Crash or accident data is also collected from NHP and NDOT. Obtaining crash data
from multiple sources is important since different agencies collect different attributes. For
instance, FAST is the only agency that collects the number of lane closure; however, FAST
does not collect other information such as weather conditions or clearance times.
The following is a list of the various attributes collected by the different agencies:
• FAST detector data: Time stamp, Location, Cumulative Volume, Volume by Ve-
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hicle size, Speed.
• FAST accident compile: Date and time, Location, Lanes Blocked.
• NHP: Date and time, Location, Incident Type, Receive Time, Dispatch Time, En-
route Time, Onsite Time, Clearance Time
• NDOT Crash Data: Date and time, Location, Weather, Number of vehicles, Type
of vehicles.
7.6 Proposed Bayesian Safety Analyzer Model
Figure 7.2: Proposed Bayesian Model
The Bayesian model in Figure 7.2 is formed via eight hierarchical levels. The increase
of hierarchy level may reduce direct dependencies between parents’ nodes and immediate
children which implies simpler distribution tables for each node. However, the number of
hierarchical levels is constrained by the nature of the problem being modeled since certain
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parameters directly depend on multiple parameters simultaneously.
Table 7.1: Terms Definitions
Term Definition
TOD Time of day
DOW Day of week
ENR Time Enroute time
OS Time Onsite time
CLR Time Clearance Time
The distribution tables for the BSA model introduced in this work are presented in Tables
7.3(a), 7.3(b), 7.3(c), 7.4(a), 7.5(a), 7.5(b), 7.6(a), and 7.6(b).
The hierarchal structure of the BSA has eight stages corresponding to the data presented
in Table 7.2.
7.7 Constructing Bayesian Model and Simulations in MATLAB - FullBNT-1.0.4
7.7.1 Nodes and Relations Assignment
Bayesian construction of the analyzer through nodes assignment and their relations is cre-
ated in MATLAB using FullBNT tool box as demonstrated in 9.
When displaying the network at this stage, the following is obtained:
bnet =
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Program 9 Bayesian Structure Construction
N = 16;
dag = zeros(N,N);
%Assign nodes in the Bayesian Structure
Location = 1; DOW = 2; Weather = 3; TOD = 4;
Accident = 5;
RecieveTime = 6; VehiclesSpeed = 7; NomVehicles = 8; VehiclesSize = 9;
ENR = 10; Severity = 11; ClosedLanes = 12;
OSTime = 13;
AccCLRTime = 14;
QueueCLRTime = 15;
SecondaryIncident = 16;
%Assign relations between nodes
dag(Location,Accident)=1;
dag(DOW,Accident)=1;
dag(Weather,Accident)=1;
dag(TOD,Accident)=1;
dag(Accident,[RecieveTime VehiclesSpeed NomVehicles VehiclesSize])=1;
dag(RecieveTime,ENR)=1;
dag(VehiclesSpeed,[Severity ClosedLanes])=1;
dag(NomVehicles,[Severity ClosedLanes])=1;
dag(VehiclesSize,[Severity ClosedLanes])=1;
dag(ENR,OSTime)=1;
dag(Severity,AccCLRTime)=1;
dag(ClosedLanes,AccCLRTime)=1;
dag(OSTime,AccCLRTime)=1;
dag(AccCLRTime,QueueCLRTime)=1;
dag(QueueCLRTime,SecondaryIncident)=1;
%Determine size of nodes
discrete_nodes = 1:N;
node_sizes = [2 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 2];
onodes = 1:N;
%Make BayNet
bnet = mk_bnet(dag, node_sizes, ’names’, ’Location’, ’DOW’, ’Weather’, ’TOD’,’Accident’,
’RecieveTime’,’VehiclesSpeed’,’NomVehicles’,’VehiclesSize’,’ENR’, ’Severity’,’ClosedLanes’,’OSTime’,
’AccCLRTime’,’QueueCLRTime’,’SecondaryIncident’, ’discrete’, discrete_nodes, ’observed’, onodes);
%Display BayNet
bnet
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equiv class : [12345678910111213141516]
dnodes : [12345678910111213141516]
observed : [12345678910111213141516]
names : [1x1assocarray]
hidden : [1x0double]
hidden bitv : [0000000000000000]
dag : [16x16double]
node sizes : [2232222432444442]
cnodes : [1x0double]
parents : 1x16cell
members of equiv class : 1x16cell
CPD : 1x16cell
rep of eclass : [12345678910111213141516]
order : [43215987121161013141516]
7.7.2 Distribution Assignment
Distributions assignment of the nodes is performed as well as inference creation. Initially,
uniform distribution is assumed for all the parameters. The Bayesian structure can learn
using data and accordingly adjust the given distributions. The probability distributions
describe the direct relationship between parents nodes and immediate children nodes.
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Program 10 Distribution assignment of nodes
%Assigning Destribution
bnet.CPDLocation= tabular_CPD(bnet, Location, [0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDDOW = tabular_CPD(bnet, DOW, [0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDWeather = tabular_CPD(bnet, Weather, [0.3 0.3 0.4]);
bnet.CPDTOD = tabular_CPD(bnet, TOD, [0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDAccident= tabular_CPD(bnet, Accident, [0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDRecieveTime= tabular_CPD(bnet, RecieveTime, [0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDVehiclesSpeed= tabular_CPD(bnet, VehiclesSpeed, [0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5]);
bnet.CPDNomVehicles = tabular_CPD(bnet, NomVehicles, [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]);
bnet.CPDVehiclesSize = tabular_CPD(bnet, VehiclesSize, [0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33]);
bnet.CPDENR = tabular_CPD(bnet, ENR, [0.5 0.9 0.5 0.1]);
bnet.CPDSeverity = tabular_CPD(bnet, Severity, [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]);
bnet.CPDClosedLanes = tabular_CPD(bnet, ClosedLanes, [0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]);
bnet.CPDOSTime = tabular_CPD(bnet, OSTime, [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]);
bnet.CPDAccCLRTime = tabular_CPD(bnet, AccCLRTime, [0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25]);
bnet.CPDQueueCLRTime = tabular_CPD(bnet, QueueCLRTime, [0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]);
bnet.CPDSecondaryIncident= tabular_CPD(bnet, SecondaryIncident, [0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5]);
%creating inference
engine = jtree_inf_engine(bnet);
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7.7.3 Marginal Distribution Computation
In order to demonstrate how to calculate marginal distributions, consider the example where
the evidence consists of the fact that ‘SecondaryIncident’ takes the value 2, meaning that
a secondary incident has occurred. Then, to compute the probability that ‘Severity’ is
at level 2, indicating injury, given that ‘Secondary ncident’ is 2. Running the code gives
p = 0.25 which makes sense since the distributions are uniform by assumption. The graph
in Figure 7.3 displays the marginal distributions of the ‘Severity’ being at level 1, 2, 3, or
4, respectively given that a secondary incident has occurred.
Figure 7.3: Marginal Distributions
7.8 Bayesian Parameter Learning
There are four types of parameter estimation:
1. Fully observed point estimate: Maximum likelihood parameter estimation from
complete data, command: learn− params
2. Partially observed point estimate: Maximum likelihood parameter estimation
with missing values, command: learn− params− em
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Program 11 Distribution assignment of nodes
%creating inference
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
engine = jtree_inf_engine(bnet);
%Computing Marginal Distributions
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%The evidence consists of the fact that Secondary Incident=2
%All the other nodes are hidden (unobserved)
evidence = cell(1,N);
evidenceSecondaryIncident = 2;
%add the evidence to the engine.
[engine, loglik] = enter_evidence(engine, evidence);
%compute p=P(Severity=2|SecondaryIncident=2) as follows.
marg = marginal_nodes(engine, Severity);
marg.T
p = marg.T(2)
%add the evidence that 3 lanes were closed
evidenceClosedLanes = 3;
[engine, loglik] = enter_evidence(engine, evidence);
marg = marginal_nodes(engine, Severity);
% Find p = P(Severity=2|SecondaryIncident=2,ClosedLanes=3)
p = marg.T(2)
%plot a marginal distribution over a discrete variable as a barchart
bar(marg.T)
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3. Fully observed full Bayesian: (Sequential) Bayesian parameter updating from
complete data, bayes− update− params
4. Partially observed full Bayesian:Not supported
Fully observed indicates that all the variables are observed, whereas partially observed
indicates that there is missing or hidden data. Full Bayesian computes the full posterior over
the parameters. However, point estimate computes Maximum Likelihood or a Maximum A
Posteriori.
7.8.1 Loading Data
Data is needed in order to perform parameter learning on the Bayesian structure. For
testing purposes, data can be generated using forward sampling. However, in this study,
a sample data file is created which corresponds to the parameters and values specified in
Tables 7.2. Various file formats are supported including txt and xls. The data is then
loaded as shown in Program 12 and used to update the distributions of each parameter in
the Bayesian structure. The original data must be processed and formatted in order to be
read by the structure.
7.8.2 Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation from Complete Data
Program 13 demonstrates how parameter learning is accomplished. After the data is loaded
from the sample file, it is used to find the maximum likelihood estimates. The learnt param-
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Program 12 Loading data from a file
data = load(’DataRdTr.txt’, ’-ascii’);
data = xlsread(’AccidentPredict.xls’)
ncases = size(data, 1) % each row of data is a training case
cases = cell(16, ncases);
cases([1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16], :) =
num2cell(data’) % each column of cases is a training case
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
eters can be viewed using a MAT LAB trick as shown in the program below. For instance,
after updating the structure in this study using a sample data file of 20 entries, the following
is obtained when node 4 is viewed:
1 : 0.4500
2 : 0.5500
Note that the distribution is not uniform anymore for this node which indicates that the
distributions of the nodes are updated using the new data.
7.8.3 Partial Parameter Learning
When data is incomplete or has missing values, the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLEs)
values are computed using the EM algorithm. An inference algorithm is used in order to
compute the expected sufficient statistics as shown in Program 14. Dipected in Figure 7.4
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Program 13 Parameter Learning
%Parameter Learning
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% find the maximum likelihood estimates
bnet3 = learn_params(bnet2, cases);
bnet3
%To view the learned parameters
CPT3 = cell(1,N);
for i=1:N
s=struct(bnet3.CPDi);
CPT3i=s.CPT;
end
%Here are the parameters learned for node 4.
dispcpt(CPT34)
is the plot of the log-likelihood at the ith iteration.
7.9 Conclusions and Future Work
7.9.1 Conclusions
In this study, a Bayesian Safety Analyzer (BSA) is constructed based on various data sources
including crash data and traffic data. It is demonstrated how posterior probabilities can
be computed and how data can be used to train the Bayesian structure composed of a
large amount of parameters. Bayesian analysis is proved to be a very efficient probabilistic
method for analyzing a large set of data in order to better estimate dependencies and
likelihood of occurrence of various events. The developed BSA can be used in the incident
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Figure 7.4: The log-likelihood at the ith iteration
Program 14 Partial Parameter Learning
%Partial Parameter Learning
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
engine2 = jtree_inf_engine(bnet2);
max_iter = 10;
[bnet4, LLtrace] = learn_params_em(engine2, cases, max_iter);
%LLtrace(i) is the log-likelihood at iteration i
plot(LLtrace, ’x-’)
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management process. It can assist decision makers in estimating the severity of a certain
incident based on given attributes in order to better prepare. BSA can also be used in order
to assess the transportation system’s safety.
7.9.2 Future Work
Future work includes developing algorithms in order to automate data formatting from
multiple sources into one file that integrates all required data and feeds into the developed
BSA.
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Table 7.2: State Description of Parameters
Parameter States Description StateStates Values
Location Freeway or Arterial Fr 2=Freeway, 1=Arterial
DOW Weekday or Weekend Wd 2= Weekday 1= Weekend
Weather Rain, Fog, or Clear Wth 3= Rain, 2= Fog, 1= Clear
TOD Peak-hour or Regular Pk 2=Peakhour, 1= Regular
Accident Accident Occurred Ac 2= True, 1= False
Receive Time Informing response agency took
greater than 1 minute
Rc 2= True, 1= False
Vehicles
Speed
Vehicles involved were going
higher than the speed limit
Vs 2= True, 1= False
Nom Vehicles 1, 2, 3, or more vehicles were in-
volved
Vn 4= more than 3, 3= 3, 2=
2, 1= 1
Vehicles Size At least one of the vehicles in-
volved was of compact, medium,
or large size
Vsz Large= 3, Medium = 2,
Compact= 1
ENR Time The responding unit was on its
way to the scene after more than
1 minute of being informed
En 2= True, 1= False
Severity Property damage(Pd), Injury
(In), Hit and Run (HR), or
Fatality (Ft)
Pd 4= Ft, 3= HR, 2= In, 1=
Pd
Closed Lanes 1, 2, 3, or all lanes were closed L 4= All lanes, 3= 3, 2= 2,
1= 1
OS Time The responding unit was on-scene
within 5, 10, 15, or more minutes
from being informed
Os 4 = more than 15 min, 3=
15, 2= 10, 1= 5
Acc CLR
Time
Accident cleared within 30, 60,
90, or more minutes
Acl 4 = more than 90 min, 3=
90, 2= 60, 1= 30
Queue CLR
Time
Queue due to accident was
cleared within 30, 60, 90, or more
minutes
Qcl 4 = more than 90 min, 3=
90, 2= 60, 1= 30
Secondary In-
cident
A secondary incident occurred S 2= True, 1= False
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Table 7.3: Hierarchical Initial Probability Distributions of Parameters
(a) Hierarchy level 1
Fr=2 Fr=1 Wd=2 Wd=1 Wth=3 Wth=2 Wth=1 Pk=2 Pk=1
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3˙ 0.3˙ 0.3˙ 0.5 0.5
(b) Hierarchy level 2
Fr Wd Wth Pk Ac=2 Ac=1
1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
1 1 1 2 0.5 0.5
1 1 2 1 0.5 0.5
1 1 2 2 0.5 0.5
1 1 3 1 0.5 0.5
1 1 3 2 0.5 0.5
1 2 1 1 0.5 0.5
1 2 1 2 0.5 0.5
1 2 2 1 0.5 0.5
1 2 2 2 0.5 0.5
1 2 3 1 0.5 0.5
1 2 3 2 0.5 0.5
2 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
2 1 1 2 0.5 0.5
2 1 2 1 0.5 0.5
2 1 2 2 0.5 0.5
2 1 3 1 0.5 0.5
2 1 3 2 0.5 0.5
2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5
2 2 1 2 0.5 0.5
2 2 2 1 0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 0.5 0.5
2 2 3 1 0.5 0.5
2 2 3 2 0.5 0.5
(c) Hierarchy level 3
Ac Rc=2 Rc=1 Vs=2 Vs=1 Vn=4 Vn=3 Vn=2 Vn=1 Vsz=3 Vsz=2 Vsz=1
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3˙ 0.3˙ 0.3˙
2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3˙ 0.3˙ 0.3˙
Table 7.4: Hierarchical Initial Probability Distributions of Parameters
(a) Hierarchy level 4
Rc En=2 En=1 Vs Vn Vsz Pd=4 Pd=3 Pd=2 Pd=1 L=4 L=3 L=2 L=1
1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 0.5 0.5 1 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
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Table 7.5: Hierarchical Initial Probability Distributions of Parameters
(a) Hierarchy level 5
En Os=4 Os=3 Os=2 Os=1
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
(b) Hierarchy level 6
Os Pd L Acl=4 Acl=3 Acl=2 Acl=1 Os Pd L Acl=4 Acl=3 Acl=2 Acl=1
1 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 1 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 1 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 2 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 2 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 3 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 3 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 4 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 4 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 1 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 1 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 1 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 1 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 2 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 2 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 2 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 2 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 2 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 3 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 4 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 4 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 4 3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 4 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 4 4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Table 7.6: Hierarchical Initial Probability Distributions of Parameters
(a) Hierarchy level 7
Acl P(Qcl=4) Qcl=3 Qcl=2 Qcl=1
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
(b) Hierarchy level 8
Qcl S=2 S=1
1 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 0.5
3 0.5 0.5
4 0.5 0.5
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Part V
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CHAPTER 8
Hybrid Modeling and Control of Ramps
8.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the modeling, parameter estimation, and development of control
schemes for switching hybrid systems as shown in Figure 8.1.
This chapter presents a feedback control design for an isolated freeway ramp that utilizes
a hybrid dynamical model for the traffic using Godunov’s numerical technique. Ramp-
metering is the primary means of controlling highway networks.
Figure 8.1: Overall research work
8.2 Introduction
Feedback ramp metering designs in the past have relied on either discretized linearized
method such as ALINEA, or nonlinear feedback designs based on ordinary differential
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equations for the traffic model. However, lumped parameter models fail to represent the
rarefaction wave phenomenon of the distributed model. This study uses Godunov based
hybrid lumped model based on which feedback control design is proposed, and simulation
results for the model are presented. Ramp metering is designed to improve the traffic flow
on the freeways by controlling the allowable rate of flow into the freeway at the entrance
ramp. Ramp metering has been studied and implemented for more than 45 years, see for
instance [77], [78], [79], and [80] for some early references. The handbook [81] provides a
nice general overview of the ramp metering methods. Some optimization based methods
on ramp metering are presented in [82], [83], and [84]. Simulation based analysis of ramp
metering is covered in many papers such as [85], and [86]. A local feedback ramp con-
trol designed based on discretized linearization of the traffic dynamics is presented in [87].
A fuzzy logic based local ramp controller is presented in [88], a neural network based in
[89], and a decentralized one in [90]. Ramp meters have been deployed in many different
countries, such as in U.S.A [91], France [92], Italy [93], Germany [94], New Zealand [95],
U.K. [96], and Netherlands [97]. Feedback ramp metering controllers based on nonlinear
lumped parameter model are detailed in [98]. Model formulations in different settings such
as the distributed model, lumped model, and their continuous and discrete time versions
are shown in [99] and [100].
8.3 Background
Ramp meters are designed to control the inflow into freeways to reduce congestion on the
highways. Ramp meters can be pre-timed, or can be operated in an actuated way. Feedback
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control theory can be used to design real-time ramp meters so that the ramp flows can be
made dependent on the current traffic conditions. Figure 8.2 shows a freeway with an
entrance ramp being controlled by a traffic light.
Traffic Flow Direction
Entrance Ramp
Ramp Signal
Exit Ramp
Figure 8.2: Ramp Metering
Ramp metering models that have been used for feedback control design that utilize lumped
parameter model have used dynamics that do not reproduce the rarefaction behavior of
traffic. In those models, when the traffic is at jam density the outflow from a section
becomes zero. However, this would mean that the traffic would never come out of the jam.
This research uses a Godunov based model in the lumped setting which reproduces the
rarefaction behavior. The study then presents a feedback control design for ramp metering
that provides asymptotic stable behavior for the closed loop system.
The next section presents the mathematical model for the system, followed by a section on
control design, and finally the section that presents simulation results.
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8.4 Mathematical Model
The LWR (Lighthill-Whitham-Richards) model, named after the authors in [101] and [102],
is a macroscopic one-dimensional traffic model. The conservation law for traffic in one
dimension is given by
∂
∂t
ρ(t, x) +
∂
∂x
f(t, x) = 0 (8.1)
In this equation ρ is the traffic density and f is the flux which is the product of traffic
density and the traffic speed v, i.e. f = ρv. There are many models researchers have
proposed for how the flux should be dependent on traffic conditions. Greenshield’s model
(see [103]) uses a linear relationship between traffic density and traffic speed.
v(ρ) = vf (1− ρ
ρm
) (8.2)
where vf is the free flow speed and ρm is the maximum density. Free flow speed is the speed
of traffic when the density is zero. This is the maximum speed. The maximum density is
the density at which there is a traffic jam and the speed is equal to zero.
A space discretized model of Equation 8.1 for the ramp metering is presented in Figure 8.3.
Here, u(t) is the ramp inflow into the freeway.
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ρ(t)fin(t) fout(t)
u(t)
Figure 8.3: Discretized Model
The ordinary differential equation (ODE) model from the figure for the ramp metering,
assuming unit length for the section, is given by
dρ(t)
dt
= fin(t) + u(t)− fout(t) (8.3)
The outflow traffic using Greenshield’s model is given by
fout(t) = vfρ(t)(1− ρ(t)
ρm
) (8.4)
Now, substituting Formula 8.4 for the outflow into the conservation Equation 8.3 shows
that when the traffic density is equal to the jam density, and the value of u(t) is zero, the
rate of increase in the traffic density is non-negative. In fact, for positive inflow, the density
can increase according to the equation. Hence, there are two issues with this model that
need to be fixed. When the traffic density is equal to jam density for the section,
1. the inflow from upstream can increase the density above the jam value, and
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2. the outflow is zero from the section not allowing for the traffic to be dissipated to
downstream.
The original distributed LWR model given by Equation 8.1 using the Greenshield’s funda-
mental relationship 8.2 does not have these limitations. This can be seen by studying the
characteristics emanating from an initial value problem for a Riemann’s problem where the
upstream traffic density is lower (see [104], [105], and [106]). Figure 8.4 shows the char-
acteristics of traffic where the initial traffic data is shown on the x-axis, where the traffic
density is piecewise constant. The middle section has the jam density ρm, the upstream
has a lower density ρ0 and the downstream has zero density. As time increases, as shown
on the y-axis, the shock wave travels upstream and at the same time the jam dissipates as
a rarefaction onto the downstream.
ρmρ0 ρ = 0
x
t
Figure 8.4: Traffic Characteristics
We can use Godunov’s model to fix these two issues in the ODE model, and use the Godunov
model as our nominal model for the control design. Note that we could also take model
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given by Equation 8.3 as the nominal model for the feedback control design and let the
closed loop system provide performance via its robustness for the real system. However, we
choose the Godunov based nominal model so as to have better representation of the system
in the nominal model.
8.4.1 Godunov based Model
The Godunov method is based on solving the Riemann problem where the initial condition
is a piecewise constant function with two values ρℓ and ρr for the upstream (left) and
downstream (right) densities (see [107]). From the junction of the two densities either a
shockwave or a rarefaction wave can emanate. A shockwave develops if f ′(uℓ) > f
′(ur) (see
[108]).
(a) Left (b) Right
Figure 8.5: Shockwaves moving Upstream (left) and Downstream (right)
The speed of the shockwave is given by Equation 8.5. In this equation, xs(t) is the position
of the shockwave as a function of time. If the shock speed is positive then the inflow at
junction between the two traffic densities will be a function of upstream traffic density,
whereas if the shock speed is negative, then the inflow at junction between the two traffic
densities will be a function of downstream traffic density.
s =
dxs(t)
dt
=
[f(uℓ)− f(ur)]
uℓ − ur (8.5)
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A rarefaction develops if f ′(uℓ) < f
′(ur). The rarefaction can be entirely to the left, or to
the right or in the middle.
(a) Left (b) Middle (c) Right
Figure 8.6: Rarefaction Solution
The analysis of the shockwave and rarefaction conditions gives us the Godunov based ODE
model for traffic. The ODE for Godunov method is the same as the conservation law, and
is give by Equation 8.6, where we have assumed unit length for the section. To derive the
rest of the model, please consider Figure 8.7.
dρ(t)
dt
= fin(t)− fout(t) + u(t) (8.6)
u(t)
ρ(t)
fin(t) fout(t)
ρℓ(t) ρr(t)
Figure 8.7: Godunov Dynamics
Now, the inflow fin(t) will be a function of upstream density ρℓ and downstream density
ρr. Here upstream and downstream are with respect to the left junction. Hence we have
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the relationship given by Equation 8.7 where we have used the function F (·, ·) that will be
obtained from the Godunov method.
fin(t) = F (ρℓ, ρ) (8.7)
Similarly, for the right junction, the outflow fout(t) is given by Equation 8.8.
fout(t) = F (ρ, ρr) (8.8)
The function F (ρℓ, ρr) in terms of its arguments is given by the Godunov method as follows
(see [107]).
F (ρ, ρr) = f(ρ
∗(ρℓ, ρr)) (8.9)
Here, the flow-dictating density ρ∗ is obtained from the following (see [107]):
1. f ′(ρℓ), f
′(ρr) ≥ 0⇒ ρ∗ = ρℓ
2. f ′(ρℓ), f
′(ρr) ≤ 0⇒ ρ∗ = ρr
3. f ′(ρℓ) ≥ 0 ≥ f ′(ρr)⇒ ρ∗ = ρℓ if s > 0, otherwise ρ∗ = ρr
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4. f ′(ρℓ) < 0 < f
′(ρr)⇒ ρ∗ = ρs
Here, ρs is obtained as the solution to f
′(ρs) = 0.
Physically, the Gordunov conditions have the following meanings:
1. f ′(ρℓ), f
′(ρr) ≥ 0 ⇒ ρ∗ = ρℓ: If the densities on the left and right of the boundary
are less than the critical density rhom/2, then the inflow is determined by the density
on the left. This is due to the fact that the segment on the right , in this case, can
absorb additional flow until it reaches the maximum flow possible.
2. f ′(ρℓ), f
′(ρr) ≤ 0 ⇒ ρ∗ = ρr: If the densities in both sections are close to jam
density, particularly, higher than the critical density, then the flow at the boundary is
determined by the density on the right since the segment on the right cannot handle
additional vehicle flow.
3. f ′(ρℓ) ≥ 0 ≥ f ′(ρr) ⇒ ρ∗ = ρℓ if s > 0, otherwise ρ∗ = ρr If the density in the
segment on the left is less than critical density and the density in the right segment
is higher than the critical density then the density that is used to determine flow at
the boundary depends on the speed of the shockwave. This is determined by noting
that in this case the density on the left is always less than the density on the right
then by using Equation 8.5 in order to determine the direction of the shockwave as
follows:
• if the flow on the left is less than it is on the right, then the shockwave is
traveling to the right. In which case, the density at the boundary is determined
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by the density on the left.
• if the flow on the left is higher than it is on the left, then the shockwave is
traveling to the right. In which case, the density at the boundary is determined
by the density on the right.
4. f ′(ρℓ) < 0 < f
′(ρr) ⇒ ρ∗ = ρs: If the density on the left is higher than the critical
density and the density on the right is less than the critical density then the critical
density is used to determine the flow at the boundary which is the maximum flow
possible.
8.5 Hybrid Dynamic Model and Control Design
The ODE model for the ramp metering system can be written as
dρ(t)
dt
= F (ρℓ, ρ)− F (ρ, ρr) + u(t) (8.10)
This is a switched hybrid system (see [109]), where the switching happens autonomously
based on the values of ρℓ, ρ, and ρr. The function F (ρℓ, ρ) can have three distinct values,
f(ρℓ), f(ρ), or f(ρs). Similarly, F (ρ, ρr) can have three distinct values. Hence, the dynamics
can be written as
dρ(t)
dt
= Gq(ρℓ, ρ, ρr) + u(t) (8.11)
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where q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 9} and the different Gq functions can be obtained from Equations 8.9,
8.10, and 8.11.
We propose the following feedback linearization based model for the ramp metering control
that attempts to keep the mainline traffic density at ρc, which is taken to be the flow
maximizing density. For the Greenshield’s model this critical density is ρm/2.
u(t) = −Gq(ρℓ, ρ, ρr)− k(ρ(t)− ρc), k > 0 (8.12)
The closed loop dynamics obtained by using this control law (if the prevalent traffic condi-
tions are enabling) provide an exponentially decaying error, i.e.
e(t) = [ρ(t)− ρc]→ 0, as t→∞ (8.13)
The enabling conditions for the performance are obviously important, since if there are
no vehicles at the ramp, then the control rate will not be achieved. Moreover, there is
a maximum possible ramp inflow rate. In addition vehicles cannot be taken out of the
freeway using an entrance ramp. Hence, only those values of the ramp flow are practically
implemented that are in the range of [0, umax].
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8.6 Simulations
The control developed in this study is implemented using the open source software scilab.
The simulated model is consistent with the conservation law as well as the Gordunov condi-
tions that make up the hybrid system. The model is first validated, then the control scheme
is added and various scenarios are simulated in order to test the control rule developed. In
this particular simulation model, the parameters used are as follows:
• Jam density: 80 vehicles/mile
• Critical Density: 40 vehicles/mile
• Free Flow Speed: 60 miles/hour
8.6.1 Simulation Model
The code presented in Program 15 is the implementation of Godunov conditions.
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Program 15 Implementation of the Godunov Conditions in Scilab
// ---------- Hybrid Godunov-Based Feedback Ramp Control
clear;
clc;
function rhog = Godunov(rl,rr)
rhos = 40;
rhom = 80;
vf = 60;
ul = vf .* (1-rl/rhom);
ur = vf .* (1-rr/rhom);
s = (ul.*rl - ur.*rr)/(rl - rr);
dfl = vf .* (1-2.*rl/rhom);
dfr = vf .* (1-2.*rr/rhom);
case1 = dfl >= 0 & dfr >= 0;
case2 = dfl <= 0 & dfr <= 0;
case3 = dfl >= 0 & dfr <= 0 & s > 0;
case4 = dfl >= 0 & dfr <= 0 & s <= 0;
case5 = dfl <= 0 & dfr >= 0;
//~(case1 | case2);
rhog = (case1 + case3) .* rl + (case2 + case4) .* rr + case5 .* rhos;
endfunction;
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The Scilab code in Program 16 describes the ordinary differential equation (ode) given in
Equation 8.10 which uses the hybrid control scheme developed in this study. In addition, a
lower limit of zero and an upper limit of 0.75 of the maximum flow is applied on the in-flow
of the control.
Program 16 Implementation of the Conservation Law in Scilab
function dx = RampControl(t,x)
vf = 60;
rhom = 80;
rhos = 40;
rhol = 20;
rhor = 20;
k=0.5;
fmax = vf*(1-rhos /rhom).*rhos;
umax = 0.75 .* fmax;
umin = 0;
rfout = Godunov(x,rhor);
rfin = Godunov(rhol,x);
fin = vf*(1-rfin /rhom).*rfin;
fout = vf*(1-rfout /rhom).*rfout;
up = fout - fin - k .* (x - rhos);
case1 = up <= umax & up >= 0;
case2 = up > umax;
case3 = up < 0;
u = up .* case1 + umax .* case2 + 0 .* case3;
dx = fin - fout + u;
//dx = fin - fout
endfunction
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The code presented in Program 17 describes the implementation of the ode solver combined
with the hybrid control law and Godunov’s conditions.
Program 17 Implementation of the Ramp Hybrid Control in Scilab
k=0.5;
vf = 60;
rhom = 80;
rhos = 40;
rhol = 20;
rhor = 20;
fmax = vf*(1-rhos /rhom).*rhos;
umax = 0.75 .* fmax;
umin = 0;
t = 0:0.0001:0.7;
x0 = [10];
x = ode(x0,0,t,RampControl);
e = x - 40;
rfout = Godunov(x,rhor);
rfin = Godunov(rhol,x);
fin = vf*(1-rfin /rhom).* rfin;
fout = vf*(1-rfout /rhom).* rfout;
up = fout - fin - k .* (x - rhos);
case1 = up <= umax & up >= 0;
case2 = up > umax;
case3 = up < 0;
u = up .* case1 + umax .* case2 + 0 .* case3;
subplot(221);
plot(t,x(1,:));xgrid;
xlabel("time");
title(’Density in the middle section ’);
subplot(222);
plot(t,rfin);xgrid;
xlabel("time");
title(’In Density used’);
subplot(224);
plot(t,e);xgrid;
xlabel(’time’);
title(’Error’);
subplot(223);xgrid;
plot(t,u);
xlabel(’time’);
title(’Control’);
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8.6.2 Simulation Model Validation
Before applying the control scheme developed in this study, the model was validated in order
to verify its consistency with the conservation law based on Godunov boundary conditions.
Therefore, different scenarios for boundary as well as initial conditions where carefully
chosen to cover all possibilities as stated in Table 8.1 which also states the figures associated
with each scenario.
Table 8.1: Scenarios Tested
ρl ρ0 ρr Figure
20 10 20 8.8
20 30 20 8.9
20 50 20 8.10
20 60 20 8.11
20 60 70 8.13
20 70 20 8.12
50 20 70 8.14
60 50 60 8.16
60 70 60 8.17
70 20 50 8.15
Note that when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 10, and ρr = 20, then at both boundaries, the conditions
should satisfy Godunov’s first condition since all the given densities are less than the critical
density. Figures 8.8 and 8.9 clearly show that at the first boundary, the density on the left
ρl was used as indicated by the “In Density Plot” which is consistent with Gardanov’s first
condition. Similarly, the “Out Density” plot is following exactly the density in the middle
section which is again consistent with Godunov’s first condition.
When ρl = 20, ρ0 = 50, and ρr = 20, the first boundary condition must satisfy Godunov’s
third condition since the density on the left is lower than the density on the right of the
boundary. However, in a very small amount of time the density in the middle section
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Figure 8.8: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 10, and ρr = 20
Figure 8.9: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 30, and ρr = 20
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reduces and becomes lower than the critical density. Therefore, for the most part, the first
boundary condition needs to be consistent with the first Godunov condition which takes on
the density on the left as demonstrated in the “In Density used” plot in Figure 8.10. The
second boundary, however, must satisfy the fourth Godunov’s condition since the density
on the right is lower than the critical density and the density on the left is higher than
the critical density. This holds until the density in the center segment becomes lower than
the critical density then Godunov’s first condition must be satisfied where the density on
the left of the boundary is used as shown in the “Out Density used” plot in Figure 8.10.
identical behaviour is also observed in Figures 8.11 and 8.12.
Figure 8.10: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 50, and ρr = 20
When ρl = 20, ρ0 = 60, and ρr = 70, the left boundary must satisfy Godunov’s third
condition since the density on the left is less than the critical density and the density on
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Figure 8.11: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 60, and ρr = 20
Figure 8.12: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 70, and ρr = 20
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the right is higher than the critical density. However, note that the flow at both sides of the
boundary is equal; therefore, according to Godunov’s third condition, the density on the
right is used at the boundary as shown in the “In Density used” plot in Figure 8.13. The
right boundary, however, must be consistent with Godunov’s second condition since both
densities are higher than the critical density in which case the density on the right of the
boundary is used as shown in the “Out Density used” in Figure 8.13.
Figure 8.13: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 60, and ρr = 70
When ρl = 50, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 70, the density on the left of the first boundary is higher
than the critical density where the density on the right boundary is lower than the critical
density. In this case, the density used at the boundary in order to determine the flow is the
critical density, that is the maximum flow, as shown in the “in Density used” plot in Figure
8.14 which stays at 40 until the center density becomes higher than the critical density.
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At this point, Godunov’s second condition is applied where the density on the right of the
boundary is used. However, initially, the second boundary must satisfy Godunov’s third
condition with a negative shock speed which uses the density on the left of the boundary
until the density on the left becomes higher than the critical density. In this case, Godunov’s
second control law must be followed which also uses the density on the right of the boundary
as shown in the “Out Density used” plot in Figure 8.14. Similar reasoning also applies to
results in Figure 8.15
Figure 8.14: Results when ρl = 50, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 70
When ρl = 50, ρ0 = 60, and ρr = 50, Godunov’s second condition must be satisfied at both
boundaries. In this case, the densities on the right of the boundaries are used as show in
the plots in Figure 8.16. The same reasoning applies to the results in Figure 8.17
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Figure 8.15: Results when ρl = 70, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 50
Figure 8.16: Results when ρl = 50, ρ0 = 60, and ρr = 50
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Figure 8.17: Results when ρl = 60, ρ0 = 70, and ρr = 60
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8.6.3 Simulation Results
After the model was verified, the hybrid control scheme developed in this study is applied
to the model. Different scenarios for boundary as well as initial conditions where carefully
chosen to cover all possibilities as stated in Table 8.2 which also states the figures associated
with each scenario.
Table 8.2: Scenarios Tested
ρl ρ0 ρr Figure
20 10 20 8.18
20 30 20 8.19
20 50 20 8.20
20 70 20 8.21
50 20 70 8.22
60 50 60 8.23
60 70 60 8.24
70 20 50 8.25
The purpose of the control is to maintain the density of the section of the freeway at the
critical density which maximizes the flow. In this particular simulation model, the critical
density is given by 40.
When ρl = 20, ρ0 = 10, and ρr = 20, the input flow of the control is shown to increase
until density in the section of interest equals the critical density or when the control reaches
its maximum allowed inflow rate as demonstrated in Figure 8.18. An identical behavior
is depicted in the simulations in Figure 8.19. In both scenarios, all densities are less than
critical density. Therefore, the first Godunov condition is applied in both cases.
When ρl = 20, ρ0 = 50, and ρr = 20, the densities at both side of the middle section are light
and less the critical density. Therefore, the density at the middle section decreases based
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Figure 8.18: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 10, and ρr = 20
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Figure 8.19: Results whenρl = 20, ρ0 = 30, and ρr = 20
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on the conservation dynamics. The control increases the inflow as the density in the middle
section decreases. It is observed in Figure 8.20 that the error goes to zero and the density
of the middle section converges to the desired density. Note that at the first boundary,
Godunov’s third condition is applied with a positive shock speed, where the simulation
configuration in Figure 8.21 the shock speed is negative indicating that the density on the
right of the boundary must be used in order to determine the inflow. It is shown in the
results in Figure 8.21 that even when the shock speed is negative, the control developed
leads the center segment to have the maximum flow if it is assumed to be provided.
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Figure 8.20: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 50, and ρr = 20
When ρl = 50, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 70, eventually the middle section becomes congested and
takes on the density of ρr = 70. Since the ramp can only control the inflow, it is not possible
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Figure 8.21: Results when ρl = 20, ρ0 = 70, and ρr = 20
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to take out undesired densities from the middle section. Therefore, as stated earlier, the
minimum possible inflow controlled is zero as depicted in Figure 8.22. In this case, the
control error will not converge to zero. The same reasoning applies to the simulation results
in Figure 8.23.
Figure 8.22: Results when ρl = 50, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 70
When ρl = 60, ρ0 = 70, and ρr = 60 indicating densities above the critical densities on
all sections, the control reduces the inflow until it reaches the minimum inflow possible as
demonstrated in the plots in Figure 8.24.
When ρl = 70, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 50, the middle section will eventually reach the density
ρr = 50 based on Godunov’s conditions as well as the conservation law dynamics. Therefore,
as shown in the simulation results in Figure 8.25, the inflow is zero from the control scheme
and the error does not converge to zero for the same reason mentioned earlier stating the
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Figure 8.23: Results when ρl = 60, ρ0 = 50, and ρr = 60
Figure 8.24: Results when ρl = 60, ρ0 = 70, and ρr = 60
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developed control cannot absorbe access flow it can only provide additional flow.
Figure 8.25: Results when ρl = 70, ρ0 = 20, and ρr = 50
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8.7 Hybrid Control Implementation Case Study
In order to demonstrate the implementation of the proposed hybrid control in real life
application, the North-bound Tropicana on-ramp was chosen with the assistance of the
Freeway and Arterial System of Transportation (FAST). Data is collected on the chosen
ramp, parameters were estimated, and then a model was developed to fit the characteristics
of the specific ramp chosen. The existing control law was obtained then implemented
in simulations along with the developed model. The proposed hybrid control was then
compared to the existing one through simulations as well.
8.7.1 Description of Scenario
The ramp in this case study was chosen with the assistance of FAST personnel. The selection
criteria of the ramp are composed of several requirements. It is vital that the chosen ramp
has a ramp meter that is controlled by the freeway sensors. Furthermore, for model fitting
purposes, it is crucial that the chosen location covers a wide range of traffic conditions in
terms of density, flow, and speed.
8.7.1.1 Location
The location that is chosen to conduct this study is the North-bound Tropicana Avenue to
Interstate-15 as depicted in Figure 8.26. The main line consists of five lanes where two of
which are express lanes; however, all five lanes are treated as regular lanes at this location
since vehicles can freely access any lane. The on-ramp has three lanes.
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Figure 8.26: The North-bound Tropicana Avenue to Interstate-15 location taken from
FAST website http://rtcsnv.com/mpo/fast/dashboard.cfm [1]
8.7.1.2 Data Sources
The data is collected at the desired location by FAST. Most freeway detectors are radar
based; however, the detection on the Interstate 15 at the Tropicana location uses loop
detectors. The counts are polled every 5 minutes, and then the data is aggregated and
reported every 15 minutes. At this location, the freeway detector has a roadway id: 59 and
a segment id 2. The data from this sensor is used by the ramp controller in order to control
the flow when operated in traffic responsive mode. The counts on the ramp, however, are
obtained from video detection. The location of the detector at the North-bound Tropicana
on-ramp is shown in Figure 8.27. It is indicated by “Ramp Meter 10”.
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Figure 8.27: The location of the North-bound Tropicana Avenue to Interstate-15 ramp
detector taken from FAST’s website http://rtcsnv.com /mpo/fast/ dashboard.cfm [1]
8.7.1.3 Data Description
In order to obtain a well balanced data range, the data points must uniformly cover the
range such that it is not biased towards a certain traffic condition. Therefore, the data is
obtain for a Thursday between 6:00am and 12:00pm since it is observed that various traffic
conditions occur throughout this weekday. This provides enough data points to estimate the
macroscopic traffic model. Depicted in Figure 8.28 is the volume-speed plot of North-bound
Tropicana Avenue to Interstate-15 obtained from FAST’s website.
The data can be obtained from FAST’s website in the format shown in 8.29[1]. A number of
attributes are available as shown in Figure 8.29, such as Speed, Volume, Volume by vehicle
size, and Occupancy. The attributes that were used in this study were Speed and Volume.
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Figure 8.28: The speed-volume plot of North-bound Tropicana Avenue to Interstate-
15 taken from FAST’s website http://rtcsnv.com/mpo/fast/dashboard.cfm [1]
Figure 8.29: Detector data from North-bound Tropicana Avenue to Interstate-15
taken from FAST’s website http://rtcsnv.com/mpo/fast/dashboard.cfm [1]
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8.7.2 Parameter Estimation
8.7.2.1 What are the Needed Parameters?
As stated earlier, the traffic flow using Greenshields model is given by
f(t) = vfρ(t)(1− ρ(t)
ρm
) (8.14)
From Equation 8.14, it is evident that vf and ρm are needed in order to model the chosen
ramp. The flow f is provided from the data as well as the speed V . In order to determine
the density ρ, the relationship f = V ∗ ρ is used. It is desired to estimate vf and ρm. It
becomes clear that Least Square Estimation (LSE) can be used if Equation 8.14 is rewritten
as in Equation 8.15.
f(t) = vfρ(t)−
vf
ρm
ρ(t)2 (8.15)
Equation 8.15 has the following general form
y = w1β1 + w2β2 (8.16)
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where,
y = f(t)
w1 = vf
β1 = ρ
w2 =
vf
ρm
β2 = ρ
2
The problem now is transformed into a linear equation where LSE can be used in order to
estimate w1 = vf and w2 =
vf
ρm
where ρm can then be calculated.
8.7.3 Projection Theorem
Theorem 8.7.1. Let H be a Hilber Space and S be a closed subspace of H. Then, ∀y ∈ H∃
a unique s0 ∈M such that ‖y − s0‖ ≤ ‖y − s‖ ∀s ∈ S and (y − s0)⊥S. [110]
The projection theorem states that given closed subspace of a complete inner product space
or Hilbert space and a member of that Hilbert space, one can find a unique member that
lies in the subspace which is the closest to the given member of the Hilbert space.
Using the resulting property or sufficient condition that the vector representing the distance
between the member of the Hilbert space to be approximated and its closest approximation
in the given subspace is perpendicular to the subspace, one can easily obtain the Least
Square Estimator (LSE) result.
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8.7.4 Least Square Estimation
Equation 8.16 describes the model that is used to describe the freeway segment of interest
indicating the parameters that need to be estimated. Rewriting Equation 8.16 in a matrix
form, let
W =
[
w1 w2
]
=
[
ρ −ρ2
]
and
β =

 β1
β2

 =

 vf
vf
ρm


then the following is obtained,
y =Wβ (8.17)
where y and W are obtained from the measured data and β is the vector of parameters to
be estimated, βˆ.
Applying the Projection Theorem, it is observed that
W ′(y −Wβˆ) = 0 (8.18)
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then the best estimate of β is given by
βˆ = [W ′W ]−1W ′y (8.19)
8.7.5 Discrete On-Line Parameter Estimation- Recursive Least Square Estimation
The best estimate given in Equation 8.19 can be used on a large set of data. However, in
case parameters need to be updated in real time as new sensor measurements are obtained,
Recursive Least Square Estimation (RLSE) is used. The RLSE is derived by rewriting y− yˆ
as follows
y − yˆ =Wβˆk+1 −Wβˆk (8.20)
The RLSE is given by
βˆk+1 = βˆk + [W
′W ]−1W ′(y −Wβˆk) (8.21)
8.7.6 Continuous On-Line Parameter Estimation and Exponential Forgetting
When dynamics are continuous or not discretized, one must implement the on-line param-
eter estimation in a continuous manner as well.
The derivation of the continuous RLSE results from the basic idea behind LSE which is
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minimizing the total prediction error as given by Equation 8.22 [111].
J =
∫ t
0
∥∥∥y(r)−W (r)βˆ(t)∥∥∥2 dr (8.22)
By performing clever manipulations [111] and by defining the gain P (t) as
P (t) = [
∫ t
0
W ′(r)W (r)dr]−1 (8.23)
the following differential continuous RLSE equations are obtained for βˆ and P
˙ˆ
β = −P (t)W ′(yˆ − y) (8.24)
P˙ = −PW ′WP (8.25)
When performing exponential forgetting, Equation 8.25 is modified as follows
P˙ = λP − PW ′WP (8.26)
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8.7.6.1 Data Formatting
As shown in Figure 8.29, speed, v, data is provided as miles per hour where volume data or
flow f is provided as vehicles per 15 minutes. Flow data is converted to vehicles per hour,
then density ρ is obtained by dividing flow by speed. The final formatted data is depicted
in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Formatted sensor data used for parameter estimation
Speed V Flow veh/15min Flow f veh/hr Density ρ veh/mile ρ2
8.8 MATLAB Implementation
LSE and RLSE are implemented using MATLAB as demonstrated in Programs 18 and 19.
Both algorithms read data that resides in some file then performs the LSE based on the bulk
matrix equation presented in Equation 8.19 where the RLSE uses the formula in Equation
8.21 in order to recursively estimate the parameters.
Program 18 Implementation of Least Square Estimation in MATLAB
clear
clc
%Data from file
data = xlsread(’EstimationData.xlsx’);
n = size(data,1);%numnber of measurements
w1 = data(1:n,2);
w2 = data(1:n,3);
y = data(1:n,1);
W = [w1 w2]
a = W
y
c = inv(W’*W)*W’*y
[b,se_b,mse] = lscov(W,y)
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Program 19 Implementation of Recursive Least Square Estimation in MATLAB
rhom = 85;
vf= 69;
bhat = [vf rhom]’;
bhat2 = [vf rhom]’;
for j=1:n,
w1 = data(j,2);
w2 = data(j,3);
y = data(j,1);
W = [w1 w2];
yhat=W*bhat;
bhat = bhat + W
(y-yhat);
end
bhat
8.8.0.2 Estimated Parameters
When applying the data using the developed MATLAB algorithems, the following parameter
estimates are obtained:
vf = 69.5815mile/hr
vf/ρm = 0.8038⇒ ρm = 86.57veh/mile
8.8.1 Existing Ramp Control
The ramp meter at the North-bound Tropicana location has two operation modes, fixed
rate and traffic responsive. Table 8.4 describes the operation modes. The ramp is turned
on during the morning peak 6:00am to 9:00am in traffic responsive mode. The ramp meter
is turned on at the maximum fixed rate, 30 vehicles per minute(veh/min), between 1:00pm
and and 6:00pm. It is important to mention that the operations of the traffic operations
personnel take into account the traffic condition on the ramp as well in determining the
flow rate.
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Table 8.4: The North-bound Tropicana ramp meter operation modes
Time Operation Mode Description
6:00am-9:00am Traffic Responsive
v < 22⇒ Rate = 20 veh/min
22 < v < 26⇒ Rate = 22 veh/min
26 < v < 34⇒ Rate = 24 veh/min
34 < v < 38⇒ Rate = 26 veh/min
38 < v < 46⇒ Rate = 28 veh/min
46 < v < 56⇒ Rate = 30 veh/min
1:00pm-6:00pm Fixed Rate 30 veh/min
Other Turned off Vehicles can flow freely
8.8.2 Comparative Simulations
8.8.2.1 Simulations of Existing Control
Program 20 is the implementation of the existing control of the chosen ramp meter based
on the responsive mode. One of the main differences between the existing control and the
proposed one is that the existing control is based only on the speed at which the speed of
the inflow. However, the proposed control is based on the density of the freeway segment
which is determined by using densities on both sides of the segment or boundary conditions.
The parameters used are based on the data collected and the least square estimation used
previously which resulted in vf = 69.5815 mile/hr and ρm = 86.57veh/mile.
8.8.2.2 Simulation Results of Proposed and Existing Hybrid Control
Figure 8.30 demonstrates the advantage of implementing the proposed Godunov-based con-
trol vs. the existing ramp meter control. It is observed that if there is enough demand at the
ramp, then the density on the freeway segment reaches jam density in a very short amount
of time. On the other hand, the density of the freeway gradually increases then stabilizes
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Program 20 Implementation of the existing ramp meter control in MATLAB
function dy = ExistRampControl(t,y)
vf = 70;
rhom = 86;
rhos = 43;
rhol = 20;
rhor = 20;
k=0.5;
fmax = vf*(1-rhos /rhom).*rhos;
umax = 0.75 .* fmax;
umin = 0;
rfout = Godunov(y,rhor);
rfin = Godunov(rhol,y);
v = vf*(1-rfin /rhom);
fin = vf*(1-rfin /rhom).*rfin;
fout = vf*(1-rfout /rhom).*rfout;
case1 = v <= 22 & v >= 0;
case2 = v <= 26 & v > 22;
case3 = v <= 34 & v > 26;
case4 = v <= 38 & v > 34;
case5 = v <= 46 & v > 38;
case6 = v <= 56 & v > 46;
case7 = v > 56;
u = 1200 .* case1 + 1320 .* case2 + 1440 .* case3 + 1560 .* case4
+ 1680 .* case5 + 1800 .* case6 + umax .* case7;
dy = fin - fout + u;
about the critical or desired density. It is evident that the proposed hybrid control is a
more suitable mechanism of controlling the ramp if the purpose is to maintain the freeway
at the maximum flow.
8.8.3 Simulations of Hybrid Self Tuning Regulator
Self-tuning adaptive control can be performed by updating the parameters with each sensor
measurement obtained by using Recursive Least Square Estimation (RLSE). In case of
simulations, the new data is obtained from the system’s dynamics. The RLSE developed in
Equation 8.21 is appropriate for discrete systems. However, a continuous version is needed
in order to implement the RLSE to update the parameters in the simulations of the adaptive
hybrid control. Therefore, Equations 8.24 and 8.25 are used in the implementation of the
algorithm in MATLAB. Program 21 is the MATLAB implementation of the function that
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Figure 8.30: The freeway segment density using the proposed Godunov-based control
vs. the existing ramp meter control
updates the system’s dynamics parameters using recursive least squares.
The plots in Figure 8.31 are the results when running the simulations at a very small gain,
initial density ρ0 = 10, and initial estimates of 0.8 ∗ vf and 0.9 ∗ vf/ρm. The plots in
Figure 8.32 are the results when running the simulations at initial density ρ0 = 50. The
plots in Figure 8.33 are the results when running the simulations at initial density ρ0 = 70.
As demonstrated in the ’Density using hybrid Control’ plot, the density converges to the
desired critical density that maximizes the flow. Even though, the initial estimates of the
parameters vf and vf/ρm were not accurate, it is demonstrated in the ’Free Flow’ and
’vf/rhom’ plots that they eventually converge to the actual parameters values.
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Program 21 Implementation of the hybrid self tuning regulator in MATLAB
function dx = NewRampControl(t, x)
vf = 70;
rhom = 86;
rhos = 43;
rhol = 20;
rhor = 20;
k=0.5;
fmax = vf*(1-rhos /rhom).*rhos;
umax = 0.75 * fmax;
rfout = Godunov(x(1),rhor);
rfin = Godunov(rhol,x(1));
fin = x(2).*rfin - x(3)* rfin^2;
fout = x(2).*rfout - x(3)* rfout^2;
up = fout - fin - k .* (x(1) - rhos);
case1 = up <= umax & up >= 0;
case2 = up > umax;
case3 = up < 0;
u = up * case1 + umax * case2 + 0 * case3;
y = x(1) * vf * (1- x(1)/rhom);
w1 = x(1);
w2 = -x(1)^2;
lambda = 10;
dx(1) = fin - fout + u;
dx(2) = (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (y-(w1 * x(2) + w2 * x(3)));
dx(3) = (w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (y-(w1 * x(2) + w2 * x(3)));
dx(4) = -(w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(6));
dx(5) = -(w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (w1 * x(5)+w2 * x(7));
dx(6) = -(w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(6));
dx(7) = -(w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (w1 * x(5)+w2 * x(7));
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Figure 8.31: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator, ρ0 = 10
0 20 40 60 80
42
44
46
48
50
t
rh
o
Density using Hybrid Control
0 20 40 60 80
9.4
9.6
9.8
10
10.2
x 10−4
t
P1
1
P11
0 20 40 60 80
56
56.2
56.4
56.6
56.8
t
vf
Free Flow speed using Hybrid Control
0 20 40 60 80
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
t
vf
/rh
om
vf/rhom
Figure 8.32: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator, ρ0 = 50
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Figure 8.33: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator, ρ0 = 70
8.8.4 Simulations of Exponential Forgetting of Parameters
In many scenarios, actual parameters of the modeled system can change over time due
to many factors such as environmental, or in other words the system has time varying
parameters [111]. In order to overcome this issue, exponential forgetting of parameters
can be used in self tuning regulators in order to give more weight to new measurements in
parameter estimation. Program 22 is the implementation of the hybrid self tuning regulator
with exponential parameter forgetting in MATLAB. This algorithm uses Equation 8.26 in
order to implement exponential forgetting.
The plots in Figure 8.34 are the results when running the simulations at a very small gain,
initial density of ρ0 = 10 and initial estimates of 0.8 ∗ vf and 0.9 ∗ vf/ρm. The plots
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Program 22 Implementation of the hybrid self tuning regulator with exponential
parameter forgetting in MATLAB
y = x(1) * vf * (1- x(1)/rhom);
w1 = x(1);
w2 = -x(1)^2;
lambda = 10;
dx(1) = fin - fout + u;
%with exponantial forgetting
dx(2) = (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (y-(w1 * x(2) + w2 * x(3)));
dx(3) = (w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (y-(w1 * x(2) + w2 * x(3)));
dx(4) = lambda * x(4)-(w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(6));
dx(5) = lambda * x(5)-(w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(5)) * (w1 * x(5)+w2 * x(7));
dx(6) = lambda * x(6)-(w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (w1 * x(4)+w2 * x(6));
dx(7) = lambda * x(7)-(w1 * x(6)+w2 * x(7)) * (w1 * x(5)+w2 * x(7));
dx = dx(:);
in Figure 8.35 are the results when running the simulations at a very small gain, initial
density of ρ0 = 50. The plots in Figure 8.36 are the results when running the simulations at
a very small gain, initial density of ρ0 = 70 As demonstrated in the ’Density using hybrid
Control’ plot, the density converges to the desired critical density that maximizes the flow.
Even though, the initial estimates of the parameters vf and vf/ρm were not accurate, it is
demonstrated in the ’Free Flow’ and ’vf/rhom’ plots that they eventually converge to the
actual parameters values.
When the results of self tuning regulator with exponential forgetting, Figures 8.34, 8.35, and
8.36 , are compared with results obtained from self tuning regulator without exponential
forgetting, Figures 8.31, 8.32, and 8.33, it is evident that the parameter updating does not
result in the same values. In self tuning regulator with exponential forgetting, the parameter
values are affected at a higher degree by the most recent measurements. For instance, at
ρ0 = 70 the ’vf’ plot in Figure 8.33,approximately 64, is closer to the vf initially calculated
which is 70. However, in self tuning with exponential forgetting, the ’vf’ plot in Figure
8.36 indicates vf estimation of less than 56, which is significantly less than the vf initially
calculated which is 70. This result is justified by noting that speed new measurements of
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Figure 8.34: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator with exponential forgetting- ρ0 = 10
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Figure 8.35: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator with exponential forgetting- ρ0 = 50
224
0 20 40 60
40
50
60
70
t
rh
o
Density using Hybrid Control
0 20 40 60
1.05
1.1
1.15
x 10−3
t
P1
1
P11
0 20 40 60
55.8
55.9
56
56.1
t
vf
Free Flow speed using Hybrid Control
0 20 40 60
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
t
vf
/rh
om
vf/rhom
Figure 8.36: The freeway segment density and parameters values based on the self
tuning regulator with exponential forgetting- ρ0 = 70
speed are low at initial density of 70 which close to jam density; with exponential forgetting,
new measurements weigh much more than old ones.
8.9 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presented a novel method for the feedback control design of an isolated ramp
based on space discretizing the hyperbolic distributed model for the traffic. The discretiza-
tion was performed using the Godunov method that has better nominal behavior represen-
tation of the dynamics than some other existing models in the literature. The Godunov
method renders the dynamics to be autonomously switched hybrid dynamics, which are
feedback linearized to obtain a feedback control asymptotically stabilizing ramp meter con-
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trol law. The study presented the theoretical derivation of the model and the control design.
Simulations were performed using the developed control scheme on the hybrid dynamics.
The simulation model was first validated then the control was applied. Various scenarios
were tested in order to cover all possible Godunov conditions at the boundary of the section.
The simulation results have demonstrated that the developed feedback control has excel-
lent performance under the various real life scenarios. A case study was conducted on the
North-bound Tropicana and Interstate 15, a major on-ramp. In this case study, data was
collected using FAST’s freeway sensors. The ramp-meter’s control strategy was obtained
as well. Parameters of the specific location were obtained from data using LSE as well
as RLSE. Then, simulations were performed comparing the Godunov based hybrid control
strategy proposed in this study and the existing control scheme. It was observed that if
there is enough demand at the ramp, then the density on the freeway segment reaches jam
density in a very short amount of time. On the other hand, the density of the freeway
gradually increases then stabilizes about the critical or desired density.
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Part VI
Conclusions and Future Work
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusions
9.1 Summary
Chapter 2 demonstrated incident management modeling using formal languages and au-
tomata theory. Formal languages methodology provides the ability to perform rigorous de-
bugging and analysis through which robustness of the Incident Management system can be
achieved upon implementation. This approach allows analysis to be conducted of processes
concurrently executed processes that have specifications for liveness and safety properties
specifications. The purpose of this approach is to model the traffic management processes
in various coordinating agencies and then to find out if undesirable situations, such as
“semaphores locking” exist. This method offers flexibility in modeling various Incident
Management systems that account for many possible existing scenarios. Formal modeling
can lead to the development of customized systems resulting in a more successful Incident
Management process. The approach studied in this study can be expanded to include a
wider range of resources for every process within the agencies as well as to model additional
agencies that might be involved in the Incident Management process. In addition, this
model can be enhanced to include real-time information within the states representing traf-
fic conditions or other continuous, random activities. Finally, real-time data and statistics
can be incorporated to support predictions and estimations.
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Using formal methods, modeling provides practical and accessible techniques that aid eval-
uating designs for concurrent software. The incident management process is composed of a
combination of sequential and concurrent events that are performed by multiple agencies.
Therefore, it is inevitable that incident management software must feature high level of
concurrency in its design. Formal methods are found to be very suitable and natural for
incident management modeling, from which incident management software can be devel-
oped. Using formal methods modeling and its associated features, such as concurrency and
property checking, can provide flexible and appropriate tools for software design, leading
to enhancement in communications, response, and management. From a practical point of
view, formal methods modeling as well as associated software are used in order to ensure
that the incident management process is well defined. The user - and in this case, the user
can be any of the responder agencies, the Department of Transportation, or any party that
has an active role in managing incidents - takes an active role in determining the structure
of the model and defining the desired safety and liveness properties.
Formal methods based approach is particularly useful for complex systems where high levels
of hierarchy and concurrency are required. Complex models can be built based on modular
structure. The software allows modular interaction through event sharing. This method
is also useful when quantification of qualitative procedures is needed. For instance, the
various Incident Management systems across the nation are evaluated based on the Incident
Command. However, the Incident Command system stands as a document that is described
qualitatively. This introduces challenges in achieving a common means of evaluation as well
as a common structure among the different IM systems.
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Chapter 3 compares the flow detector volume data to manual counted traffic video volume
data. Since, traffic videos can have varying levels of clarity depending on different factors
such as the angle, distance, occlusion, and clarity due to environment, a new technique for
statistical analysis for comparison was developed. This technique used clarity ratings of the
manual counters. Analysis was performed to obtain a model relating the rating numbers
to consistency variation, which was then used for paired t-test for final comparison. This
technique was used on data collected and the results were presented.
In Chapter 4 the classical reliability approaches were introduced, variability based on nor-
malized standard deviation, analysis of Variance ANOVA, travel time mean estimation,
reliability as a measure of non-failures, and information theory based approach. These
methos were applied to the I-15 corridor in Las Vegas. Two types of analysis were con-
ducted, day-to-day and within the day reliability, on the DMS data obtained from FAST
using the six proposed methods. It was found that that these measures are not always
consistent when compared.
In Chapter 5, it was found that information theory provides a direct measure of uncertainty
from which the reliability measure can be easily derived. To indicate variability, classical
reliability measures mainly use statistical variance as well as its different forms. There is
no doubt that these measures somewhat represent certainty; however, the proposed entropy
based reliability considers not only variance but also all statistical moments of a probability
density function. This follows from the fact that the entropy formulation uses the probabil-
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ity density function as a whole in order to extract the certainty associated with the travel
time.
Chapter 6 demonstrated measuring the reliability of networked roadway segments. In this
study it is found that the algebraic structure of the reliability of a network is consistent
with the semi-ring min-plus algebraic structure. This provides us with well established
properties that can simplify the algebra over networks’ reliability. This study discovers the
structure of the algebraic space when reliability is measured for a network.
In Chapter 7, a Bayesian Safety Analyzer (BSA) is constructed based on various data
sources including crash data and traffic data. It is demonstrated how posterior probabili-
ties can be computed and how data can be used to train the Bayesian structure composed of
a large amount of parameters. Bayesian analysis is proved to be a very efficient probabilis-
tic method for analyzing a large set of data in order to better estimate dependencies and
likelihood of occurrence of various events. The developed BSA can be used in the incident
management process. It can assist decision makers in estimating the severity of a certain
incident based on given attributes in order to better prepare. BSA can also be used in order
to assess the transportation system’s safety.
Chapter 8 presented a novel method for the feedback control design of an isolated ramp
based on space discretizing the hyperbolic distributed model for the traffic. The discretiza-
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tion was performed using the Godunov method that has better nominal behavior represen-
tation of the dynamics than some other existing models in the literature. The Godunov
method renders the dynamics to be autonomously switched hybrid dynamics, which are
feedback linearized to obtain a feedback control asymptotically stabilizing ramp meter con-
trol law. The study presented the theoretical derivation of the model and the control design.
Simulations were performed using the developed control scheme on the hybrid dynamics.
The simulation model was first validated then the control was applied. Various scenarios
were tested in order to cover all possible Godunov conditions at the boundary of the section.
The simulation results have demonstrated that the developed feedback control has excel-
lent performance under the various real life scenarios. A case study was conducted on the
North-bound Tropicana and Interstate 15, a major on-ramp. In this case study, data was
collected using FAST’s freeway sensors. The ramp-meter’s control strategy was obtained
as well. Parameters of the specific location were obtained from data using LSE as well
as RLSE. Then, simulations were performed comparing the Godunov based hybrid control
strategy proposed in this study and the existing control scheme. It was observed that if
there is enough demand at the ramp, then the density on the freeway segment reaches jam
density in a very short amount of time. On the other hand, the density of the freeway
gradually increases then stabilizes about the critical or desired density.
9.2 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation work are listed below.
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9.2.1 Modeling
• Formal Language Modeling of Incident Management: Formal language and
automata theory is used for modeling, analyzing, and implementing traffic incident
management process.
• Hybrid Modeling of a freeway on-ramp: Godunov based conditions are used in
determining boundary conditions of the hyperbolic PDE used in modeling traffic flow
on a freeway section.
9.2.2 Sensing
• Detector Validation: A weighted t- statistics developed in order to compare a set
of uncertain data with another set of uncertain data with various levels of uncertainty.
9.2.3 State Estimation
• Hybrid Estimation: Estimation techniques are developed in order to estimate from
the data the time of occurrence of various events such as the time of incident and the
time of incident clearance.
9.2.4 Performance Analysis
• Reliability Theory: Average travel time is a good indicator of the performance of
a highway segment or a transportation network in general. However, by itself, it lacks
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information about the overall performance of the transportation system. Hence, for
proper assessment of the transportation system’s performance, this research developes
and uses five different reliability measures for freeway and arterials in Las Vegas:
variability based on normalized standard deviation, analysis of variance (ANOVA),
average time mean estimation, reliability as a measure of non-failures, and information
theory.
• Entropy Based Reliability: A novel travel time reliability is developed that is
based on measuring the uncertainty of travel time from data.
• Network Reliability: Max-plus algebra is proposed in order to extend the reliability
measure of a component to network reliability.
• Bayesian Networks: A Bayesian network is a probabilistic model which represents
relationships between uncertain variables and can be used as a framework for various
applications. This research develops a Bayesian traffic safety analyzer using crash
data and other surrogate information to estimate risks at various locations.
9.2.5 Control
• Hybrid Ramp Control:A hybrid control scheme is developed in order to maintain
a given freeway segment at certain desired conditions.
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9.3 Future Work
There are many areas of this dissertation that can be enhanced by further research. These
are listed below. Formal methods modeling of incident management will be extended to
hybrid modeling in future work. Future work can also include developing algorithms in
order to automate data formatting from multiple sources into one file that integrates all
required data and feeds into the developed BSA. In the future, the minimal path problem
using a probabilistic approach based on failure analysis will be considered. Dependency of
roadway links is a major issue that will also be considered in future studies of reliability.
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